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International Relations suffers from underspecified treatments of culture that risk 
reifying, essentializing, or ignoring the effects of cultural differences in the conduct of 
relationships between states. Following a review of the development of the culture 
concept, this interpretivist, epistemologically critical realist, dissertation introduces 
intercultural adaptive frameshifting from the intercultural communication literature. To 
assess whether culture has effect within an epistemic community, four frameworks are 
evaluated within a non-IR field (global Christian reasoning). Speech act theory is used to 
assess meaningful affect through illocutionary and/or perlocutionary divergence based on 
cultural difference. 
Following the findings that such cultural differences do in fact matter in the non-
International Relations epistemic community, the culture concept is brought back into IR 
through three case studies employing most-similar and most-different case design. 
Counterfactual analysis is used to assess the potential for intercultural competence, 
exercised by one foreign policy executive in each dyadic case, to impact the conduct of 
international relations at a critical juncture brought about by cultural difference. Through 
process tracing, and particularly through practice tracing, culture is found to 
meaningfully affect the conduct of international relations, and intercultural adaptive 
frame-shifting (also called intercultural competence or intercultural development) is 
found to attenuate the effects.  
The findings of this dissertation are intentionally tentative, and primarily take the 
form of passing the hoop-test. This program of research points to the need for more 
iii 
 
robust consideration of the culture concept in International Relations. It does not supplant 
existing paradigms, but could easily come alongside and be used within Neoclassical 
Realism, Constructivism, and some strands of Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism. 
The findings are meaningful for practice as well as theory, as intercultural competence is 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Contemporary international relations (IR), ranging from bilateral negotiations to 
multilateral organizations, minimize cultural differences as an important limit on 
complexity. This minimization of such cultural differences facilitates communication and 
the conduct of IR, in part through the development of a unique third culture – especially 
within institutions. However, the principal cost of such minimization is that underlying 
epistemological, ontological, and cosmological differences persist in unrecognized and 
therefore uncounted ways and affect the ultimate success or failure of such relations and 
institutions. 
Some authors have successfully drawn attention to cultural factors in international 
institutions and international relations, and the reviews of that strain of the relevant 
literature by Lantis (2002, 2014) are particularly useful. Yet cultural analysis has not 
been effectively integrated into the political science mainstream. Challenges abound, 
including the following hurdles: 
1. The squishiness of the subject of culture – which is in part based on its processual 
rather than static nature (Putz, Schmitz, and Walch 2014). 
2. The fact that levels of analysis are very difficult to navigate at the intersection 
between culture and political science. 
3. The difficulty, from a practitioner’s perspective, to tell what benefit the 
observations of strategic culture could actually bring to the conduct of 
international relations; while the purist (what Lustick might call early Lakatos) 
might reject the importance of this concern, Lustick (1997) points out that late 
Lakatos indicates the need for theory to be carried forward entrepreneurially – and 
if no one sees a benefit to a theory, it has little chance of gaining cachet. 
In the attempt to inquire about the depth of cultural differences, it is useful to have 
in mind the question of why such differences might matter. Culturally variant 
interpretations of shared texts and experiences is an area of particular interest for this 
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project. For example, consider the importance divergent readings of the United Nations’ 
(UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) could cause. A senior member of 
a prestigious international award-granting institution once remarked to this author that 
culture was an excuse used by bad faith actors to persist in human rights abuses while 
proclaiming faithfulness to the UDHR. This is an understandable political reading of the 
situation. What if, in fact, deeper epistemological, ontological, and cosmological 
preunderstandings (Julian 2010) mean that various actors might actually interpret the 
same text(s) differently? The question is, in part, a hermeneutical one, which raises an 
important framing discussion regarding whether it “should” matter whether the readings 
are different – something about which positivists, phenomenologists, and critical realists 
disagree. However, the question of what should matter and what does matter do not 
always align (and indeed is based on deeper normative assumptions anyway). 
Significance of the Study 
More than 30 years ago, Sagan (1988, 12) offered the following unction: “Today 
there is an urgent, practical necessity to work together on arms control, on the world 
economy, on the global environment. It is clear that the nations of the world now can 
only rise and fall together. It is not a question of one nation winning at the expense of 
another. We must all help one another or all perish together.” Since then, Germany 
reunified in 1990 and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991; Rwanda, Serbia, and Myanmar 
have experienced ethnic cleansing; and the United States suffered the terrorist attacks 
carried out by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 and has been involved in two wars 
against Iraq as well as its longest-ever conflict (against the insurgent Islamist extremists 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan). Within the 32 years since Sagan spoke, the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization (NATO) has enlarged six times, most recently in 2020; Hong Kong 
was transferred from British to Chinese rule in 1997; there were currency crises in Asia 
and Europe; and Sudan has been split in two. This same time frame saw the revolts of the 
Arab Spring in 2010–2011 and the now eight-plus years of civil war in Syria, which 
sparked one of the largest humanitarian and refugee crises in recent history from 2015–
2018. 
Meanwhile, the world finds itself now with nine nuclear states, many of which 
employ different strategies from one another (Bracken 2012; Narang 2014). International 
organizations have seen new pressures—as in the departure of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union (Brexit) in 2020—and have experienced various threats placed 
against them by leaders such as U.S. President Donald J. Trump, who among other things 
defunded the World Health Organization in the midst of a pandemic. Indeed, the 
interdependence of the contemporary world has been demonstrated anew amidst the 
COVID-19 outbreak, which has shown both the strengths and weaknesses of such 
interdependence. Surely in such a context the capacity for people of different 
backgrounds to arrive at shared understandings means that “culture is a concept we 
cannot do without” (Gaenslen 1997, 277). 
Problem Statement 
This brief recap of the last 32 years omits many natural and human disasters, but 
what it makes clear is that in such a world, the capacity of international actors to achieve 
shared meaning is of incredible importance. The world is significantly internationalized, 
and yet the effect cultural difference has on international relations is poorly understood 
(Avruch 1998; Lantis 2002, 2014). One of the main reasons for this is that “cultural 
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analysis is intrinsically incomplete” (Geertz 1977, 29). The question of how to apply the 
difficult concept of culture to international relations (IR) is not novel – reflecting on IR 
and international communication Sadri and Flammia (2011) describe the problem well: 
In an increasingly interdependent world, realities demonstrate that neither IR nor 
communication have exclusive domain over the subfield of intercultural 
communication. . . . One major challenge is that neither discipline has integrated 
the concepts, theories, and methods of both fields to provide a comprehensive 
perspective on intercultural puzzles. . . . Last, but not least, the majority of 
communication and IR studies focus mainly on either individual, group, national, 
or global level of analysis and ignore the interactions among different actors at the 
different levels of a study. These shortcomings do not allow us to understand the 
real nature of intercultural conflicts, to identify the main elements of such 
intercultural challenges, and to avoid the pitfalls or to offer relevant solutions to 
address them. (Sadri and Flammia 2011, xi) 
Purpose of the Study 
Given the problems in studying culture, this dissertation endeavors to demonstrate 
that cultural differences are real, pervasive, persistent, very deep, and that they have 
significant effects on the conduct of IR. Thus, the initial goal is to demonstrate that 
cultures can vary to a greater extent than has been commonly imagined by authors of 
strategic culture within the field of IR. However, it is also the intention of this project to 
address the question of culture in a way that removes it from the shackles of reification 
and essentialism, while simultaneously opening the door to more practically useful 
approaches to cultural inquiry and intercultural interaction. By taking seriously the depth 
of differences between cultures, the move from a traits-based approach to culture to a 
constructivist approach to culture becomes both intellectually and practically useful and 
appropriate (M. J. Bennett 2013). 
The findings of this dissertation may be very important for the conduct of 
international relations. Consider the case of an illocutionary or perlocutionary misfire 
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between actors of states as proposed above. If the reason for the misfire is due to cultural 
factors outside of the actors’ awareness(es), and if attention could be brought to such 
factors, it would be important to do so. Alternative explanations may have damaging 
consequences. For example, if the explanation given is that “the other actor is a bad faith 
actor,” this can have significant ramifications in the conduct of international relations. On 
the other hand, being perceived as a bad faith actor when one believes oneself to be a 
good faith actor can itself have significant ramifications. As an example, if two states 
agree on the locution of the UDHR, but due to cultural preunderstandings arrive at 
distinctly different perceptions of illocutions or perlocutions, they might both believe 
themselves to be in compliance while accusing the other of violations of human rights. 
There, of course, are bad faith actors, and this project in no way intends to simply explain 
these away. Rather, the intent is to clarify whether culture may be an “invisible factor” 
and to make it (more) visible if indeed it is there. 
If culture matters in international relations, this dissertation should identify a path 
forward in determining how and why. By approaching the topic “from the side” rather 
than merely building on top of the stalled-out culture/IR nexus, there is greater potential 
to contribute to an important but underdeveloped conversation. 
Specification of Research Questions 
As noted above, it has been suggested by some scholars that culture is merely an 
excuse for bad behavior by nefarious state actors. The counter-suggestion made by this 
project is that the attempt to argue whether “convenient” interpretations of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, or other shared documents, are merely political in nature 
cannot be effectively pursued without reference to the question of whether, in fact, the 
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documents themselves might be interpreted differently due to cultural-perceptual issues. 
The effects of such differences when armed conflict is a potential outcome are of exigent 
interest. It is understandable but lamentable that Jervis (1976, 8) intentionally omitted 
cultural difference1 from considerations of perception and misperception. If Jervis is 
accurate in arguing that even aside from cultural differences misperception can abound 
between actors, then this could be much more the case if the very grounds on which 
interpretation takes place differs between actors. Thus, it is not only intellectually 
stimulating but also a matter of real-world interest to discover whether such differences 
do in fact exist and impact actors’ interactions with the world. This gives rise to the 
primary research question and a related question of implication: 
Q1: Do cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of actors from different 
cultures to arrive at shared meanings of shared texts and events? 
 
Q2: Does the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 matter in the conduct 
of international relations?  
If such differences do matter, the question of how this insight is a practical one 
becomes salient. Intercultural adaptation has been proposed as “the entire process of 
generating an expanded repertoire of behavior supported by an alternative worldview” 
(M. J. Bennett 2013, 83). Bennett explains that this capacity differs significantly from 
assimilation and is an alternative to it: “Adaptation involves the extension of one’s 
repertoire of beliefs and behavior, not a substitution of one set for another. So people 
don’t need to lose their primary cultural identities to operate effectively in a different 
cultural context” (96). This last point is particularly important if adaptation is to have any 
 
1 In his second edition (2017), Jervis acknowledges (in the preface) the potential impact of culture but 
nonetheless maintains the stance of his original volume: “I have ignored two well-known approaches to the 
study of perceptions—cultural differences and ego psychology. I have instead found it fruitful to look for 
patterns of misperception that occur within a shared culture . . .” (8). 
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utility for IR – it will simply not do to encourage those who conduct foreign policy to 
utilize intercultural adaptation if it requires them to assimilate to some other culture. The 
results of assimilative policy might well be understood as traitorous. Instead, adaptation 
offers a solution in which foreign policy could be conducted in a way that increases 
understanding of the other while also maintaining identity firmly within one’s own 
culture. Thus, Q3 is added to the first two questions to suggest the possibility of practical 
implications of the research: 
Q3: Does intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which such 
differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
Hypotheses 
The first two questions are taken together, to form the basis of a hypothesis (H1), which 
is then brought into the IR discipline as H2: 
H1: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and events. 
 
H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
Importantly, the hypothesis is not that cultural differences preclude culturally different 
actors from arriving at shared meanings but rather that their ability to arrive at such 
meaning is materially affected by such differences. The third question, in turn, becomes 
the foundation of H3: 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation meaningfully affects changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
This dissertation does not use a null hypothesis as it is conducted from an 
interpretivist and constructivist research frame rather than a positivist one (Martin, 
Nakayama, and Flores 2001; Berg and Lune 2012; Allan 2016). While Popperian 
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falsifiability is an important goal in positivist frames, it is not appropriate for this 
research, as the epistemological stance taken here is critical realism (Collier 1994). One 
of the primary tools for investigating the hypotheses will be process tracing, which 
provides a way to qualitatively assess the validity of the hypothesis without the use of a 
null hypothesis (A. Bennett 2010). 
Study Area 
If this research is successful, it may contribute to several different literatures. 
First, and most directly intended, this dissertation is expected to present a way forward 
for the stalled study of culture in international relations literatures – particularly including 
strategic culture. Civilizational studies may also benefit through the development of a 
new language for describing the ways in which groups of people (at different levels of 
analysis) can vary culturally. The international communication literature has largely 
ignored the deeper elements of culture and may be assisted through the application of a 
new framework. 
Interculturalist literature also stands to benefit by demonstrating ways in which 
that messy and eclectic field could demonstrate its relevance to international relations 
(and perhaps political science more generally). The constructivist strain of intercultural 
development theory may be particularly well connected to this project, as deep and 
subjective semiotic constructs may feature in this research. If so, the usefulness of the 
intercultural development and adaptation approach may be seen. Finally, the literature of 
global Christian theology may stand to gain from this research, as a new type of analysis 




There are several important limitations in this project. First, the goal is not to 
describe any particular culture, although cultural frameworks will be assigned in the case 
studies. Second, the goal of this project is not to suggest that cultures are unchanging or 
static (Martin, Nakayama, and Flores 2001). Third, this project will not result in 
predictive modeling of how particular cultures might interpret and/or apply a text. Fourth, 
despite the use of GCR, this project does not intend to privilege Christian interpretations 
of the world over others but rather uses these to demonstrate difference. 
Organization of the Study 
The research proposed above will involve several distinct phases. First, the 
culture concept will be considered in the thorough review of the relevant literature on that 
topic in Chapter Two, including intercultural competence as described in the 
Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (M. J. Bennett 1986, 2013). Following 
this, the chapter presents review of the relevant literature addressing approaches to 
culture within International Relations. The cultural frameworks identified in this proposal 
must be defined from the literature. 
Chapter Three involves an in-depth explanation of the methodology to be 
employed. As a brief preview, the basic program of this dissertation is proposed as 
follows: 
1. Identify several cultural differences, which might matter within international 
relations. 
2. Investigate these differences within a non-IR research frame – Global Christian 
Reasoning (GCR). 




4. Apply any remaining differences to three IR case studies and assess H1 and H2 
through process tracing and counterfactual analysis. 
For the first three steps, literature must be selected from GCR in order for the 
analysis to be completed. A systematic analysis of that sample must be undertaken, 
applying the cultural frameworks to phenomena discussed in the GCR text. The results of 
the systematic analysis must be applied to Q2 and H1 using speech act theory. Fifth, this 
information must be brought forward and applied to the counterfactual case studies so 
that their validity is evaluated. Finally, the utility of intercultural adaptation will be 
assessed through the case studies. There is no involvement of human subjects in the 
research, which is accomplishable using written records alone. 
Chapter Four presents the results and discussion of the GCR analysis. Chapter 
Five is comprised of the three counterfactual case studies. Analysis will be completed in 
Chapter Six, and Chapter Seven presents the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW2 
Culture is a complicated topic, but its study is of exigent interest: “Culture, with 
its processes and functions, is a subject upon which we need all the enlightenment we can 
achieve” (Benedict 1934, 18). For this reason, the literature review features the following 
sections. First, the term culture is defined and discussed through the following steps: (1) a 
brief history of the term from 1871–1963, primarily as addressed in important books 
during that century; (2) a brief history of the evolution of the term from 1972–2015, again 
primarily as discussed in important books during that half-century (the section includes 
the turn to intercultural communication); (3) a look at attempts to define culture; (4) a 
consideration of cultural values constructs; (5) a consideration of particular values 
constructs; (6) an examination of other cultural variations; (7) a brief overview of how 
cultural differences and intercultural communication intersect; (8) and, finally, an 
introduction to intercultural competence. Following this treatment of the culture concept, 
the literature review turns to an examination of culture in international relations, 
including (1) international communication; (2) civilizational studies; (3) intercultural 
communication and diplomacy; (4) culture within international relations; and (5) 
perception and misperception. The conclusion includes consideration of how this 
dissertation contributes to the existing literature. 
The understanding of the word culture, as approached in this dissertation, is a 
relatively recent etymological development. The first noted use of the word in this sense 
was in 1860 (“Culture, n.” 2020). Older meanings of the word, related to the cultivation 
 
2 Elements of this section originally appeared in Jones, Stephen W. “The Impact of Culture on Perceptual 
and Communication Processes in International Relations.” In The Pacific Century?, 1–82. Hong Kong: 
International Studies Association, 2017. 
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of land (as early as 1450) or worship (1483) (“Culture, n.” 2020) may be linked to the 
contemporary understanding, but it is not inconsequential that the word in its present 
usage only carries a century and a half of development. While the notion has earlier 
origins in French and German, the complex picture emerging in the nineteenth century is 
the most relevant (n.b., the sense of culture in this project is compatible with Oxford 
English Dictionary’s branch III, sense 7): 
The sense development of the word in branch III. from the 19th cent. onwards is 
very complex; the term is frequently distinguished from civilization n. (and to 
some extent also from society n.), although the precise distinctions made differ 
greatly. In one important tradition originating in Germany in the 18th cent., the 
term is used to denote the (perceived) state of development of the intellectual life 
of a society (compare sense 6), but this was challenged (already before the end of 
the 18th cent. by the German philosopher Herder) by another (countable) use with 
reference to the ideas, customs, etc. of a society or of a group within a society 
(compare sense 7); this has frequently been used in the context of rejection of 
normative or hierarchical conceptions of the development of society, and hence 
with loss of the previously transparent connection with earlier senses at branch 
III. (“Culture, n.” 2020) 
 
This complex picture, in which it is unclear whether culture refers to civilization, 
society, intellectual life, customs, and/or ideas is one of the reasons that culture is such an 
intellectually and theoretically challenging concept in the field of political science in 
particular. Yet this does not mean that the concept has no utility, rather that its intended 
use must be specified with care, as it is attended by a number of difficulties (Avruch 
1998, 6), ranging from definition to application. 
The Culture Concept 
A Brief History of the Study of Culture (1871–1963) 
Although the study of culture as currently understood is relatively new, White 
(1949) argues that it is in fact a very old phenomenon: “Ever since the earliest days of 
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human history local groups of people have been distinguished from one another by 
differences in speech, custom, belief, and costume…” (xvii; emphasis added). While the 
contemporary study of culture is new, White suggests Herodotus (in the fifth century BC) 
was a forerunner in this study, making observations of cultural differences potentially 
quite an ancient practice. Indeed, old texts such as the Judeo-Christian scriptures bear 
witness to and make observations about the emergence of and differences between 
groups. However, White observes that the rise of contemporary cultural inquiry was 
borne out of the failings of (the also relatively recent) academic disciplines of sociology 
and social psychology, which “worked out general principles of a science of social 
behavior” but were too limited in that they either did not describe cultural differences or 
assumed Western culture(s) to be the standard for all humanity (1949, xvii). 
White identifies Tylor ([1871] 1873) as the forerunner of the modern study of 
culture. Tylor, who used culture and civilization interchangeably, identified the concept 
“in its wide ethnographic sense” as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, 
belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as 
a member of society” (3). Tylor also gave voice to the no longer accepted idea that 
cultures evolved from primitive to complex societies (p. 6 and throughout). Of course, 
evolutionary thinking was very much in the zeitgeist at that time, and Tylor apologizes 
for insufficiently incorporating Darwin. These early issues – the question of the meaning 
of the culture concept and its relation to other fields of inquiry, whether it is 
interchangeable with civilization, and whether cultures evolve from class to class – 
remain relevant even today. 
 
14 
Some 50 years later, Sapir (1921, 207) argued that racial purists would not be 
encouraged by the evidence concerning the distribution of race, linguistic, and cultural 
classifications. Observing the intersection of these phenomena, Sapir contends that 
“language, race, and culture are not necessarily correlated. This does not mean that they 
never are” (215). While Sapir acknowledged that racial and cultural lines could 
“correspond to linguistic ones,” there was both important variation (215). Sapir observed 
that “culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks” (233). It is fascinating to 
observe that while Sapir negated necessarily causal links from language to culture (in that 
direction) in 1921, he is also known for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which runs in the 
opposing direction, advanced most directly by his student Whorf (1940). 
Boaz, in the introduction to Benedict’s (1934, xiv) Patterns of Culture, observed a 
shift in the study of culture, as any “attempt to conceive a whole culture as controlled by 
a single set of conditions” was insufficient. This meant that “the purely anthropo-
geographical, economic, or in other ways formalistic approach seemed to give distorted 
pictures” (xiv). Thus, as early as 1934, a processual (rather than trait-based or fixed) 
understanding of culture emerges. This leads Boaz to describe the circumstance in which 
“we must understand the individual as living in his culture; and the culture as lived by 
individuals”; and revealing the importance of process in understanding culture (xiv.). 
In the pages that followed Boaz’s comments, Benedict (1934, 14) argues that 
“what really binds men together is their culture” over and above race, which she 
deconstructed; she explained culture as “the ideas and the standards [people in groups] 
have in common.” Benedict employs both the ideas of cultural values (p. 15) as well as 
forms and processes (15). She bucks “modern science” to suggest that “the whole . . . is 
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not merely the sum of all its parts, but the result of a unique arrangement and interrelation 
of the parts that has brought about a new entity” (42). While she embraced Malinowski’s 
traits-in-context approach, she rebuked his attempts to generalize these discoveries from a 
particular context to the whole world or to a whole class of humanity. 
Instead, Benedict creates a framework for culture, which she calls configuration, 
borrowing from Gestalt psychologists (1934, 47). These configurations result in the 
selection of “some segment of the arc of possible human behaviour, and in so far as it 
achieves integration its institutions tend to further the expression of its selected segment 
and to inhibit opposite expressions” (234). However, she also observes that individuals 
will always vary in relation to their own integration of those values, thus allowing for 
variance within a culture. 
In his reprinted 1941 article, Malinowski (1944, 3) acknowledges that one of the 
problems with the study of anthropology (and cultural anthropology) was that the 
attendant subfields “come dangerously near other legitimate fields of social and natural 
sciences: psychology, history, archeology, sociology and anatomy.” Very much unlike 
other some of the authors reviewed here, Malinowski was a proponent of racial 
classifications and the correlation of the “physical type with the cultural creativeness of a 
race” (5). Yet, perhaps counterintuitively, Malinowski appears to argue for something 
approaching the psychic unity of man, noting, “We shall be able to show that some 
realities which seem very strange at first sight are essentially cognate to very universal 
and fundamentally human cultural elements;” such a finding enables “the description in 
familiar terms, of exotic customs” (41). Malinowski defined culture thus: 
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It obviously is the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers’ goods, 
of constitutional charters for the various social groups, of human ideas and crafts, 
beliefs and customs. Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or an 
extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, 
partly material, partly human and partly spiritual, by which man is able to cope 
with the concrete, specific problems that face him. (Malinowski 1944, 36) 
 
In 1944, Benedict was tasked by the United States Office of War Information with 
making the invisible elements of Japanese culture visible (Benedict [1946] 2005). One of 
the most important themes to emerge from this work was the distinction between shame 
and guilt cultures (222ff.), which is where one of the frameworks that come into focus in 
later chapters of this dissertation originated. 
A few years later, White was again working to characterize the nature of culture. 
The understanding of culture as a free-flowing process both historically and laterally, is at 
least as old as White, who stated: 
Culture may be considered, from the standpoint of scientific analysis and 
interpretation, as a thing sui generis, as a class of events and processes that 
behaves in terms of its own principles and laws and which consequently can be 
explained only in terms of its own elements and processes. Culture may thus be 
considered as a self-contained, self-determined process; one that can only be 
explained in terms of itself. (White 1949, xviii) 
 
Against Malinowski, White argued that environmental determinism is insufficient for the 
origins of culture (xix). It is also interesting for the purposes of the present dissertation 
that the culture concept has lost cachet at other historical junctures as well (xix). 
The observed change in cultural groups over time also intrigued Mead (1955, 7), 
who asks, “How can technical change be introduced with such regard for the culture 
pattern that human values are preserved?” and suggests, “It is necessary to think about 
these patterns, these changes, and these considered attempts to protect the mental health 
of a world population in transition.” In some ways this is an opposite approach to the 
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questions engaged by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who asked 50 years later which 
cultural patterns were correlated with development. Mead suggests that culture “is a 
systematic and integrated whole” (12) and applies it as follows: Culture is 
an abstraction from the body of learned behaviour which a group of people who 
share the same tradition transmit entire to their children, and, in part, to adult 
immigrants who become members of the society. It covers not only the arts and 
sciences, religions and philosophies, to which the word ‘culture’ has historically 
applied, but also the system of technology, the political practices, the small 
intimate habits of daily life, such as the way of preparing or eating food, or of 
hushing a child to sleep, as well as the method of electing a prime minister or 
changing the constitution. (Mead 1955, 12–13) 
 
Despite what might be described as a culture as everything approach, Mead does 
clarify the particular importance cultural values. She expects that the application of 
culture to both policy and technical change will be distinctly practical. At the same time 
her rich descriptions of culture might well explain Waltz’s (1954, 52) response to Mead’s 
unction to study and learn from cultures: “We had better pause to ask what all this is for.” 
However, his rejoinder is not her answer to it, and indeed she clarifies that this is indeed a 
practical area of inquiry (Mead 1955, 16ff.). 
Hall (1959, xiii) observes that “most Americans are only dimly aware” of culture 
– that is, the “ ‘silent language’ even though they use it every day.” He also observes that 
problems with intercultural communication “are seldom seen for what they are. When it 
becomes apparent to people of different countries that they are not understanding one 
another, each tends to blame ‘those foreigners,’ for their stupidity, deceit, or craziness” 
(xiii). Hall suggests five steps for analyzing culture: 
1. To identify the building blocks of culture–what we later came to call the isolates 
of culture, akin to the notes in a musical score.  
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2. To tie these isolates into a biological base so that they could be compared among 
cultures. We also stipulated that this comparison be done in such a way that the 
conditions be repeatable at will. . . . 
3. To build up a body of data and a methodology that would enable us to conduct 
research and teach each cultural situation in much the same way that language is 
taught without having to depend upon such qualities as “empathy” in the 
researcher.  
4. To build a unified theory of culture that would lead us to further research.  
5. Finally, to find a way to make our discipline tangibly useful to the non-specialist. 
(Hall 1959, 27) 
As can be observed by this program, Hall seems to operate in an essentially 
positivist frame, even claiming (in step two) that “without this [repeatability], 
anthropology can lay no claim to being a science.” Compared to the processual nature of 
culture noted by Benedict (1934), Hall’s emphasis on isolates and de-emphasis on 
empathy appear to be a critical juncture in the development of the culture idea – two 
directions which Bennett decidedly rejects only a few decades later (M. J. Bennett 1986, 
1998). 
Hall delivers on this endeavor through the development of what he called the 










10. exploration (Hall 1959, 38–39, ff.) 
 
3 Hall (1959) defines each of these systems in detail on pages 39ff. However, it should be noted that 
bisexuality here does not indicate attraction to both sexes, as it does in contemporary parlance. Instead, Hall 
refers to what would today be called gender roles, gender norms, and gender expression. 
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Hall then goes on to examine the interactions between these isolates (esp. 196–97) and 
remarks, “By way of summary, it is important to remember that culture is not one thing 
but a complex series of activities interrelated in many ways, activities with origins deeply 
buried in a past when there were no cultures and no men” (58). Significantly, for the 
question of cultural values, Hall relates these to the Primary Message Systems and 
suggests that all cultures have developed values in regards to these systems (189).4 
White, in the preface to his Evolution of Culture argues that the anthropologist 
Boaz led the attack upon cultural evolutionism (1959, vii). White indicates that non- and 
anti-cultural evolutionist perspectives peaked in the 1920s under Malinowski’s 
leadership. However, White endeavors to revive the evolutionary approach to culture. He 
begins by arguing that “man and culture originated simultaneously; this by definition” (5; 
his definition is presented later in this chapter). Importantly, White appears to reject a 
racial evolution within the human species (11–12). In discussing the distinctions between 
groups, he observes,  
We do know that the influence of culture upon the behavior of peoples is so 
powerful, so overriding, that we may be sure that such temperamental differences 
as may exist among peoples is slight and insignificant in comparison. And there is 
good reason to believe that the phenomena, or qualities, called temperament are 
 
4 Hall (1959) presents an eight-point schema for social scientists (191–92). These are partially reproduced 
here: “1. Culture is communication and communication is culture. 2. Culture is not one thing, but many. 
There is no one basic unit or elemental particle, no single isolate for all culture. There are at least ten bases 
for culture, all deeply rooted in the biological past, that satisfy the rigid criteria imposed by using a 
linguistic model for culture. 3. The study of institutions and their structure and the study of the individual 
and his psychological makeup are excluded from the specific study of culture as it is used here, although 
they are involved in it on a higher organizational level. 4. Man operates on three different levels: the 
formal, informal, and technical. Each is present in any situation, but one will dominate at any given instant 
in time. The shifts from level to level are rapid, and the study of these shifts is the study of the process of 
change. 5. Culture is concerned more with messages than it is with networks and control systems. . . . 7. 
There is also a principle of relativity in culture, just as there is in physics and mathematics. Experience is 
something man projects on the outside world as he gains it in its culturally determined form. Man alters 
experience by living. There is no experience independent of culture against which culture can be measured. 
8. Cultural indeterminacy and cultural relativity are not easy concepts for the layman to grasp. . . .” 
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not innate, or biologically determined, at all, but are produced by cultural 
influence. (White 1959, 12) 
 
Compared to the racial evolution of a century prior, White’s (1959) cultural 
typology is progressive. Perhaps one of the most striking observations White makes is 
built on the distinction between culture and cultures. The former refers to the whole of 
humanity, the latter enables reference to a particular “tribe, nation, or region” sometimes 
through adding the article “a” as in a culture. He then goes on to observe that “the culture 
of mankind in actuality is a one, a single system; all the so-called cultures are merely 
distinguishable portions of a single fabric. The culture of mankind as a whole may be 
conserved temporarily as a flowing stream, or nontemporally as a system, or both, i.e., as 
a system in a temporal continuum” (17). Intriguingly, while describing culture as 
processual, White endeavors to lock down the process by means of evidently positivist 
framings, such as “T (Sb  Pr  D) → society or social system” (20).5 This general 
trajectory does lead to an approach to culture in which some are viewed as higher and 
thus, whether implicit or explicit, some as lower; this is an idea which becomes important 
for modernization theorists and problematized through dependency theorists (e.g., 
Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978). 
Hall, whose 1959 schema for social scientists is presented in Table 2, provides the 
useful example of the difficulty of interpreting behavior in an unfamiliar country, relying 
specifically on a pattern of bargaining: 
If people can recognize a pattern, it doesn’t much matter what specific events they 
perceive. These can, in fact, be quite different and still be part of the same pattern, 
just as houses are still houses even though made of different materials. 
 
5 White explains the formula: “in which the technological factor, T, exercised and expressed in the tools 
and processes of subsistence, Sb, protection from the elements, Pr, and defense from enemies, D, 
determines the social system” (White 1959, 20). 
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Throughout the Middle East, for example, bargaining is an underlying pattern 
which is significantly different from the activity which goes under that name in 
our culture. Yet what is perceived on the surface (i.e., Arab methods of 
bargaining) looks familiar and is assumed to be the same. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. (Hall 1959, 106–7) 
 
Hall 1959 goes on to identify errors of value judgments and errors of classification that 
are problematic precisely because they are based on patterns that are taken for granted. 
But how then to study such patterns? Hall suggests an approach focused on principal 
message systems of interaction, association, subsistence, gender, territoriality, 
temporality, learning, play, defense, and use of materials. While these may be useful, and 
indeed some of these message systems have apparent relevance to international relations, 
it is actually an approach most profoundly forwarded by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
(1961) that provides the practical basis for this study. 
Table 1  
Hall’s Schema for Social Scientists 
 
 
Schema for Social Scientists 
1 Culture is communication and communication is culture.  
2 Culture is not one thing, but many. There is no one basic unit or elemental particle, no single isolate for all 
culture.  
3 The study of institutions and their structure and the study of the individual and his psychological makeup are 
excluded from the specific study of culture as it is used here, although they are involved in it on a higher 
organizational level. 
4 Man operates on three different levels: the formal, informal, and technical. Each is present in any situation, 
but one will dominate at any given instant in time. The shifts from level to level are rapid, and the study of 
these shifts is the study of the process of change. 
5 Culture is concerned more with messages than it is with networks and control systems. The message has three 
components: sets, isolates, and patterns. Sets are perceived and constitute the point of entry into any cultural 
study. They are limited in number only by the patterned combination of isolates that go to make them up. […] 
6 There is a principle of indeterminacy in culture. Isolates turn into sets when they are studied in detail and are 
therefore abstractions. The more the precise the observer is on one level, the less precise he will be on any 





Drawing on several earlier projects, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) offered the 
first comprehensive system for cultural values. They explain the system thus:  
Value orientations are complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) principles, 
resulting from the transactional interplay of three analytically distinguishable 
elements of the evaluative process—the cognitive, the affective, and the directive 
elements—which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human 
acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of ‘common human’ problems. 
These principles are variable from culture to culture but are, we maintain, variable 
only in the ranking patterns of component parts which are themselves cultural 
universals Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. (1961, 4) 
 
They also acknowledge variation in the extent to which different cultures were 
aware of their values. Intriguingly, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck were strong proponents of 
cultural relativity (1) but made their arguments within positivist epistemology – perhaps 
an indication that they were unaware of the extent to which values orientations and 
epistemology might intersect. 
They posited six problems “tentatively singled out as the crucial ones common to 
all human groups,” though they only dealt with the following five of these: 
1. What is the character of innate human nature? 
2. What is the relation of man to nature (and supernature)? 
3. What is the temporal focus of human life? 
4. What is the modality of human activity? 
5. What is the modality of man’s relationship to other men? (Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck 1961, 10–11) 
Table 1 Continued 
 
7 There is also a principle of relativity in culture, just as there is in physics and mathematics. Experience is 
something man projects on the outside world as he gains it in its culturally determined form. Man alters 
experience by living. There is not experience independent of culture against which culture can be measured. 
8 Cultural indeterminacy and cultural relativity are not easy concepts for the layman to grasp. They mean more 
than what is good by one set of standards may be bad by some other. They mean that in every instance the 
formulae must be worked out that will enable scientists to equate event A2 in culture A1 with B2 in culture B1. 
A proper cultural analysis has to begin with a microcultural analysis on the isolate level once the sets have 
been perceived. 
 
Edward T. Hall 1959, 192  
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While the particular frameworks that result from these questions will be 
considered more fully in a later section, the most important contribution of Kluckhohn 
and Strodtbeck was to state the underlying assumptions for the values orientations 
system: 
1. First it is assumed that there is a limited number of common human problems for 
which all peoples at all times must find some solution. 
2. The second assumption is that while there is variability in solutions of all the 
problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely variable within a 
range of possible solutions. 
3. The third assumption, the one which provides the main key to the later analysis of 
variation in value orientations, is that all alternatives of all solutions are present in 
all societies at all times but are differentially preferred. 
a. Every society has, in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations, 
numerous variant or substitute profiles. 
4. Moreover, it is postulated that in both the dominant and the variant profiles there 
is almost always a rank ordering of the preferences of the value-orientation 
alternatives [the exception being societies undergoing change]. (Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck 1961, 10) 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck conclude that the results of their rigorous study “have been 
sufficiently conclusive to warrant according the value-orientation theory an independent 
status in studies of human behavior” (364). They argue that while the values-orientation 
theory originated in cultural studies, “its analytic value reaches far beyond a study of 
cultural factors in and for themselves” (364). This becomes particularly important if such 
values are to be considered for the purpose of political science and international relations. 
Consider their argument, which is that  
Culture exists, and is observable, only in the behavior, attitudes, motives, and 
perceptions of ‘reality’ which individuals show, in the interaction systems 
individual develop, and in the products which individuals, singly or collectively, 
create. Conversely, there is no aspect of human behavior which is not influenced 
to some degree either directly or indirectly, by culture. Basic values are a 
particularly pervasive cultural factor of influence. (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 




If they are correct, then it behooves the political scientist to identify and understand such 
values and their impact. However, such analysis must wait for a later section. 
Steward (1963, 3) also worked to identify “regularities of form, function, and 
process which recur cross-culturally among societies found in different cultural areas.” 
He explains, “The cultural patterns and causal interrelations which may develop 
repeatedly in different parts of the world and thus constitute cross-cultural regularities are 
subject to both synchronic and diachronic formulations” (4). In this way, Steward 
borrows from but also redefines the evolutionism of Tylor (1873) and White (1959) 
observed earlier. He emphasizes the important theme of adaptation, acknowledges 
culture as process, and observes that neither form nor function is sufficient to 
understanding cultural phenomena and thus combines them into form-function. This 
leads Steward to call for a more intense relativism than he observes in some of his peers: 
“Particular patterns of behavior found among one or more but not all groups of mankind 
must be explained in very different terms than the behavior common to all people. In fact, 
particular patterns must be conceptualized differently than universals” (8). Here is found 
a most interesting statement of the intersection of similarity and difference – of universal 
and particular:6 
All men eat, but this is an organic and not a cultural fact. It is universally 
explainable in terms of biological and chemical processes. What and how 
different groups of men eat is a cultural fact explainable only by culture history 
and environmental factors. All men dance, but the universal feature of dancing is 
bodily rhythm which is a human rather than cultural trait. Specific movements, 
music, attire, ritual, and other attributes of dancing which have limited occurrence 
and gives dances meaning as cultural facts are not subject to universal explanation 
or formulation. A formula that explains behavior of all mankind cannot explain 
culture. . . . No culture phenomena are universal. (Steward 1963, 8) 
 
6 This distinction becomes very important in M.J. Bennett’s (1986, 1998) Minimization stage, which 




There thus arises a tension. On the one hand, there are universal human experiences, but 
on the other hand, cultural responses to these phenomena lead to different experiences of 
the world. Knowing where universal ends and is supplanted, followed up by, interpreted, 
understood, or ignored by cultural phenomena is one of the great and important 
undertakings in the study of culture. Too much assumed to be universal will obfuscate 
real differences, whereas too much assumed to be cultural will obfuscate real similarities. 
A Synopsis of the History of the Study of Intercultural Communication (1972–2015) 
 By the 1970s, the field of intercultural communication had advanced to the stage 
where Samovar and Porter ([1972] 1976) assembled the first intercultural reader 
(textbook). Important authors such as Singer, Triandis, Yousef, Barna, Mead, and Adler 
contributed to this compilation, which helped to build initial structure around the study of 
intercultural communication. They included consideration of “attitudes, social 
organization, patterns of thought, roles and role prescriptions, language, use and 
organization of space, time conceptualization, and nonverbal expression” (9; numeration 
removed for clarity). In their treatment of culture, Samovar and Porter acknowledge a 
traditional anthropological definition of culture as 
the cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, meanings, beliefs, values, 
attitudes, religions, concepts of self, the universe, and self-universe relationships, 
hierarchies of status, role expectations, spatial relations, and time concepts 
acquired by a large group of people in the course of generations through 
individual and group striving. Culture manifests itself both in patterns of language 
and thought and in forms of activity and behavior. These patterns become models 
for common adaptive acts and styles of expressive behavior, which enable people 
to live in a society within a given geographical environment at a given state of 




However, reflecting on the cultural tumult in the United States during the 1960s 
and 1970s, Samovar and Porter explain that these movements (1) were in part responsible 
for the development of the field of intercultural communication, and (2) pointed to 
potential inadequacies in this definition – after all, while racial and ethnic groups could 
qualify for this definition, other group memberships might also be well explained by 
culture. This led them to posit a scale of most-to-least similar cultures as a way to 
acknowledge that cultural difference varies based on the groups under consideration. 
Samovar and Porter also offered one of the first definitions of intercultural 
communication – a branching of the field that is important for the present study, arguing, 
Intercultural communication can best be understood as cultural variance in the 
perception of social objects and events. The barriers to communication caused by 
this perceptual variance can best be lowered by a knowledge and understanding of 
cultural factors that are subject to variance, coupled with an honest and sincere 
desire to communicate successfully across cultural boundaries. (Samovar and 
Porter 1976, 9) 
 
Only two years later, Condon and Yousef (1974, 1975) offered what has been 
billed as the first intercultural communication textbook.7 This marks an important turning 
point in the field. About 100 years earlier, the modern concept of culture was introduced 
by Tylor. In the intervening years the concept developed in fits and starts, alternating 
between genetic, environmental, and social explanations, and experiencing highs and 
lows of relevance. Condon and Yousef represent a critical juncture. While 
anthropologists remain relevant, intercultural communication is not the domain of 
anthropology alone. They credit William Howell of the University of Minnesota as one of 
the pioneers of intercultural communication and set off to build the new field. Condon 
 
7 Their editor wrote, “Professors Condon and Yousef have written a very special book, which we believe to 




and Yousef included in their first volume observations of cultural differences, values, 
value orientations (leaning on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck), beliefs, nonverbal 
communication, homes, language, translation/interpretation, epistemology, rhetoric, and 
reasoning. They conclude considerations of how to enact intercultural communication in 
practice. 
Condon and Yousef also attempted to improve on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck by 
looking at overlapping categories (Figure 1). In this way, they attempted to utilize the 
deductive approach employed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck while also critiquing and 
expanding on it. Their work is important to the present dissertation especially in relation 
to structuring and interacting with cultural values constructs, as becomes evident in the 
operationalizing of such frameworks in this dissertation’s methodology. Specifically, 
their recognition that there may be more than two “poles” on a framework and that such 





Figure 1. Overlapping Categories. 
(Author). An interpretation of a similar image by Condon and Yousef (1975, 59). 
While interculturalists were getting started, anthropologists were by no means 
done. Hall ([1976] 1989, 16) clarifies three characteristics of culture: “It is not innate, but 
learned; the various facets of culture are interrelated—you touch a culture in one place 
and everything else is affected; it is shared and in effect defines the boundaries of 
different groups. . . . There is not one aspect of human life that is not touched and altered 
by culture.” He discusses monochronic and polychronic time, the effect of language on 
organizing and releasing information, embodied culture, high- and low-context cultures 
and identification. However, it is perhaps Hall’s chapter on “culture as an irrational 
force” that brings the most to bear on the present dissertation. In it, Hall describes how 
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cultural logics, while obvious to their users, are in fact not inherently logical. He blames 
the issue on extension transference, which signals the psychological turn in intercultural 
communication – a turn realized more fully in Brislin (1980). 
Geertz’s (1977) work came before Brislin, however, and The Interpretation of 
Cultures holds a special place in the literature on culture.8 One of the most important 
contributions Geertz makes is to draw out Weber’s anthropology into an approach to 
culture, which is “essentially a semiotic one” (5): “Believing, with Max Weber, that man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be 
those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (5). Thus, the interpretivist turn in 
culturology has a (by now) long history. 
As mentioned above, Brislin approaches culture through the lens of psychology. 
As with other authors, he bemoans the “amorphous” nature of the culture concept (1980, 
3). He presents multiple aspects of life in which aspiring psychologists should be aware 
that cultural differences might be at play: socialization, formal education, intergroup 
relations (including prejudice), interactional spaces, work, gender, and health. 
The important contribution of Brislin (1980) here is that it demonstrates how, 
even though the culture concept is amorphous and difficult to pin down, it is also of great 
practical importance in fields that had previously not been aware of the concept. In this 
way, the culture concept may have an “indigenizing” capacity by which it is as much a 
perspective or lens as it is a thing in itself. But then, this is what Geertz expected by 
bringing in the interpretivist understanding. However, the risk implicit in such 
 
8 Google Scholar listed this book as having been cited 69,099 times as of 19 Jun 2020. Compared this with 
Hall’s Beyond Culture, published a year earlier but had been cited 15,609 times as of the same date. 
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indigenization is that as the concept diffuses it may become diffuse. This may be part of 
the issue Lantis (2002) encountered when reviewing culture in international relations – 
without an integrated conceptualization of culture it becomes difficult to tell whether 
authors mean the same thing by the concept. The difficulty of application of the culture 
concept is demonstrated by Geertz (1983), such as in his essay on anthropology and law, 
in which he argues that relativization itself is an insufficient goal. Instead, interpretivist 
anthropology “welds the processes of self-knowledge, self-perception, self-understanding 
to those of other-knowledge, other-perception, other-understanding; that identifies, or 
very nearly, sorting out who we are and sorting out whom we are among” (181–82). This 
is an imminently practical concern: “It can help both to free us from misleading 
representations of our own way of rendering matters judiciable . . . and to force into our 
reluctant consciousness disaccordant views of how this is to be done” (182). The 
relationship between culture and international relations begins to come into view through 
observations such as Geertz’s. 
By 1983, the culture concept had made it into the communication literature 
(Gudykunst and Speech Communication Association 1983). However, much like 
Casmir’s (1978) volume, Gudykunst’s Intercultural Communication Theory appears to 
have only partially been written by authors who grasped the culture concept. As with 
Brislin’s integration of culture in psychology, Gudykunst’s contributors seem generally 
to be more conversant with their own theories (such as rhetoric, system-theoretic 
perspectives, mass media, etc.) than with the culture concept itself. While this is 
understandable, it means that some scholars may believe they have internalized the study 
of culture when in fact they may have been exposed to only a shadow representation. The 
 
31 
work also demonstrates that it is possible to address comparative culture without really 
addressing culture in the interactional space.9 Such a failing is also one of the reasons that 
area-studies are insufficient. Knowing how cultures “are” without knowing how they 
interact is of some value but remains insufficient for the interactional space necessary in 
international relations. 
Hall and Hall ([1990] 2012) demonstrate an attempt to function at multiple levels 
of analysis. They present culture-general concepts such as time, context, space, 
information flow, and interfacing as building blocks that can help the practitioner look at 
different cultures in similar ways. In particular they examine Germans, French, and 
Americans. Through providing culture-specific examinations of culture-general 
principles, there is an opportunity to imagine hypothetical interactions between the 
groups examined. 
The appeal of culture-general frameworks is demonstrated perhaps most 
aggressively by Hofstede (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010). While 
Hofstede has his critics (e.g., M. J. Bennett 2013a), his frameworks have been influential, 
particularly in the business world. One of the risks of Hofstede’s approach is the 
temptation to move away from the processual approach to culture articulated by Benedict 
(1934). The frameworks as presented by Hofstede take on a reified life of their own. 
Like Hofstede, Trompenaars (Trompenaars 1994; Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars 1997), applies the concept of culture to international business. He makes 
clear that, unlike Hall and Hall, he is not trying to make it possible to understand 
particular cultures. Instead, he says, “It is my belief that you can never understand other 
 
9 Chapter 2 by Okabe, for example, compares Japanese and American values without exploring how these 
function in the interactional space. In this way, the chapter is more cross-cultural than it is intercultural. 
 
32 
cultures” (1994, 1). Trompenaars attempts to “give readers a better understanding of their 
own cultures and cultural differences in general, by learning how to recognize and cope 
with them in a business context” (2). He pushes back on the idea that global cultures are 
collapsing into a single culture, instead noting that the differences are far deeper than 
they originally appear. He provides an easy way to think of culture: “Culture is the way 
in which a group of people solves problems” (7). He then presents three main categories 
of the types of problems he has in mind: 
• relationships with people 
o universalism vs. particularism 
o individualism vs. collectivism 
o neutral vs. emotional 
o specific vs. diffuse 
o achievement vs. ascription 
• attitudes towards time 
• attitudes towards the environment (Trompenaars 1994, 10–12) 
Trompenaars’ approach is unlike some of the other more reductionist approaches that 
oversimplify culture in order to make it fit into the target field. Adler (2002) similarly 
does the hard work of translating cultural ideas into the business world without 
sacrificing their complexity. 
However, by this time, another stream of cultural inquiry had begun to develop: 
intercultural competence. This was birthed out of the work of M. J. Bennett (1986, 1993) 
and eventually resulted in the development of the Intercultural Development Inventory as 
well as his later volumes (1998, 2013a). Bennett’s theoretical frameworks are discussed 
in more depth in a later section of the literature review, but one element that should be 
acknowledged here is that Bennett aggressively incorporated a constructivist perspective 
into the study of culture. A defined non-positivist epistemology provided a way to resolve 
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some of the knottier tensions noted between other approaches to culture and intercultural 
relations while allowing the development of new ideas and approaches, such as 
intercultural competence. 
Wierzbicka (1997) demonstrates how a linguistic approach to culture opens doors 
to understanding and meaning that might be hidden through over-obvious but false 
interpretations of the world. She characterizes cultures as “heterogeneous, historically 
changing, interconnected, and ‘continually exchanging materials,’ ” and as having “no 
fixed contours” (18). At the same time, she defends Geertz’s semiotic approach to culture 
and argues, “The evidence of the reality of cultural norms and shared conceptions is 
provided by language and, in particular, by the meanings of words” (22). 
The Psychologist Brislin (1999) returned to the scene to describe the 
psychological processes of cross-cultural encounters. Ward, Bochner and Furnham 
(2001) addressed the same. What is clear from these volumes is that there is significant 
difference between cultures, and this causes disturbance for people who cross between 
cultures. While there are many possible reasons for this, communications scholar Ting-
Toomey (1999) suggested that one of the major difficulties in the intercultural 
communication event is that identity itself is being negotiated. Unlike earlier 
communications scholars who appeared to pay short shrift to the depth of cultural 
difference, Ting-Toomey clearly explicates the importance of value orientation 
differences on the intercultural communication event. She also opens the door to 
mindfulness in intercultural communication – a theme hinted at by previous scholars but 
more fully developed by Ting Toomey.10 
 
10 And later by Schaetti, Ramsey, and Watanabe (2008) 
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By 2004, the field of intercultural training was well-developed enough to support 
the Handbook of Intercultural Training (Landis, Bennett, and Bennett 2004). This 
significant volume applies Bennett’s developmental approach to intercultural 
competence, and insights from psychology, as well as explorations into the somatic 
experience of culture and studies of cross-cultural transition processes. By this stage, the 
field of intercultural communication was well connected to (though not entrenched in) 
peace corps and study abroad training, which are both represented in this book and others 
that followed (especially Vande Berg, Paige, and Lou 2012). 
In 2015, a possible shift to intercultural research started to emerge, in which 
cognition featured as especially important (Shaules 2015; M. J. Bennett 2016). 
Meanwhile, handbooks and encyclopedias were written (Deardorff 2009; Janet Marie 
Bennett 2015), formalizing the intercultural field. Thus concludes the brief overview of 
the history of the culture concept as observed in this dissertation. 
Attempts to Give Meaning to the Culture Concept 
As may be observed in the preceding pages, culture is a complex and contested 
term, with a complex history (Shweder 2000). The application of culture in 
developmentalist terms is associated, for example, with the perspective that some cultural 
systems are “relatively devoid of truth, goodness, beauty, or practical efficiency,” 
trapping people in “error, ignorance, bad habits, immorality, and squalor” (160). Such a 
perspective on culture (which Shweder himself rejects) has been used to explain failures 
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of development or even to suggest that cultural change is the primary change needed in 
order for development to be accomplished.11 
Hall (1959, 20) describes a curious situation in which, although for 
“anthropologists culture has long stood for the way of life of a people, for the sum of 
their learned behavior patterns, attitudes, and material things,” they nonetheless disagree 
on “what the precise substance of culture is.” He laments that while culture had already 
been defined in print in the mid-nineteenth century (Tylor 1873), the term “still lack[ed] 
the rigorous specificity which characterizes many less revolutionary and useful ideas” 
nearly 100 years later (Edward T. Hall 1959, 20). Indeed, this still seems to be the case. 
White offered this definition of culture: 
By culture we mean an extrasomatic, temporal continuum of things and events 
dependent upon symbolling. Specifically and concretely, culture consists of tools, 
implements, utensils, clothing, ornaments, customs, institutions, beliefs, rituals, 
games, works of art, language, etc. All peoples in all times and places have 
possessed culture; no other species has or has had culture. In course of the 
evolution of primates, man appeared when the ability to symbol had been 
developed and become capable of expression. We thus define man in terms of the 
ability to symbol and the consequent ability to produce culture. (White 1959, 3) 
 
Such a definition, while unwieldy, is important because it expresses the importance of 
defining culture well – the very ontology of humankind is dependent on culture, 
according to White. 
As with other concepts addressed in this paper, the definition of culture is far 
from neutral and may be used as a tool of power (Moon 2008). If culture is 
conceptualized as existing only at the level of the nation-state, a move that Condon and 
Yousef (1975) reject, then subcultures, including gender and social class, may be 
 
11 As noted by Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have a complicated 
relationship to this claim. 
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overlooked, which may reinforce the power of hegemonic actors. Avruch (1998) suggests 
several problems with inadequate attempts to define culture, as well as a potential 
solution, but he notes that even the solution has limitations (Table 1). 
Furthermore, the level of analysis is selected for examining culture is not neutral, 
the conflation of individuals or groups with institutional culture may not only result in 
reification but may do so in such a way that enables disenfranchisement of non-dominant 
actors (M. J. Bennett 2013a). Culture may be understood at least at the levels of regional 
society, national, corporation or organization, and department within organizations 
(Trompenaars 1994). 
Table 2  




Inadequate Views of Culture 
Culture is homogeneous Problem: Presumption that culture is free of internal paradoxes and 
contradictions, and that individuals have clear and unambiguous 
guidance. Also problematic in that this suggests that a culture can be 
easily grasped by an outsider. 
Culture is a thing Problem: This is a reification. Culture is better understood as a 
“shorthand way of referring . . . to bundles of complicated cognitive 
and perceptual processes” (14). See also Putz, Schmitz, and Walch 
(2014) and Bennett (2013b). 
An individual can possess but a 
single culture 
Problem: Privileges tribal, ethnic, or national culture over other types of 
culture; Particularly problematic when political scientists privilege 
nation-state interpretations of culture and suggest “national character.” 
Individuals always possess multiple cultures.  
Culture is custom Problem: reduces culture to tradition or etiquette, downplays individual 
agency and struggle. 
Culture is uniformly distributed 
among members of a group 
Problem: Oversimplifies intracultural variation, which is ignored or 
dismissed as deviance. 




Geertz suggests that culture is the semiotic web of meaning spun by people and 
ultimately defines culture as 
an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [sic] 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward 
life. (Geertz 1977, 89) 
 
While Geertz suggests that words such as meaning, symbols, and conception need 
explanation, it is actually perhaps his use of the word inherited that requires clarification. 
Geertz does in fact offer this clarification, with his (chap. 3) observation that the modes 
of thinking that humans are able to accomplish are largely accessible due to social 
processes after birth, rather than due to genetic inheritance. Bennett also addresses this 
tension, noting that 
while one is born into a cultural system, that system only exists because the 
previous generation kept on constructing reality more or less in they way they 
were socialized. And the system will continue to exist insofar as the new members 
(elements) in the system enact the roles and rules of the system. (Bennett 2013a, 
8–9) 
Table 2 Continued 
 
Adequate Definition of Culture 
Proposed Definition: 
“Culture consist of the derivatives 
of experience, more or less 
organized, learned or created by 
the individuals of a population, 
including those images or 
encodements and their 
interpretations (meanings) 
transmitted from past generations, 
from contemporaries or formed by 
individuals themselves” (Schwartz 
1992 as quoted in Avruch 1998, 
17) 
Strengths: 
• Connects culture to experience, 
interpreted social action, and practice. 
• Leaves nature of culturerience, 
interpreteLocates culture both outside 
and inside individuals 
• Structure and agency are balanced. 
• New images can be created and 
culture is not essentialized as 
timeless. 
Limitations: 
• “imitations: in a populatione 
created and culture is not 
essentialized as timeless. 
Examples include kinship, 
language, race, creed, 
socioeconomics, geographical 
region, occupation, etc. Each 
such group is a potential 
“container” for culture. 
• Leaves open the problem of a 
uniform distribution of culture. 
Instead culture should be 
understood as socially and 
psychologically distributed 
within a population  
 





The focus on the socially apprehended and constructed elements of culture that 
results from this approach is well-captured by Ruben: 
Those symbols, meanings, images, rule structures, habits, values, and information 
processing and transformation patterns an conventions that are shared in common 
by members of a particular social system or group. . . . [and which] result from the 
negotiated creation, shared use, and mutual validation of symbols, meanings, and 
communication rules and patterns. (Ruben 1984, 143nn7–8) 
 
Although this understanding is useful, Bennett’s (1998, 3) more nimble definition 
of culture as “the learned and shared patterns of beliefs, behaviors, and values of groups 
of interacting people” may more parsimoniously capture both the depth and breadth of 
the concept, while drawing attention to the process by which culture is both developed 
and maintained (learned and shared). The approach to culture taken in this paper, then, 
relies on Bennett’s definition, which contains constructivist underpinnings and finds 
applicability at multiple levels of analysis. 
Cultural Values Constructs 
As noted above, it was Kluckhohn (with Strodtbeck 1961) who first developed the 
theory, typology, and research method for the study of cultural values known as value 
orientations (Condon 2015), although Benedict ([1947] 2005) had introduced some of the 
concepts earlier. While Hofstede’s (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 
2010) inductively derived values orientations are better known, Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck’s deductive values model, and derivatives thereof, may have more 
applicability even today (Condon 2015; M. J. Bennett 2013a, 81). For Bennett, the 
problem with Hofstede’s model can be summarized in this way: 
There is some paradigmatic confusion created by the use of that system, however. 
Unlike the other cultural value systems, the Hofstede dimensions are not 
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constructed as etic categories. The methodology used to create the categories is 
positivist, and therefore the results of the research – the dimensions of culture – 
are assumed to have an objective existence. While this is a useful assumption for 
the purposes of complex rank-ordering of cultures,12 it is not very useful for the 
practice of intercultural communication. The more culture is considered a ‘thing’ 
and not an ongoing coordination of meaning, the less able people are to see their 
own role in creating that meaning. This restricts their ability to exercise either 
cultural self-awareness or perspective taking of other cultural worldviews. (M. J. 
Bennett 2013a, 81–82) 
 
Condon (2015, 848) concurs with Bennett that the Kluckhohn (1961) approach is 
uniquely useful – in part because it avoids the reduction of value orientations to “different 
cultural positions along continua between polar terms.” Instead, Kluckhohn’s model 
presents three options for each theme: 
Table 3  
Kluckhohn’s 1953 model 
Condon and Yousef (1974, 1975) acknowledge both strengths and weaknesses in 
the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) approach. These include the possibility of 
deductively generating too few categories or of generating categories that end up being 
only a moderately good fit. However, “despite these problems, the advantages should be 
apparent. We have a structure and vocabulary that can be used as a standard for 
comparing different cultures and for describing variations within a single society” 
 
12 Indeed, Hofstede’s model is used for this purpose in the Methodology section. However, Hofstede’s 
model is not used for developing country profiles for the reasons mentioned by Bennett. 
Innate predisposition Good (mutable or 
immutable) 
Neither good nor bad 
(mutable or immutable) 
Evil (mutable or 
immutable) 
Man’s relations to nature Mastery (man over 
nature) 
Harmony (man in nature) Subjugation (man under 
nature) 
Time dimension Future oriented Present oriented Past oriented 
Valued personality type Activity Being-in-becoming Being 
Modality of relationship Individual Collateral Linear 
 




(Condon and Yousef 1975, 58). Building their model on intersections between the self, 
society, and nature, Condon and Yousef suggest twenty-five sets, with three variations 
each (Table 4). 





individualism individuality interdependence 
Age youth the middle years old age 
Sex equality of sexes female superiority male superiority 
Activity doing being-in-becoming being 
The Family 
Relational orientations individualistic collateral lineal 
Authority democratic authority-centered authoritarian 
Positional role behavior open general specific 
Mobility high mobility phasic mobility low mobility, stasis 
Society 
Social reciprocity independence symmetrical-obligatory complementary-
obligatory 
Group membership many groups, brief 
identification, sub-ordination 
of group to individual 
balance of [the other 
two] 
few groups, prolonged 
identification, 
subordination of the 
member to the group 






Formality informality selective formality pervasive formality 
Property private utilitarian community 
Human Nature 
Rationality rational intuitive irrational 
Good and evil good mixture of good an evil evil 
Happiness, pleasure happiness as goal inextricable bond of 
happiness and sadness 
life is mostly sadness 
Mutability change, growth, learning some change unchanging 
Nature 
Relationship of man 
and nature 
man dominating nature man in harmony with 
nature  
nature dominating man 
Ways of knowing abstract circle of induction-
deduction 
specific 
Structure of nature mechanistic spiritual organic 
Concept of time future present past 
The Supernatural 
Relationship of man 
and the supernatural 
man as god pantheism man controlled by the 
supernatural 
Providence good in life is unlimited balance of good and 
misfortune 
good in life is limited 
Knowledge of the 
cosmic order 
order is comprehensible faith and reason mysterious and 
unknowable 
 
Condon and Yousef (1975, 60–62) 
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However, the extensive focus on values orientations in Condon and Yousef 
(1975) does not represent the only way in which culture can be studied, though they are 
perhaps one of the most important lenses. Condon and Yousef describe the preferential 
option for values orientation in this way: 
We have allotted more space for our discussion of values than for any other topic 
considered in this book. Not only do values pervade all of the other topics, they 
also may provide the best guidance for understanding and adapting to other 
cultural patterns of communication. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 60) 
 
Several additional values models should also be briefly considered. Mentioned 
above, Hofstede’s (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) model 
includes six value orientations measured at the level of national culture. These are power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and 
indulgence. Limits to Hofstede’s model were already discussed. 
Trompenaars (Trompenaars 1994; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1997) 
presents three categories, the first of which has several sub-dimensions. “Relationships 
with people” includes the themes of universalism vs. particularism norms, individualism 
vs. collectivism in identity, neutral vs. emotional expression, specific vs. diffuse focus, 
and achievement vs. ascription status (Trompenaars 1994, 10–11). The two remaining 
dimensions are “attitudes towards time” and “attitude towards the environment.” For 
Trompenaars, these orientations represent the range of specific solutions that cultures 
select to respond to problems. 
Schwartz (2011) suggests that there are between two and nine distinct value 
dimensions, depending on which authors one reads. While he suggests that there is 
overlap between many of the dimensions, he suggests that “it is too soon to try to arrive 
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at ‘the best’ set of dimensions. Choosing any one set of dimensions would lose the 
richness of cultural understanding that diverse theories permit” (314–15). Nonetheless, he 
suggests that it is worth the effort to clarify the overlap and distinction between the 
various sets of values dimensions. Schwartz’s model is different from the others in that it 
began at the level of the individual (Knafo, Roccas, and Sagiv 2011) and then moved 
toward the social group (the others start with the social group and move toward the 
individual. His basic value dimensions include power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security 
(Grove 2015b). 
Several authors (Muller 2001; Lebow 2008; Friedrichs 2016) draw attention to 
key motivational structures. Muller presents the following couplets: honor and shame, 
power and fear, and guilt and innocence. Lebow suggests fear, interest, and honor. 
Friedrichs, draws on Leung and Cohen (2011) and Kim Cohen and Au (2010) to the 
address the motivating power of the worth orientations of honor, face, and dignity. 
The 2004 Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) Study suggests nine cultural dimensions: performance orientation, uncertainty 
avoidance, ingroup collectivism, power distance, gender egalitarianism, humane 
orientation, institutional collectivism, future orientation, and assertiveness (Grove 2015a). 
Additionally, the GLOBE project identified six global dimensions of leadership: 
charismatic/value based, team-oriented, participative, humane-oriented, autonomous, and 
self-protected leadership (GLOBE 2016). From these, twenty-one primary leadership 
dimensions were developed. 
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The World Values Survey, which has been run in seven iterations since 1981, 
includes topics such as the following: 
Trust to social and political institutions, support for democracy and alternative 
political regimes, tolerance to foreigners and ethnic minorities, support for gender 
equality, the role of religion and changing levels of religiosity, the impact of 
globalization, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national 
identity, culture, diversity, local and national security in contemporary world, 
subjective well-being and happiness, social capital, social media, corruption, 
elections and electoral integrity, attitudes towards migration and influence of 
migration on national development, interest in politics, political participation and 
unconventional political activity, development of science and technology, social, 
ethical and moral norms. (World Values Survey n.d.) 
 
While there is a significant amount of data, much of which does not fit into the category 
of values orientations, analysis by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) suggests that “there are 
two major dimensions of cross cultural variation in the world” (World Values Survey 
n.d.). These include traditional values and secular-rational values on one continuum, 
juxtaposed with survival values and self-expression values on the second.13 
Other Cultural Variations 
What should be clear following the Values Frameworks section of the literature 
review is that there are many different approaches to the study of values orientations of 
various cultural groups. Yet even Condon and Yousef (1975), with their impressive 75 
values orientations positions (with even more permutations), do not claim that these 
represent the whole of cultural variation. They additionally draw attention to nonverbal 
communication, language, thought patterns, and even variations in styles of houses as 
necessary to understanding the range of cultural variation. For his part, Stewart (1978) 
provides a list of nine critical components of intercultural communication including 
 
13 The selected values constructs utilized in this dissertation (Shame / Honor, Guilt / Innocence; Time 




language and thinking, values, interfaces in communication (particularly rapport between 
sender and receiver), orientation to action, forms, principles and representation, trust, 
private and public rules, cultural background (reserves) of meaning, and an implied 
observer agent. While further such lists could be developed, it is more useful to briefly 
address three more core areas of cross-cultural variance: ontological and epistemological 
frameworks, interactional frameworks, and history and identity models. 
Ontological and Epistemological Frameworks 
The values frameworks introduced above describe differences in orientations to 
the world that can extend deep into the experience of the world and represent something 
beyond merely different emphases within the world. Consider for example Condon and 
Yousef’s (1975) range of options for the knowledge of the cosmic order: order is 
comprehensible, faith and reason, and mysterious and unknowable. These represent not 
merely different emphases but different episteme and perhaps even different ontology. 
Discussing the question of ontological differences present in worldview, Osmera (2015, 
879) reflects, “A fundamental question is whether this is a case of labeling the same 
given world with a variety of terms by separate cultures or whether the world being 
labeled is fundamentally different for each culture.” 
The worldview metaphors offered by Pepper (1942 as cited in Hiebert 2008, 24) 
include conceptualizations of the world as organic, “which sees the world and ultimate 
realities as living beings,” and mechanistic, “which looks at the world as an impersonal 
machine, like a watch, run by invisible forces operating according to fixed laws.” Such 
divergent views of the world certainly indicate a difference in ontology, as “that branch 
of metaphysics concerned with the nature or essence of being or existence” (“Ontology, 
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n.” n.d.). Hiebert underscores this view, defining worldview as “the foundational 
cognitive, affective, and evaluative assumptions and frameworks a group of people 
makes about the nature of reality which they use to order their lives” (26). 
Given the presence of cognitive assumptions and frameworks in cultural 
worldviews, it is appropriate as well to consider that different cultural groups also rely on 
different ways of knowing. This has already been hinted at through reference to Geertz’s 
(1977) semiotic definition of culture and the recognition that symbolic forms are used to 
develop knowledge. An example of the intersection between ontological and 
epistemological cultural variation is offered by Hiebert: In a culture that relies on modern 
materialistic realism, members “assume that the world around them is real, orderly, and 
predictable, and that they can experience it with a measure of accuracy by means of their 
senses” (46). By contrast, a culture that relies on an idealism that assumes that the world 
is an illusion created by the mind may be more likely to: 
See ultimate reality as existing inside the person. The external world is a sum of 
subjective inner experiences—a transitory, every-changing creation of our minds. 
It has no ultimate reality. It is maya, or virtual. In such a chaotic, unpredictable 
world, meaning and truth can be found only in oneself, in the deep innermost 
experiences of the self. Sensory experience and rational analysis are illusory and 
cannot be trusted. Consequently, true reality cannot be discovered by empirical 
experiments and analysis, but must come as inner flashes of insight, which 
ultimately show us that even we do not truly exist as separate individuals but are 
parts of one ultimate cosmic energy field. (Hiebert 2008, 46) 
 
A separate paper would be required to explore the implications of different 
ontological and epistemological systems and the ways in which these lead to not only a 
different style of interacting with the world but with a different experience of the world 
altogether (indeed, a different world). These types of differences can also be investigated 
in terms of patterns of thinking, “or how people process perception,” on a range from 
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concrete to abstract construction of percepts (M. J. Bennett 2013a). The author of this 
dissertation has, in a separate paper (Jones 2015), explored some of these issues as relates 
to constructed knowledge and the intersection between constructivism and culture. Let it 
suffice for this paper to acknowledge that cultural differences can go beyond the values 
used to frame interaction with the world to the very understanding and experience of 
what the world is and how it can be known. Clearly the study of religion could also be 
used to extend this inquiry of ontological difference. 
Interactional Frameworks 
While similar to values frameworks, a distinct way to understand culture is 
through interactional frameworks. These frameworks address ways in which 
communication actually takes place. Hammer (2009a) suggests placing of the continuum 
of emotional restraint and expressiveness on a Cartesian plane with the continuum of 
directness and indirectness. The four resultant quadrants are four distinct strategies for 
conflict communication: engagement (expressive/direct), dynamic (expressive/indirect), 
accommodation (restrained/indirect), and discussion (restrained/direct). He suggests that 
different cultural groups tend toward different primary conflict styles, and that 
mismatched styles in conflict can easily lead to secondary conflicts (those not about the 
substantive issue). On the other hand, Elmer (1993) suggests that cultural values 
orientations can be used to explain why certain conflict styles are used but does 
distinguish the conflict interaction style from the underlying value orientation. 
There are many more such styles that could be considered, both in verbal and 
nonverbal communication. For example, Sadri and Flammia (2011) draw attention to the 
following (verbal) styles: direct/indirect; instrumental/affective; elaborate/exact/succinct; 
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personal/contextual; high/low context; and formal/informal. Meanwhile, Bennett (2013a) 
suggests the categories of language use, leave-taking rituals, compliments and apologies, 
high- and low-context, and paralinguistic elements such as pitch and tone as examples of 
interactional frameworks. 
History 
Two final elements of cross-cultural variation are history and identity. The 
distinctive histories of each cultural group shape the group’s understanding of themselves 
and of the world (Martin and Nakayama 2014). What is more, Martin and Nakayama 
suggest that interaction events between groups require the negotiation of those histories – 
particularly when there are interactive histories between groups. 
Linked to history is the concept of identity. Ting-Toomey (1999, 30) suggests that 
cultural identity is “the emotional significance that we attach to our sense of belonging or 
affiliation with the larger culture.” Interestingly, Ting-Toomey ties the content of such 
identity back to the value orientation of individualism and collectivism. She also suggests 
that the salience of identity will vary depending on the interaction situation. Hopf (2016, 
5) applies very similar logic to the identities of states, suggesting that while “patterns of 
cooperation and conflict depend on how states understand themselves in the international 
system,” such identities are not static. Instead, for both Ting-Toomey at the 
individual/cultural level and for Hopf at the national level, identities are intersubjectively 
negotiated. Many different strategies exist for arriving at, maintaining, and negotiating 
cultural identities (Salett and Koslow 2003).14 
 
14 Narratological Frameworks will also be considered in the Methodology chapter as an alternative 
approach to culture. 
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Cultural Differences and Intercultural Communication 
The previous section of the literature review has demonstrated that there is reason 
to believe that culture – through influence over values orientations, ontologies, 
epistemologies, interactional styles, and identity – could lead to significantly different 
perceptions of situations, others, and self. Adler explains the situation this way: 
Do the French and the Chinese see the world in the same way? No. Do 
Venezuelans and Ghanaians see the world in the same way? Again, no. No two 
national groups see the world in exactly the same way. Perception is the process 
by which individuals select, organize, and evaluate stimuli from the external 
environment to provide meaningful experiences for themselves. . . . Perceptual 
patterns are neither innate nor absolute. They are selective, learned, culturally 
determined, consistent, and inaccurate. (Adler 2002, 77) 
 
These claims about the intersection between culture and perception are not unique 
to Adler (Singer [1976] 1998) and appear to be relevant in the consideration of 
international relations. Yet the study of culture is also incredibly complex and messy, and 
“the complexity of cultural diversity seems overwhelming” (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 61): 
Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more 
deeply it goes, the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose most telling 
assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the 
matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both your own and that of others, that 
you are not quite getting it right. . . . There are a number of ways to escape this—
turning culture into folklore and collecting it, turning it into traits and counting it, 
turning it into institutions and classifying it, turning it into structures and toying 
with it. But they are escapes. (Geertz 1977, 29) 
 
Bennett (2013a, 61) argues that the application of cultural general (deductive) 
frameworks such as those described in the previous section is a great advantage in the 
practical negotiation of relationships across cultures. The following extended quotation 
provides an important outline of how this approach is used to build understanding: 
By identifying where one’s own and a particular other culture lie on the continua 
of contrasts, the user can create a broad picture of the other culture and how it 
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differs from her own. It is a relatively simple matter to apply the framework to all 
the cultures with which one has contact. In some cases of light contact, there may 
be no need for more culture-specific information; the culture-general framework 
will be sufficient to identify and analyze relevant differences. In other cases, it is a 
straightforward matter to add culture-specific information (emic categories) to 
one or more of the culture-general frames. 
The culture-general framework operates as an observational strategy and 
as a learning-to-learn technique (Bateson, 1972), since it calls attention to the 
areas of difference that are most important to consider when first encountering 
another culture. By initially identifying general cultural differences, a newcomer 
to the culture can avoid obvious misunderstandings and move more quickly 
toward learning relevant emic categories. In this way, the culture-general 
framework offers an entrée into the culture-specific knowledge that will be 
necessary to operate effectively over the long run. But of course it is insufficient 
to simply know any amount of culture-general or culture-specific knowledge. 
Eventually, cultural knowledge becomes a doorway into the embodied experience 
of another culture. (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 61) 
 
If Bennett is correct, then it is not necessary to establish a fully formed ethnography for 
each culture under consideration. Instead, cultural general frameworks can initially be 
applied even without significant emic work and without needing to solve Geertz’s 
problem of infinite incompleteness. Rather, the intercultural approach involves using 
awareness of such differences to combat ethnocentric perception and ethnocentric 
interpretation (M. J. Bennett 2013a). Though the topic will not be further explored here, 
Yoshikawa’s (1980) double-swing model and Ting-Toomey’s (1999) identity negotiation 
model are two examples of the ways in which the intercultural communication process 
itself can be investigated. 
Intercultural Competence15 
As mentioned above, knowing about culture is not the same as being competent at 
communicating across cultures, or as Janet Bennett (2015, xxiii) suggests, “Knowledge 
alone does not equal competence; intercultural competence also requires motivation and 
 
15 This section is largely taken from a paper written by the author for IDV 871. 
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skill.” However, the question of what constitutes competence across cultures is still an 
open one, with many different contributions. Writing for UNESCO (United Nations 
Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), Dupront suggests that at least one goal 
of such competence is the reduction of prejudices and bias. 
Just as in the analysis of the cultural fact the existence of levels of culture has 
been brought to light, in just the same way we all considered that one of the first 
objectives of research into the ‘intercultural’ should be to associate, in a receptive 
attitude toward different cultures and a knowledge of them as free of prejudice, 
bias and summary condemnations as possible, the widest possible circles and the 
masses in the certainty of mutual enrichment. (Dupront 1983, 214–15) 
 
Slavik (2004, 14), though, is measured in her analysis of what can be 
accomplished by intercultural competence, admitting that “of course, improved 
intercultural communication does not guarantee an end to conflict.” Nonetheless, such 
improvements “can reduce misunderstanding and fear based on misperception, and 
ensure that when conflict does occur, parties at least have a common understanding of the 
conflict” (14). 
This section will not press into the myriad approaches to and definitions of 
intercultural competence, as such an exploration is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that resources such as The SAGE Encyclopedia 
of Intercultural Competence (Janet Marie Bennett 2015) and The SAGE Handbook of 
Intercultural Competence (Deardorff 2009) provide full, contemporary explorations of 
these topics. For the purpose of the present dissertation, it is sufficient to acknowledge 
the major types of intercultural competence models identified by Spitzberg and Chagnon 
(2009, 10): (1) Compositional models, with lists of relevant traits, characteristics and 
skills; (2) Co-orientational models with focus on perceptual acuity, perspective taking, 
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empathy, and so forth; (3) Developmental models, which suggest stages through which 
individuals progress; (4) Adaptational models, which expect the presence of multiple 
interactants and the mutual adjustment of actions, attitudes and understanding; and (5) 
Causal Process models, which use interrelationships among components to generate 
testable criteria of competence. The model utilized in this study is the Developmental 
Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) / Intercultural Development Continuum (IDC), 
which is best located under the third type, developmental models. However, as 
acknowledged by Spitzberg and Chagnon, the five types are not mutually exclusive, so 
cases could be made for multiple categories or re-categorization. Hammer (2015), one of 
the main champions of the DMIS/IDC model notes that, despite their popularity, there are 
significant limitations to trait-based models of intercultural competence and urges 
adoption of the developmental perspective instead. 
First introduced by Milton Bennett (1986) as a way to conceptualize the move 
from ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism, the Developmental Model of Intercultural 
Sensitivity (DMIS) remains an influential conceptualization of how individuals and 
groups relate to cultural difference. This extended passage from Jones (2011) explains the 
developmental nature of the model: 
Bennett’s six stage model was founded on the developmental perspective credited 
to Erikson (Thompson & Bennett, 2005B). Two foundational principles are that 
“(1) humans move through various phases and stages in their lives, and (2) each 
stage is characterized by a particular question or issue that the person must 
resolve” (Thompson & Bennett, 2005A, p. 6). Thus people move through the 
DMIS as they move through stages in “cognition as described by Jean Piaget or 
ethicality as described by William G. Perry Jr.” (Bennett, 1998, p. 25). Bennett 
explained that the DMIS is “based on ‘meaning-making’ models of cognitive 
psychology and radical constructivism” (p. 25) and “links changes in cognitive 
structure to an evolution in attitudes and behavior toward cultural differences in 
general” (p. 25). 
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In considering the developmental nature of the model, Hammer (2008) 
further explained that the when a developmental stage is in front of a person, it 
may be intentionally addressed, thus potentially resulting in “further progression 
along the continuum” (p. 247). However, it is also possible that an issue, although 
largely resolved, may still be holding back a person’s or group’s further 
development. Erikson (1963), in explaining his own developmental model, 
suggested the following underlying assumption: “that the human personality in 
principle develops according to steps predetermined in the growing person’s 
readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with, a widening 
social radius” (p. 270). 
Furthermore, when considering the movement between stages, Erickson 
(1963) stated, “we do not consider all development a series of crises: we claim 
only that development proceeds by critical steps—‘critical’ being a characteristic 
of turning points, of decision between progress and regression, integration and 
retardation” (pp. 270-71). It is thus appropriate to understand that in a 
developmental model, a person may move either forward or backward, and that 
such movement may be brought about by points of crises. Also important is 
Erikson’s clarification that although a person must proceed through the stages in 
order, elements of each developmental stage are present to a small degree even 
before a person reaches later stages. Hammer (2008) explained that even though a 
person may demonstrate certain signs of a stage beyond their current status, 
unless they have resolved the crisis issue for their current stage, they are not yet in 
one of those leading stages. 
Whereas Erikson’s (1963) focus was psychosocial, Hammer and Bennett 
(2007) clarified that in the DMIS “the underlying assumption of the model is that 
as one’s experience of cultural difference becomes more sophisticated, one’s 
competence in intercultural relations potentially increases” (p. 12, italics in 
original). (Jones 2011, 7–9) 
 
This dissertation focuses on whether cultural differences matter in the conduct of 
international relations and is not a comprehensive study of intercultural competence, nor 
of analyses of the institution under study from all potential level of intercultural 
competence. For these reasons, this review presents only a brief overview of the DMIS / 
IDC models, which have been thoroughly developed, particularly by Bennett (M. J. 
Bennett 1986, 1998, 2004, 2012, 2013a, 2016; Janet M. Bennett and Bennett 2004) and 
Hammer (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman 2003; Hammer 2009b, 2011, 2012, 2015).The 
DMIS is a model of movement from ethnocentrism, or monoculturalism, to 
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ethnorelativism or interculturalism. It has been applied to both groups and individual 
levels of analysis, particularly through its associated measurement tool, the Intercultural 
Development Inventory (IDI) (Hammer 2009b). 
In clarifying the relationship between the two models (DMIS / IDC), the DMIS 
was, as mentioned above, conceptualized by Bennett in 1986. An assessment based on 
the model was operationalized as the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI), which 
Bennett and Hammer collaborated on. Hammer now owns the IDI, and based on the 
findings of the instrument, he has revised the model somewhat. This has resulted in the 
IDC, about which he continues to publish (e.g., 2015). Bennett continues to publish about 
the DMIS (e.g., 2016). Bennett’s emphasis remains firmly wedded to the constructivist16 
foundations of the model (M. J. Bennett 2013b, 2013a, 2016), while Hammer seems more 
keen to emphasize its practical application (Hammer 2009b, 2012). Figure 2 
demonstrates the relationship between the models. 
Direction of 
Movement 
Experience of Difference Increases 
DMIS Stages Denial Defense Minimization Acceptance Adaptation Integration 
DMIS  
Stage Types 
Ethnocentric Stages Ethnorelative Stages 
IDC Stages Denial 
Polarization 









Monocultural                                 Intercultural  
Mindset 
CD Measured on 
a separate plane, 
not considered 




Figure 2. Comparison of the DMIS and IDC. 
 
16 As noted previously, while Bennett’s constructivism is related to the Constructivist paradigm in 
International Relations, the connection is indirect. 
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Adapted from Jones (2011, 12). 
A more detailed description of each stage can be found in Table 5. What follows 
is a condensed explanation of the stages, drawing on Bennett and Hammer in their 
various iterations:17 Denial is a stage at which cultural difference is not meaningfully 
experienced. Polarization is a stage in which difference is experienced but is experienced 
dualistically, where either one’s own group or another group is good and the opposite 
group is bad. Minimization follows this Defense/Polarization and is a stage in which 
difference is accepted but in which similarity and universalistic assumptions are used to 
cover the depth of difference. Acceptance involves the recognition that despite the 
linkages brought about by shared humanity, people really do experience the world quite 
differently from one another, and that similarities are not enough to explain these 
differences. Adaptation involves the capacity to shift lenses or shift frames from one’s 
own set of lenses to another’s (and back again). Integration goes beyond this into the 
development of identity once the capacity to frame shift is realized. 
Given the focus on Minimization in the present study, a recent passage from 
Bennett is worth including in whole: 
In the third and final stage of Ethnocentrism, Minimization, the threat of Defense 
has been resolved by assuming a basic similarity among all human beings. 
Differences that were threatening in Defense are subsumed into already-existing, 
familiar categories. These categories are of two types: physical universalism, 
wherein, for instance, all human beings have the same needs; and transcendent 
universalism wherein, for instance, everyone is subject to the same spiritual 
principles, whether they know it or not. People in Minimization recognize cultural 
variation in institutions and customs (objective culture) and may be quite 
interested in those kinds of differences. However, they hold mightily to the idea 
that beneath these differences beats the heart of a person pretty much like them. 
Because they are still lacking cultural self-awareness, people in Minimization 
 
17 Some of this paragraph originally appeared in a post the author wrote for week 6 of IDV 871. 
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cannot see that their characterizations of similarity are usually based on their own 
culture.  
People with a Minimization worldview are nice about people from other 
cultures. They make statements such as “we are all one under the sun,” and they 
may be sincerely motivated to include cultural diversity into their activities. 
However, they cannot fathom why people of other cultures might not want to 
engage in the proffered activities. This stage is associated with various “melting 
pot” ideas, where a lot of emphasis may be placed on assimilation into the host 
culture. Politically oriented people at this stage may argue for universal human 
rights or world capitalism, without reference to how such a position might be 
perceived by others as a form of cultural imperialism. People of dominant ethnic 
groups may assume that all people have “equal opportunity,” failing to perceive 
that institutions fashioned in their own culture’s image may offer them advantages 
while hindering the achievement of others who are culturally different. 
Organizations characterized by Minimization may overstate their 
sensitivity to diversity issues, claiming to be “tolerant” and “colorblind.” This 
leads to poor retention of cultural diversity, since people from non-dominant 
cultural groups often interpret these claims as hypocritical. An extreme emphasis 
on corporate culture creates strong pressure for culture conformity, creating 
international antagonisms where the corporate culture clashes with the local 
















Table 5  





Stage Description Issue to be Resolved 
Denial A person is “unable to experience differences in other than 
extremely simple ways” and has a worldview structure that has 
either “no categories or only broad categories for construing cultural 
difference” (M. J. Bennett 2007). “In some cases, people with this 
orientation may dehumanize others, assuming that different 
behavior is a deficiency in intelligence or personality” (19). Key 
features are disinterest in and avoidance of cultural difference 
the ability to recognize 
the existence of culture as 
an explanatory principle 
and thus construe cultural 
difference (M. J. Bennett 




Characterized by “a judgmental orientation grounded in a sense of 
‘us versus them,’” (Hammer 2009, 249). Bennett (2007) emphasized 
that in this stage it is common to have stereotyped understandings of 
other cultures. The two main variations of Defense are as follows: 
(a) Defense/Denigration, wherein any other culture (and its values 
and behaviors) are judged negatively; (b) Defense/Superiority, 
wherein positive elements of one’s own culture are exaggerated 
(Bennett 2007). 
The key issue to resolve 
in Polarization (whether 
Defense or Reversal) is 
“to recognize the 
stereotypic nature of 
one’s perceptions and 
experiences of the other 
culture and to actively 
identify commonalities 
between one’s own 
views, needs, and goals 
and that of the other” 





The “poles are reversed” and one views “another culture as superior 
while maligning one’s own” (Bennett 2007, 20). Reversal is 
distinguished from Defense, because “Reversal consists of generally 
positive evaluations toward other cultures” (Hammer 2009, 249). 
However, he clarified by noting that both of “these evaluations are . 
. . stereotypic and reflect little, deeper cultural understandings of the 
other cultural community” (249). Hammer continued that a key 
feature of Reversal is the tendency to be overly critical of the 
cultural practices of one’s own group one the one hand, and 
uncritical of an often idealized other group on the other hand. 
Minimization Attention to differences is diminished, while physical and 
transcendental similarities are emphasized. Bennett (2007) conceded 
that this stage appears sensitive compared to the polarization of 
Defense, however “the assumed commonality with others is 
typically defined in ethnocentric terms: since everyone is essentially 
like us, it is sufficient in cross-cultural situations to ‘just be 
yourself’” (21). Hammer (2008) noted that difference is masked by 
commonality lenses, such as “an over-application of human 
similarity, as well as universal values and principles” (249). 
“to deepen understanding 
of one’s own culture 
(cultural self-awareness) 
and to increase 
understanding of culture 
general and specific 
frameworks for making 
sense (and more fully 
attending to) cultural 
differences” (Hammer 
2009, 249). 
Acceptance Individuals in acceptance “perceive that all behaviors and values, 
including their own, exist in distinctive cultural contexts and that 
patterns of behaviors and values can be discerned within each 
context” (Bennett 2007, 22). Does not indicate a blind approval of 
any way of approaching the world, “but rather acceptance of the 
distinctive reality of the other culture’s worldview” (22). 
“reconcile the 
‘relativistic’ stance that 
aids understanding of 
cultural differences 
without giving up one’s 






Stages of the DMIS / IDC. Adapted from (Jones 2011, 13–17) 
Intercultural Adaptive Frame-Shifting18 
Intercultural competence leads to the capacity to engage in adaptive frame-
shifting (stage five in the DMIS and IDC). Intercultural adaptive frame-shifting draws on 
several composite fields: constructivism, empathy, and embodied ethnocentrism, which 
are wide-ranging and deep. It has been necessary to communicate the general approach of 
the literature in these areas, rather than to attempt to represent the whole of the 
conceptual frames. The first frame, arguably the most fundamentally important frame in 
the frame-shifting theory, is constructivism. This is followed by a consideration of 
embodied ethnocentrism and finally by a consideration of empathy. 
Constructivism 
 Glasersfeld (1984) attributes the role of first constructivist to Giambattista Vico 
(ca. 1710), and he accords Piaget the honor alongside Vico of being subject to early 
skepticism about constructivism. Rather than placing primary emphasis on genetic or 
environmental factors, Kelly (1963, 8) and Glasersfeld emphasize “the creative capacity 
 
18 This section originally appeared in the author’s paper for IDV 710. 
Table 5 Continued 
 
Adaptation Emphasizes both cognitive frame shifting and behavioral code-
shifting. Bennett (1998) involves “a shift in perspective away from 
our own to an acknowledgement of the other person’s different 
experience” (208). “The ability to empathize with another 
worldview in turn allows modified behavior to flow naturally from 
that experience. It is this natural flow of behavior that keeps code-
shifting from being fake or inauthentic” (Bennett 2007, 23). 
Hammer (2008) explained that having resolved the ethical malaise 
of Acceptance, a person is able to deeply understand cultural 
difference while maintaining a strong sense of ethical commitment 
to other principles. It is thus that a person can accept difference 






cognitive frame shifting 
and behavioral code 
shifting is occurring 
such that an individual is 
able to experience the 
world in ways that 
approximate the 
experience of the 
cultural ‘other’” 
(Hammer 2009, 250). 
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of the living thing to represent the environment, not merely to respond to it.” Kelly and 
Glasersfeld argue that this capacity is often exercised subconsciously, as a necessary 
response to a complex world, famously referred to by Whorf (1998, 90) as a 
“kaleidoscopic flux of impressions” that must be organized by the human mind to be 
comprehended. While this word picture contrasts significantly with the “undifferentiated 
homogeneity” that Kelly (1963, 9) suggests the mind must organize, the authors agree on 
a world void of meaning until meaning is applied to it by people. 
The process of applying meaning to the world, called perception by Singer 
(1998), is not passive, even if it is subconscious. Singer suggests that stimuli are selected, 
evaluated, and organized from the external environment. Kelly (1963, 9) takes this 
concept further, noting that people find it necessary to organize the world in order to be 
able to make sense of it, and that this need is so profound that even a poorly fitting 
construction is more helpful than no construction at all. That is a striking claim and a 
claim which is offensive to epistemological realists (Glasersfeld 1984). 
However, Glasersfeld (1984) argues that rather than attempting to understand 
human knowledge as something that matches the external world, it is more useful to 
understand human knowledge as a set of conceptualizations designed to fit that world. 
This contrast between match and fit opens the possibility of multiple potential fits; a 
potentially endless set of constructed responses could exist in the same environment 
simultaneously, all with potentially the same or different levels of fit. Fit is different from 
the idea of a knowledge, which matches the external world, because whereas different 
knowledge-structure match sets could be compared for fidelity to the original; fit sets 
cannot be so easily compared. Kelly (1963) adds that while the concepts that comprise 
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such fits are in a sense real, the reality is accorded not in relation to their match to the 
world at large but rather in the real employment of the frames by the user. The attempt to 
find fit generates for Kelly something that is real, but the real thing is not something 
which exists in external reality but rather in the perception (like Singer) or construction 
designed to fit that reality (like Glasersfeld). Constructivists agree that the environment 
as people perceive it is not the reality, instead “the environment as we perceive it is our 
invention” (Foerster 1984, 42). 
If the reality of the environment is an invention, and if multiple fits may be 
invented, then it follows that different people are free to construct the world in different 
ways, as none of them is actually constructing the world as it really is (Kelly 1963; 
Foerster 1984). Indeed, the same phenomena can often be viewed “in the light of two or 
more systems” (Kelly 1963). Of course, there are many phenomena about which 
constructs are never created – these do not belong to a system and are not perceived; yet 
that they could be perceived suggests that further constructs could be built to recognize 
such phenomena (Kelly 1963) or that constructs could be changed to interpret the world 
differently. 
Indeed, this is what Kelly (1963, 9) anticipates: people continue to attempt to 
improve their constructs by “altering them to provide better fits.” However, the capacity 
of people to change their constructs will be limited by their social-historical location; 
Glasersfeld (1984, 30) suggests that the constraints people encounter in their experience 
of the world “spring from the history of our construction, because at any moment 
whatever has been done limits what can be done now.” Nonetheless, Kelly (1963) 
suggests that through a process of superordinating some constructs and subsuming other 
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constructs, it is possible (though perhaps difficult) to reorder one’s experience of the 
world so that it better fits the external world. 
The possibility of multiple constructions raises questions about the capacity of 
people to transmit and change constructs, to which this paper could now turn. However, 
because the primary concern of this paper is the capacity to shift frames across cultures, it 
is appropriate to first consider the role of culture in the development of constructs. 
Culture and Constructivism 
Constructivists seem to have a difficult time with culture, on the one hand 
acknowledging the concept as an important one but on the other hand struggling to 
reconcile the intensely individual experience of constructing reality to the intensely social 
experience of sharing those constructions and thereby reality (Palmaru 2012a; Palmaru 
2012b; Kelly 1963). Echoing Whorf (1998), Krippendorff (2008) claims that the 
linguistic systems that people use have an important impact on the structure of individual 
cognitions. Krippendorff further suggests that the linguistic cognition process is a 
fundamentally social one, a claim that again echoes Whorf. 
If cognition is at least partly social, then it follows that the process of construction 
is also at least partly social (Krippendorff 2008; Whorf 1998; Berger and Luckmann 
1967). The social elements of construction and communication tend to take place with 
certain people more than others, and the lines of those divisions are often understood to 
be cultural divides (Singer 1998; M. J. Bennett 2013a). Bennett explains that the cultural 
knowledge systems that result from repeated interactions with particular cultural groups 
are passed from generation to generation through a process of socialization. Palmaru 
 
61 
(2012b, 69) shares this view, noting that “culture is a key link in the constant 
reproduction of the social world without which the social would just cease to exist.” 
Constructivists (Ackermann 2015; Palmaru 2012b) are cautious about the extent 
to which individuals, even from the same socio-cultural background, can really achieve 
shared meaning with another person. Singer (1998) reconciles himself to both ends of this 
tension, noting that it is neither possible for two individuals to construe the world in 
exactly the same ways nor in completely different ways. Singer suggests that people from 
similar backgrounds, especially similar cultural backgrounds, will tend to perceive the 
world in rather more similar ways than will people from different backgrounds. Kelly 
(1963, 94) shares this expectation, noting that “people belong to the same cultural group, 
not merely because they behave alike, nor because they expect the same things of others, 
but especially because they construe their experience in the same way.” 
This similarity in construal of the world leads Palmaru (2012b, 69) to go so far as 
to suggest that “culture could be defined as a collective construction.” So while 
constructivists like Palmaru recognize that individuals will not perceive or construe the 
world in exactly the same way, they can nonetheless find that “culture is constituted by 
the shared mental constructs of individuals” (69; emphasis added). However, Bennett 
(2013a) and Palmaru both expect that cultural systems are not static but rather are 
continuously evolving, especially through the communication process: the shared mental 
constructs of culture are “created, maintained, and changed in communication by 
meanings that are contributed to the messages by others” (Palmaru 2012b, 69). 
Given that there are multiple competing definitions and conceptualizations of 
culture, it may be valuable to note that at least some constructivists express some 
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hesitation regarding one of the more famous authors on culture. Palmaru (2012b), for 
example, strongly resists Hofstede’s (i.e., 1991) concept of culture as a mental program 
or software (though Palmaru suggests that this concept actually originated with 
Luhmann). Several problems emerge with the concept of culture as mental program, two 
of which are considered here: (1) the most pronounced problem with culture as a program 
is that it locates culture in the mind of the individual, rather than in co-created space as “a 
phenomenon beyond actors as a collective knowledge that does not coincide in detail 
with the personal sense systems of a particular actor” (Palmaru 2012b, 70); and (2) the 
second problem with culture as a program is the underemphasis of the communication 
process which risks reifying cultures into phenomenon more static than they actually are 
(Palmaru 2012a; Palmaru 2012b; M. J. Bennett 2013c). 
As has been demonstrated in this section, a constructivist approach can be 
reconciled with certain conceptualizations of culture. This happens through the 
recognition that the process of construction is at once individual and social, a concept that 
requires the paper to turn briefly to a consideration of radical and cybernetic construction 
before turning to the question of whether and how constructs can be transmitted and 
adapted. 
Radical Constructivism 
The approach to constructivism employed herein may be considered a radical 
constructivism. The term is sometimes used meaningfully and thus must be addressed 
briefly. In essence, radical constructivism is radical because it does not attempt to 
represent an objective view of the world (Glasersfeld 1984). As Singer (1998) explained, 
the existence of objective reality is not of particular concern when attempting to 
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understand humans because humans necessarily experience the world subjectively. This 
subjectivity is, according to Glasersfeld, the key work of radical constructivism: to 
explain an experience of the world that is largely stable and reliable despite the human 
incapacity to know things as they truly are. Radical constructivism is radical in part 
because it is “post-epistemological” (N. Noddings, as quoted in E. von Glasersfeld 1990) 
and does not rely on a traditional notion of truth. Bennett (2006) emphasizes the 
etymology of the word radical (see “Radical, Adj. and N.” 2015) and similarly suggests 
that constructivism that is radical is so because the assumptions of such constructivism 
extend all the way to the root of knowledge – radical constructivism is thus not a slight 
departure from epistemology as commonly understood but instead uses such different 
assumptions that its course must be fundamentally different from said epistemology. 
Palmaru (2012b) indicates that it might be useful to consider radical 
constructivism as being initiated by the individual and then moving toward society, 
whereas social constructivism begins with society and then moves to the individual. 
Bennett (2013a) requires a radical constructivism for his concept of frame-shifting but 
does so in a way that also relies on social constructivism. This tension is expressed in the 
dialectic process wherein “objective culture is internalized through socialization and 
subjective culture is externalized through role behavior. Thus, in a circular, self-
referential process, the institutions of culture are constantly re-created by people enacting 
their experience of those institutions” (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 7). While this dialectic 
process may conflict to some degree with Palmaru’s conception of radical constructivism, 
Palmaru nonetheless suggests that in the context of individual and social construction, the 
use of bivalent either/or thinking is a trap; he thus invites and anticipates the dialectic 
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himself in his consideration of culture. The problem of the dialectic may be resolved, or 
at least clarified, through the consideration of the cybernetic view of constructivism. 
Cybernetic Constructivism 
Stated briefly, cybernetics involves the use of feedback in the modification of the 
process of production of something (E. von Glasersfeld 2002). Cybernetic construction of 
knowledge acknowledges the role of the observer in creating the knowledge he/she 
participates in knowing. In analyzing the process of knowing, Foerster (1984) claims that 
cognition can thus be understood as the process of computing a reality, or perhaps 
computing descriptions of a reality, or computing descriptions of descriptions, or 
computing computations. This increasingly restricted (or is it expanded?) view of 
cognition is restricted precisely because of the recognition of the feedback loop in the 
process of knowing. The move from the process of computing descriptions of a reality to 
the process of computing descriptions of descriptions, for example, is made precisely 
because the observer is not in fact describing reality as it is but as it is perceived. 
Recognizing the role of the generator of knowledge in the generation of knowledge is a 
cybernetic approach (Foerster 1984; E. von Glasersfeld 2002). 
While Glasersfeld (2002) suggests that radical constructivism is an outgrowth of 
cybernetic construction, cybernetic construction can also help to reconcile the apparent 
difference between the individual (radical) and social constructivist approaches 
mentioned in the previous section (Radical Constructivism) by drawing attention to the 
feedback loop present in knowledge generation. Another fascinating outcome of this 
approach is that knowledge must be understood from within a cultural system (hence the 
relevance of the participant observation approach in anthropology), where the socio-
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cultural feedback systems allow the observer to determine the accuracy with which 
he/she is constructing knowledge in a manner similar to people within a culture. This is in 
part due to the role of cybernetics in understanding the communication process. 
Glasersfeld (2002) draws attention to three cybernetic communication functions of 
interest here: (1) the sender of feedback messages must have a set of codes that 
corresponds to the messages to be sent; (2) the receiver of the feedback must have a set of 
codes that corresponds to the messages to be decoded; and (3) to achieve success, the first 
and second codes must be the same. 
Summarily, the cybernetic approach thus gives rise to the radical constructivism 
approach, both as applied to the individual and to the feedback process in the social 
development of constructions. Furthermore, the cybernetic approach raises the question 
of whether or not the codes used for the transmission of messages are the same between 
senders and receivers – a question that connects directly to the original concern of this 
paper in that it suggests that people with different systems of knowing may not in fact be 
able to understand each other without a process of approximation of the frame (or code 
set) of the other and in particular the cultural other. This then gives rise to the question of 
whether and how constructs can be transmitted and adapted. 
Transmitting and Adapting Constructs 
In the previous section, the review of the literature has considered the ways in 
which individuals use constructs to comprehend and construe reality. That this is at least 
in part a social process has also been explored, including the likely effects of socio-
cultural processes on formulating similar constructions among members of groups. 
However, the process of interacting with others, and particularly of construing the 
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constructions of others, adds another layer of complexity. Geertz (1977) suggests that the 
attempt to understand others, especially across cultures, is one that involves something 
akin to generating and testing guesses – fictive approximations of what others mean and 
experience. 
Kelly (1963) suggests that a person who attempts to understand and have a 
constructive role in another person’s frame must engage in the process of decoding and 
understanding that person. Interestingly, he does not claim that it is necessary to share the 
same, or even a very similar, set of constructions as the interaction partner in order to 
have a constructive role in that person’s life, thus discounting the necessity of 
assimilation in order to find connection. Instead, it is necessary to effectively interpret the 
other person’s outlook. Kelly furthermore suggests that construal of the other’s outlook 
does not need to be mutual to be effective. The capacity of one to construe the other may 
be sufficient to generate the shared space for effective interaction. 
This leads Kelly (1963, 63) to claim furthermore that if through the act of 
construing another “we can predict accurately what others will do, we can adjust 
ourselves to their behavior. If others know how to tell what we will do, they can adjust 
themselves to our behavior.” 
This does not yet answer the question of whether and how a construct could be 
communicated from one person to another. Kelly (1963) suggests that a construct can 
indeed be communicated from one person to another without losing its reality. This is 
striking, given the necessity of the shared codes for encoding and decoding mentioned by 
Glasersfeld (2002). However, Kelly suggests that constructs themselves are impersonal in 
their allegiance – that one person has constructed a particular meaning does not mean that 
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this meaning cannot also be constructed by another person. The question of the fidelity of 
transfer remains, but this is due to the communication process rather than to the nature of 
constructs. Of course, the second order cyberneticist here steps in to suggest that 
constructs themselves have no essential essence (this would be a reified view) but that the 
concept of constructs is itself constructed (E. von Glasersfeld 2002). Though this would 
seem to threaten the idea that an identical construct can be held by two different 
individuals, Kelly’s assertion can be clarified to indicate that there is nothing to preclude 
two people from coming to achieve such a similar construal of some phenomenon that it 
is, at least for practical purposes, the same. Of course, the interior and socio-cultural 
context of each individual remains different, and the individuals might thus experience 
the construct differently (a la Singer 1998); however, this is not itself evidence of some 
incapacity to achieve shared constructions. 
Ackermann (2015) also takes on the issue of whether or not shared constructions 
are achievable. On the one hand, she claims that “as constructivists, we ‘know’ that we 
can never fully understand others or be understood by them” (418), arguing that 
ultimately the interior world is impenetrable. However, she claims this does not preclude 
the achievement of nearly shared experiences, referred to as as-if shared experiences, in 
which people agree to act as if their shared constructions are really shared, even though 
this shared experience is fundamentally fictive. Ackerman suggests that acknowledging 
the fictive nature of the as-if experience is useful in avoiding reification. At the same 
time, the as-if-ness of these shared encounters does not make them non-powerful. 
Palmaru (2012b) joins Ackerman and Kelly in suggesting that shared meaning is 
at least partly possible to achieve, noting, “Clearly, the phrase ‘shared meaning’ does not 
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indicate that there are identical personal senses. A shared meaning is an emergent 
property of the communication and interaction” (76). However, it is necessary to go 
beyond the question of whether constructs can be effectively transmitted and shared to 
the question of whether they can be adapted. Palmaru suggests that they can, pointing to 
the interrelationship between cognition and action to note that the process of living 
enables the adaptation of existing constructs. 
Kelly (1963) suggests that in order to adjust one’s frameworks, three features are 
needed: (1) there must be a superordinate construct that allows for the development of the 
new construct (which itself could eventually be superordinated, but it must begin as 
subordinate); (2) there must a permeability in the existing constructed frames that allows 
for the development of the new or adjusted constructs to enter the perceived context; and 
(3) in terms of context, ideally there is an absence of threat and/or preoccupation with old 
constructs, and there is a safe space in which to test the viability of the new constructs. 
The third criteria may be especially interesting for the context of international 
development, given the pressures that can at times face development practitioners. 
Constructivism Summary 
This section has introduced the concept of constructivism, including both 
cybernetic and radical constructivism. People know reality as they construct it, and this 
process is both intensely individual and intensely social. It is simultaneously impossible 
for people to share either a total lack of similarity or complete similarity in their 
constructions of the world. People living in cultural groups tend to share rather more 
similar constructions with each other than they do with members of other cultural groups. 
These constructs can be communicated with a surprising level of fidelity, but this 
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transmission relies on the development of as-if communication spaces where shared 
meaning is asymptotically approximated rather than fully achieved. It is facilitative, 
though perhaps not strictly required, for at least one communication partner to construe 
the other’s perspective to achieve the creation of these as-if spaces. Constructs can be 
changed, but there are conditions that facilitate and impede these changes. 
Embodied Ethnocentrism 
The previous section explored the theoretical foundations of constructivism and 
included an emphasis on the cognitively constructed experience of the world. Taking into 
account that this paper addresses the question of frame-shifting in the cross-cultural 
interaction setting, it is important to recognize that several authors have suggested that 
the intercultural communication experience is not merely a cognitive exercise. Instead, 
they argue the body is also significantly involved in the process. This forms an important 
element of Bennett’s frame-shifting model which includes both cognitive and behavioral 
frameshifting (Bennett 1998) and thus involves not merely the mind but also the body. 
That the literature around the experience of the world focuses primarily on the 
cognitive domain is noted by Bennett and Castiglioni (2004) and Hastings (2015). These 
authors suggest that attention to the body and its senses is a relatively recent development 
in the Western academy, with Bennett and Castiglioni going so far as to argue that “the 
excision of the body in Western thought has led to the reification of the products of the 
mind” (250). Perhaps because of this, Schaetti, Ramsey, and Watanabe (2008) rely 
heavily on eastern sources in their development of the concept that one must pay 
attention to the role of and messages from “the feeling body” in the cross-cultural 
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encounter. Three main topics emerge in understanding the role of the body: (1) the body 
as perceiver/interpreter, (2) the body as reactor, and (3) the body as interactor. 
The Body as Perceiver/Interpreter 
Hastings (2015, §: “The senses”) argues that there are seven sensory categories 
that must be considered in the body’s role of perceiver: (1) sight, (2) sound, (3) touch, (4) 
taste, (5) smell, (6) physical sensations, and (7) sensing. These last two merit brief 
explication: physical sensations refers to the feelings and sentience that the body 
experiences while moving through the world, whether in the mundane or the special, and 
it includes the “deeply felt quality that we have about meanings within one’s culture.” 
Examples include the feeling-body experience of waiting in line, driving in traffic, the 
effects of a breeze, ambient temperature, or the anticipation of a holiday. Sensing on the 
other hand has to do with awareness that is experienced in the other six senses but is not 
directly derived from any of them or from any combination of them. Examples include 
the feeling of being observed or the sense of someone’s presence, which are sometimes 
invoked even without any direct evidence from any of the other sensory channels. 
According to Hastings, these sensory experiences are not understood as being inherently 
good or bad but are expected to have culturally shaped meanings. 
Bennett and Castiglioni (2004) also add a sense beyond the fifth that they call an 
energetic field, which seems to be a combination of Hastings’ sixth and seventh senses. 
They claim that the experience of the body is not merely informative but also becomes 
part of the co-creation of the space. Kelly (1963) seems to anticipate this process when 
noting that much of a person’s construction of the world may be pre-linguistic or 
altogether nonlinguistic. Indeed, he posits that “construing is not to be confounded with 
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verbal formation” (51) and raises the possibility that physiological construction may be 
just as thoroughly constructed as psycho-cognitive construction. However, this is 
important for Kelly because the words themselves do not make the construct – persons 
may use the same words to describe a construct and yet have a different lived experience 
of the construct. 
Kelly, Bennett and Castiglioni, and Hastings, thus all look to the body as an active 
participant in selecting which phenomena are acknowledged and how they are 
immediately perceived. As Bennett and Castiglioni put it, “people in each situation are 
feeling the culture of the place” (258) through their bodies. 
The Body as Reactor 
Bennett and Castiglioni (2004) suggest that because the body has learned certain 
ways of being in the world – whether these are Kelly’s prelinguistic constructions or 
some other patterns – it often reacts in ways that are consistent with what it has learned is 
normal in terms of how to be in the world. Schaetti, Ramsey, and Watanabe (2008) build 
on this suggestion in formulating their concept of how to process the stresses of 
intercultural interaction. They suggest that due to the body’s important role in 
interpreting the world, its subconscious reactions are actually an important source of data 
about one’s lived experience of the world. Indeed, Schaetti et al. and Bennett and 
Castiglioni argue that the body’s pre-cognitive constructed reactions can reveal much to 
the cognitive mind once its attention has been turned to the body as a data source. 
Bennett and Castiglioni (2004) suggest that, at least sometimes, this preconscious 
somatic reaction to the world is effectively the manifestation of embodied ethnocentrism. 
The body does not consciously judge that one culture is better than another, but because it 
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has developed non-linguistic adaptive constructions within the context of a particular 
culture, the reactions of the body will tend to favor certain cultural ways of being – 
whether these relate to smells, proxemics, touch, or other senses. 
The Body as Interactor 
One of the reasons that Hastings (2015) finds the study of the body’s interaction 
with culture to be important is that all human senses convey meaning. He suggests that 
these senses actually perform communicative functions at levels of meaning sometimes 
on par with words themselves (though obviously non-linguistically). Yet even as 
Hastings elevates the senses to an important form of cultural discourse, Bennett and 
Castiglioni caution that it is in fact quite difficult to come attain comprehension or 
experience of the way of being in which someone else experiences in the world. This 
suggests that the feeling-body constructs of the world may be similar to the cognitive 
constructs of the world discussed in the previous section of the literature review in that 
they are intensely personal and that when they are shared, there is a limitation on just 
how thorough or precise that sharing is. Indeed, Bennett and Castiglioni’s caution evokes 
Ackerman’s (2015) sense of as-if-ness as a mode for achieving shared meaning. 
This does not mean that the body is not communicating. Instead, it means that the 
communication may be fraught with misunderstanding, just as the mismatch in the code-
lists of cybernetic constructivism may lead to misinterpretation of similar cognitive 
stimuli, so the signals and semi-automated (learned) response of the body could be easily 
decoded using the wrong code list. This may be why Bennett and Castiglioni emphasize 
that “the intentional use of empathy is key to developing intercultural competence” (260). 
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Thus, having recognized the body as perceiver/interpreter, reactor, and interactor, the 
paper now shifts to the final major section of the literature review: empathy. 
Empathy 
M. J. Bennett and Castiglioni (2004, 260) argue that empathy can be used to 
“apprehend experience that is inaccessible to us in our own cultural worlds,” an 
application that certainly supports the notion of frame-shifting that is considered in this 
paper. They suggest that the practice of empathy is one that involves the sensing body as 
well as the cognitive function and attitude. This section explores the question of how 
empathy can be understood and practiced. Bennett (2013b) suggests that empathy should 
be distinguished from sympathy, a thought that will be considered at the end of this 
section. First, however, it is prudent to establish the state of the art of empathy theory. 
Empathy can be approached from many different lenses, and whole volumes are 
dedicated to the study of empathy in art (i.e., Keen 2010), aesthetics (i.e., White 2013), 
moral development (i.e., Hoffman 2000), and law (i.e., Dubber 2006). Empathy also has 
a standing in popular literature, especially around the topics of love and self-help (i.e., 
Ciaramicoli and Ketcham 2000). Coplan and Goldie (2014) trace the theoretical 
development of empathy through theoretical psychology, moral theory, aesthetics, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, clinical psychology, developmental and social 
psychology, care ethics, neuroscience, and even animal behavior and social organization. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, however, it is necessary to focus in on three 
particular areas of empathy research: (1) reconstructive/cognitive empathy, (2) mirroring 




Coplan and Goldie (2014, ix) note that empathy is important in terms of learning 
to “gain a grasp of the content of other people’s minds, and to predict and explain what 
they will think, feel, and do.” Although, they admit that there is not precise agreement 
about how this happens. One view is the theory theory which suggests that people take a 
theoretical view toward other people, an example of which is to suppose that “if someone 
wants something and believes that by doing such-and-such he will be able to get it, then, 
all things being equal he will do such-and-such” (xxxii). Though this rationalist view held 
sway through much of the twentieth century, Coplan and Goldie suggest that it has been 
largely replaced by the simulation theory (also called simulationism). The simulationist 
view essentially allows a person to take the view of another person and to simulate what 
the other would do, rather than using a hypothetical-deductive approach. The simulation 
is, however, usually imagined and is used to understand the other, rather than to actually 
accomplish what the other would do. 
While these first two processes are clearly different from each other, Coplan and 
Goldie (2014) suggest that they are both still primarily conscious cognitive processes, 
also understood as higher-level empathy, which is also called the reconstructive route to 
empathy (Goldman 2014). A different theoretical option is less concisely named, but it 
entails a base-level picking-up on the thoughts and feelings of another person, which is 
understood as lower-level empathy, or what Goldman (2014) calls the mirroring route to 




Further developing the theme of constructive empathy, (Matravers 2014) argues 
that while empathy is a path to knowledge of (1) another’s emotional and mental states 
and (2) what the experience of heretofore unknown mental and emotional states feels 
like, there are in fact significant limitations in the exercise of empathy. The two primary 
limits are conceptualized as (1) accessing the correct inputs and (2) the capacity to 
reproduce the target states of the other with fidelity. Even if these are satisfied, Matravers 
doubts that the empathizer actually has the capacity to reproduce the complex experience 
of being that the other in fact experiences, thus diminishing the possibility that empathy 
can actually generate, at least comprehensively, the desired knowledge of the other with 
the frequency it may be commonly assumed that it can. 
While they do not cast as much doubt on the possibility of empathizing, Coplan 
(2014), Bennett (2013b), and Decety and Meltzoff (2014) also provide some caution in 
empathetic identification in suggesting that empathy must not be practiced as self-
oriented perspective taking but is rather other-oriented perspective taking. That is to say, 
effective empathy does not involve the placement of oneself in the other’s metaphorical 
shoes but rather the placement of oneself into the other’s experience of being his/herself 
in those shoes. The difference is very significant, as putting oneself in another’s shoes is 
prone to result in “false consensus effects, personal distress and prediction errors based 
on egocentric biases” (Coplan 2014, 13) – a claim the Bennett extends to not only 
egocentric but also ethnocentric biases. 
Mirroring Empathy and Imitation 
Though it will not be discussed at length here, the concept of mirroring empathy 
must be briefly introduced. Iacoboni (2014) describes neurological research that 
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investigates the process by which one sees his/herself in the other, where the other may 
be perceived as an extension of the self. Iacoboni suggests that humans’ neurobiology 
actually has the capacity to put “us ‘within each other’” (also called intersubjectivity) 
(57). Decety and Meltzoff (2014) emphasize that the capacity for human imitation of 
humans is innate, having tested newborns and found not only can they correctly replicate 
the optically observed facial actions of others, but they can iteratively correct their own 
actions to better match the face they are replicating, despite the fact that they cannot see 
their own face. They argue that this capacity is fundamentally different from non-human 
primates, and it suggests that the capacity for intersubjectivity is not learned but is innate. 
The capacity of the pre-linguistic human to demonstrate imitation and 
intersubjectivity is important because it complexifies the process by which researchers 
understand how empathy functions (Decety and Meltzoff 2014). Rather than suggesting 
that empathy must be constructed through linguistic processes, imitation and mirror 
neuron research suggests that at least part of the capacity for empathy happens at the 
neuro-somatic levels, with or without linguistic construction (Iacoboni 2014; Decety and 
Meltzoff 2014). Decety and Meltzoff further report that intention, emotion, and attention 
are apparently readable to pre- or developingly-linguistic people (like infants). 
Fascinatingly, Iacoboni points the finger for human atrocities committed against one 
another at the higher-level constructions that tend to divide, finding that people’s 
fundamental brain function is to move people toward social empathy rather than 
antipathy. 
In the end, Coplan and Goldie (2014) resist the idea that the division between 
cognitive empathy and mirroring empathy need be absolute. Instead, they argue that data 
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gained through mirroring empathy can be enriched by simulative and reconstructive 
empathy and that there is nothing to gain by denying this connection. Coplan and Goldie 
argue that such denials exist apparently due to the tendency of empathy researchers to 
focus exclusively on one or the other of these types of empathy, and they call for further 
development of the philosophical literature on empathy. Indeed, despite their focus on 
mirror empathy, Decety and Meltzoff (2014) echo Coplan and Goldie’s sentiment, noting 
for example that when active (reconstructive) empathy is added to the passive (mirror) 
empathy, the precision of the empathy response increases. 
Intercultural Empathy 
As mentioned previously, Bennett and Castiglioni (2004) view empathy as one of 
the core tools for developing intercultural competence. DeTurk (2001) employs a dialogic 
approach to empathy, in which the empathizer intentionally and iteratively moves toward 
the more faithful approximations of the other while intentionally decentering his/herself 
from his/her own normal experiences. This approach seems, at least in part, to echo 
Yoshikawa’s (1980) double-swing model and its inter-subjective unity. 
DeTurk (2001) applies a critical communications frame to problematize empathy 
in the context of unequal relations of power. Apparently in reaction to the risk of 
reinforcing power differentials and further marginalizing non-powerful others, DeTurk 
proposes that “it seems that attempting to perceive others’ internal frames is not what is 
important or appropriate. Instead, we should foster relational empathy through dialogue” 
(380). However, while the power dynamics expected by DeTurk may certainly prove 
problematic, it is difficult to see how this solution (conversation) directly qualifies as 
either form of empathy (reconstructive or mirroring) described in the previous sections. 
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Indeed, this solution is on the one hand a conscious rejection of reconstructive empathy, 
and yet it actually doubles back on itself by replacing reconstructive empathy with a 
dialogue-based attempt at generating (reconstructing) shared meaning (empathy). The 
difference is supposedly to be overcome by dialogue, but it seems unlikely that the power 
dynamics at play could be less disruptive in dialogue than in the original empathetic 
response. 
The solution to DeTurk’s problem may not be best located in rejecting 
reconstructive empathy but instead by asserting with Bennett (2013b), Coplan and Goldie 
(2014), and Decety and Meltzoff (2014) that such empathy must be other-centered rather 
than self-centered. Bennett anticipates the problem of power but suggests that the real 
failure to empathize is actually due to the use of sympathy (focused on one’s own 
experience) in place of empathy (focused on the other’s experience). In exploring how to 
operationalize this kind of empathy in the intercultural setting, Wang et al. (2003) note 
that reconstructive empathy (which they call intellectual empathy) must take into account 
the perception of the world as the other person perceives it, including not merely the 
personal experience of the world but also the culturally located experience of the world. 
Bennett’s (2013b) conceptualization of empathy appears to rely on both the 
reconstructive (cognitive oriented) and the imitative (emotional/behavioral oriented) 
approaches to empathy described in the previous sections of this review. It is important to 
establish which form Bennett relies on (or whether it is both) as this reveals which 
theoretical frame he anticipated as he discussed adaptive frame-shifting. Bennett clarifies 
through offering a six step process for the practice of intercultural empathy: (1) assuming 
difference, (2) knowing self, (3) suspending self, (4) allowing guided imagination, (5) 
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allowing empathetic experience, and (6) reestablishing self. These six steps could all 
happen in the exclusively reconstructive frame except that Bennett elsewhere (with 
Castiglioni 2004) rejects a solely cognitive process of practicing empathy and instead 
advises intercultural practitioners to develop a somatic feeling for the ethno-physiological 
experience of being part of another culture. As this suggestion is made within the 
discussion of empathy, it follows that Bennett anticipates both reconstructive and 
mirroring empathy. 
Constructive Frame Shifting in the Intercultural Context 
This dissertation includes the question of whether intercultural adaptive frame-
shifting might attenuate misunderstandings caused by cultural differences within 
international relations. Frame-shifting was found to be rooted in three major theoretical 
areas: constructivism, embodied ethnocentrism, and empathy. 
The constructivism literature led to the conclusions that individuals construct their 
experiences of the world and therefore do not encounter a truly real world but rather a 
constructed one; multiple constructions are possible; constructions tend to be rather more 
similar within than across cultural groups; constructions can be transmitted with some but 
not complete fidelity; it is possible to change constructions when certain criteria are met; 
and people can approximate an understanding of other people’s constructed experience of 
the world. 
The embodied ethnocentrism literature led to the conclusions that the body, and 
not solely the mind, are involved with the construction of the experience of the world; the 
body learns that certain ways of being in the world are more familiar than others; those 
familiar ways of being in the world tend to be rather more similar within than across 
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cultural groups; and the body plays an active, if pre/sub-conscious role in 
communication. 
The empathy literature led to the conclusions that humans possess some capacity 
to experience the self in the other; empathy is at least to some degree innate and pre/sub-
conscious; empathy can also be a cognitive process; that these processes interact; these 
processes may be at least to some degree influenced by social features such as power; and 
empathy across cultures must take into account not only the experience of the other as a 
person but as a culturally located person. These three major fields converge for Bennett 
(M. J. Bennett 1998; M. J. Bennett 2004; M. J. Bennett 2013a; J. M. Bennett and M. J. 
Bennett 2004; Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman 2003) in the capacities for behavioral and 
cognitive frame-shifting in the Adaptation stage of the Developmental Model of 
Intercultural Sensitivity. 
Culture and International Relations 
Applying culture to society can be difficult because it is not grouped by area but 
instead by stratifications, leading to a situation in which “different culture groups of the 
same time and place live by quite different standards and are actuated by different 
motivations” (Benedict 1934, 212). However, Benedict clarifies that “the nature of the 
cultural processes is not changed within these modern conditions, but the unit in which 
they can be studied is no longer the local group” (212–13). Thus, it will be necessary to 
clarify how culture will be defined as an integrated whole for the purpose of this study. 
Benedict’s ([1946] 2005, 5) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword grew out of the 
intersection of culture and international relations: the U.S. Office of War Information had 
tasked her with trying to “see how your enemy looks at life through his own eyes.” Hall 
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(1959) indicates that he had been working in the selection and preparation of American 
government expats. He reflects, “I remain convinced that much of our difficulty with 
people in other countries stems from the fact that so little is known about cross-cultural 
communication. Because of this, most of the good will and great efforts of our nation 
have been wasted in our foreign aid programs” (xii–xiii). 
Culture is a concept that is recognized to some degree in International Relations, 
though how and to what extent varies. As noted above, Waltz (1954, 52), in response to 
anthropologist Margaret Mead’s call to study and learn from cultures, reflects, “We had 
better pause and ask what all this is for.” He notes, in response to Frank’s urging of the 
increased knowledge of other cultures, that in some people increased cultural knowledge 
provokes humility and in others arrogance. Indeed it is perhaps unsurprising that Waltz is 
suspicious of the capacity of the study of culture to generate anything like peace – 
certainly the emphasis on structure he revealed later on (1979) is consistent with this 
view. Yet Waltz does make an important observation: 
The point of all this is not that every contribution the behavioral scientist can 
make has been made before and found wanting, but rather that the proffered 
contributions of many of them have been rendered ineffective by a failure to 
comprehend the significance of the political framework of international action. In 
such a circumstance, their prescriptions for the construction of a more peaceful 
world can only be accidentally relevant. (Waltz 1954, 76) 
 
However, Weber provides a foundation of the importance of study of culture in 
international relations, particularly through the observation that “we are cultural beings 
with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it 
significance” (1949, 81 as quoted in Barnett 2013). This capacity to lend significance to 
the world was noted by Jervis (1976), who although intending to ignore culture and 
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psychology (8) when writing Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 
nonetheless acknowledges that “the person’s background and culture” can have 
significant effects in “creating perceptual predispositions” (151). 
Writing as a defensive structural realist, Walt implied that ethnocentrism (though 
the word was not used) could play a constraining role on international relations: 
Reacting positively towards [ideologically similar states] and harshly towards 
[ideologically dissimilar states] will encourage good relations with one and drive 
the others to cling together more tightly in opposition. The hypothesis thus 
becomes self-fulfilling, and the result is then used to prove that the original belief 
was correct. (Walt 1985, 26) 
 
This type of reification is certainly targeted by scholars of culture such as Bennett 
(2013a, 2013b) and suggests the study of the relationship between the self and “other” 
offered by interculturalists may be useful in international relations (IR). 
Lebow (2008, 118) posits a cultural theory of international relations and in so 
doing discusses problems with Huntington (1996) and Almond and Verba (1965), both of 
whom he suggests employ culture in an “unsophisticated way” (118). Both of these 
approaches to culture suffer from leaving culture “badly defined, treated as static and 
monolithic, and not distinguished from other aspects of society or the environment that 
would establish its autonomy” (118.) According to Lebow, such tautological approaches 
to culture leave culture defined by the behaviors it might measure and thus produce 
nothing of substance for political scientific inquiry. However, Lebow does find his own 
way forward and posits “three fundamental motives that reflect universal human needs – 
appetite, spirit and reason – and a fourth – fear – that grows in importance to the failure 
of reason to constrain appetite or spirit” (505). Lebow thus attempts the creation of a 
grand theory of international relations. Unlike many other cultural authors, he engages 
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realism, liberalism, and constructivism. However, if successful, he would supplant rather 
than supplement them. And yet despite these grand ambitions, Lebow does not address 
culture as it has been explored in this literature review – leaving many of the most 
important voices on culture silent. 
Lebow’s grand undertaking then reinforces the pattern of failing to take seriously 
the concept of culture (at least as explored in this dissertation) rather than reversing it. 
Why then the relative paucity of cultural studies in international relations? Henderson 
(1998, 461) blames this lack on the “neorealist hegemony” over IR. This failure to 
incorporate culture in IR studies is not acceptable to Henderson because, like Jarvis, he 
recognizes the influence of culture on the perceptions of decision-makers (466): 
Culture provides a basis for ‘changing meaning,’ whereby actions in one cultural 
context are filtered through an alternative cultural lens in ways that may distort 
the original meaning of the actions and the original intent of the actors. . . . 
Intentions and behavior that are evaluated through similar/dissimilar cultural 
lenses are less/more likely to be misperceived, thus reducing/increasing the 
likelihood of conflict. (Henderson 1998, 466–67) 
 
The remainder of this section on Culture as Understood in International Relations 
seeks to address three areas of interest: (1) a brief look at international communication 
literature; (2) a short examination of civilizational studies in IR; and (3) a brief overview 
of intercultural communication and diplomacy. 
International Communication 
From a communication perspective, the idea that culture might in some way affect 
international relations is not a new one – in Casmir’s volume on Intercultural and 
International Communication, Stacey (1978, 572) asserts that “there seems to be more 
and more communication with less and less success in resolving the foreign affairs 
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problems of nations.” Yet Hopmann (1978) in the same volume expresses concern that 
communication frameworks may have limited utility when applied to international 
diplomacy in that they were not developed for such a purpose. However, while Casmir’s 
volume does bring intercultural and international communication into the same space, 
there is actually very little interaction across these disciplines even in that work. 
A similar isolation of international communication takes place in Mody’s (2003) 
volume on International and Development Communication, and culture is such an 
insignificant part of the framing of the book that appears not to be defined within it. Even 
the title of Sadri and Flammia’s (2011), Intercultural Communication: A New Approach 
to International Relations and Global Challenges (emphasis added), notes that the 
intersection between international and intercultural communication and relations has not 
been well developed. As they suggest, “One major challenge is that neither discipline has 
integrated the concepts, theories, and methods of both fields to provide a comprehensive 
perspective on intercultural puzzles” (Sadri and Flammia 2011, xi). Yet while their book 
does more than most to tie together the fields, they miss critical elements of each, 
including no apparent reference to realism, liberalism, or constructivism (at least as 
visible in the table of contents, the index, and a brief review) as well as no apparent 
reference to intercultural competence. Such oversights are puzzling but, at least in the 
review conducted here, appear to be more the rule than the exception. The international 
communication literature thus providing only a limited understanding of the intersection 
between culture and international relations, the next topic to be considered is whether the 
civilization studies arising from international relations may be of more use. 
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Civilizational Orientations in Security Studies 
Avruch (1998, 23), writing from a peace studies perspective, laments that “all of 
the inadequate ideas about culture” from Table 1 “can be found at work when, as in 
‘national character’ studies, international relations, retaining the state as its foundational 
concept, has tried to grapple with culture.” Such critiques could be leveled at “clash of 
civilization” discourses such as those undertaken by Huntington (1993, 1996), as noted 
by Avruch (1998) and Jackson (2010). Katzenstein (2010, 3) attempts to strike a balance 
between appreciating Huntington’s conclusion that cultural matters are a source of 
conflict, while also requiring that civilizations be understood as “pluralist and plural.” 
Katzenstein requires this as an improvement over an essentialist “succumbing to ‘the 
illusion of singularity,’ the view of collective identities as singular, unchanged, and 
unchanging traits of actors” (9; interior quotes from Sen 2006). Reviewing Katzenstein 
and others, Desch notes the hope that civilizationists place in the cultural approach: 
Virtually all new culturalists in security studies are united in their belief that 
realism, the dominant research program in international relations that emphasizes 
factors such as the material balance of power, is an overrated, if not bankrupt, 
body of theory, and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, do a 
much better job of explaining how the world works. (Desch 1998, 141) 
 
Indeed, Katzenstein (1996) does view the interrelated concepts of identity, norms, and 
culture as having powerful explanatory utility. The differences in interpretation of global 
events lead to variations in responses that Katzenstein (2003) claims may be significant 
enough to strain even long-standing alliances. Yet for all of the promise of civilizational 
studies – and, indeed, the recent Civilizations in World Politics (Katzenstein 2010) does 
seek to offer thick, complex, explorations of sameness and difference – there is lacking 
an attendant exploration of how individuals or nation-states, or actors at other levels of 
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analysis, might think about the capacity to achieve shared perceptions of the world. Thus, 
the following section considers the world of diplomacy and negotiation across cultures. 
Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy 
The art of international negotiation is known to be a difficult one (Zartman and 
Rasmussen 1997; Zartman 2007), and unsurprisingly, different approaches have thus 
been developed: 
Paul Y. Hammond has noted the significant contrast which existed between 
Foreign Service officers like Kennan and Bohlen, who stressed reliance ‘upon the 
personal skills and noncommunicable wisdom of the career official,’ and 
administrators like Acheson, who accepted ‘the necessity . . . of forward planning 
with all its rigidities, simplifications, and artificialities.’ (Gaddis 1974, 400) 
 
While it is difficult to say what all personal skills and wisdom might be needed, it 
is likely that at least part of what is needed is a capacity to comprehend the world in a 
way that is unfamiliar (Cohen 1991). Reflecting on Szaley, Cohen explains it this way: 
For there to be real understanding—true communication in the normative sense of 
the term—the parties engaged must be able to draw upon matching semantic 
assumptions. And this ability occurs optimally within the boundaries of common 
culture. . . . In the area of diplomatic negotiation the potential for dissonance 
inherent in intercultural communication finds its most sustained expression. Not 
the simple, unmediated conversation of tourist and local here, but a complex and 
sustained interchange of proposals over time, overlaid by level after confusing 
level of interagency consultation, political supervision, and media and legislative 
oversight. At every stage of negotiations the possibility for misunderstanding 
exists, whether about the procedure, the content, or the institutional setting. It is a 
wonder that agreement is ever reached! (Cohen 1991, 20–22) 
 
Cohen thus suggests 10 recommendations for the intercultural negotiator (Table 2) that 
reflect his conclusion that cultural differences are not superficial and stylistic but are, in 






Table 6  
Ten Recommendations for the Intercultural Negotiator 
Based on Cohen (1991, 160–61) 
It is Slavik’s (2004) (out of print) volume on Intercultural Communication and 
Diplomacy that appears to most intentionally bridge the divide between these two topics. 
In the preface, Walter Fast (2004, ix), Ambassador and Director General of the Swiss 
Agency of Development and Cooperation, notes that “diplomats, of course, have a long 
tradition of intercultural communication skills. Representing one’s country elsewhere and 
plunging into international relations and politics has a natural intercultural flavour.” 
Moreover, Ambassador Fast instructs readers not to assume that intercultural 
communication “just happens” and instead points out that cultural differences extend not 
only to visible differences such as language and clothing but also to “deeper rooted 
values and modes of thinking” (x). The remainder of the volume might benefit from 
Recommendation 1 Prepare for a negotiation by studying your opponents’ culture and history and not just 
the issue at hand. Language and the historical relationship are especially important. 
Recommendation 2 (Try to) establish a warm, personal relationship with your interlocutors. If possible, 
make contact and invest in the relationship in advance. 
Recommendation 3 Do not assume that your verbal or nonverbal message is understood accurately from the 
other side. Do not assume that you have accurately understood their verbal or 
nonverbal messages. 
Recommendation 4 Pay attention to the use of indirect and nonverbal communication. Be prepared to read 
between the lines and be very careful about any signals you might unintentionally send. 
Recommendation 5 Be aware of status and face. Establish interlocutors as equals. Avoid anything that leads 
to the loss of face for self or other. 
Recommendation 6 Do not overestimate the power of good arguments – these may not sway your 
opponents even if they are well developed. Pay special attention to facts and 
circumstances. 
Recommendation 7 Adapt your strategy to reflect your opponents’ cultural needs. Be prepared for haggling 
– do not give away everything at once. But be prepared to accommodate what you can. 
Recommendation 8 Do not be flexible if your opponents are intransigent. Repeated concessions may 
confuse rather than clarify the situation. Avoid compromising with yourself. 
Recommendation 9 Be patient. Haste almost always means making unnecessary concessions. Do not try to 
force them to short-circuit their bureaucratic processes. 




relating the insights to one or more of the major IR paradigms – surely they would have 
different application for realist, liberal, or constructivist perspectives.19 
Conclusion of the Literature Review: Perception and Misperception 
This dissertation speaks into a gap in the literature. This gap has been identified in 
this chapter and is bordered on one side by a robust literature explicating culture and on 
the other by political science and international relations. Unlike Lebow (2008), this 
dissertation does not represent an attempt to develop a grand theory of international 
relations. Instead, an argument is made that existing paradigms are incomplete because 
while there have been attempts to bridge the gap, these are insufficient. Moreover, these 
gaps are expected to have real world (not merely abstract) consequence for the conduct 
and interpretation of international relations – whether through a realist, liberal, 
constructivist, or English School lens. The role of culture on perception and 
misperception in international relations may be of particular interest. This issue of 
perception is identified by Jervis (1976) as one of the most fundamental problems in 
international relations. Yet as noted previously, Jervis himself did not account seriously 
for the role of culture. 
This dissertation contributes to several different literatures. First and most directly 
intended, this project is expected to present a way forward for the stalled study of culture 
in international relations literatures. Civilizational studies may also benefit through the 
development of a new language for describing the ways in which groups of people (at 
different levels of analysis) can vary culturally. The international communication 
 
19 Drezner (2015) gives an overview of how international relations paradigms would play out in case of a 
zombie invasion, and one can perhaps superimpose the principles of intercultural and international 
communication onto the paradigmatically influenced responses he suggests. 
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literature has largely ignored the deeper elements of culture and may be assisted through 
application of the frameworks explored here. 
Interculturalist literature also stands to benefit by demonstrating ways in which 
that messy and eclectic field could demonstrate its relevance to international relations 
(and perhaps political science more generally). The constructivist strain of intercultural 
development theory (emphasis for clarity) may be particularly well connected to this 
project, as deep and subjective semiotic constructs feature in this research. The usefulness 
of the intercultural development and adaptation approach may be seen. Finally, the 
literature of global Christian theology may stand to gain from this research, as a new type 
of analysis may identify previously hidden or underdeveloped phenomena. This claim 
will be clarified in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach. 
However, several limitations must be noted. First, some of what has been 
presented so far approaches culture as though it can be studied at the national level, while 
some does not. Condon and Yousef advocate for the latter position: 
When we speak of values or value orientations, our focus should always be on 
cultures, not nations. A nation is a political entity which may contain within it 
many quite different cultures; similarly national borders may politically 
distinguish areas which are culturally identical. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 48) 
 
Clearly, state borders are poor proxies for cultural identities. Of course, there is 
also a whole literature on the appropriateness of the state as a unit of analysis (Evans et 
al. 1985; Jarvis 1989). It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer these questions. 
Instead, the difficulty is acknowledged. The pattern of the paper will match much of the 
literature (e.g., Trompenaars 1994; Adler 2002; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) in 
using the name of a state to refer to the dominant cultural tendencies and identities of that 
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state, leaving to others (i.e., Migdal 1988) to work out the relationship between societies 
and states. Yet despite the fraught nature of studying culture, it is worth the attempt. 
Geertz (1977, 30) clearly expects to find cultural analysis engaging the “hard surfaces of 
life,” including the political. After all, “warfare, which man uses against his human 






CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The goal of this dissertation project is to ascertain whether cultural differences 
meaningfully affect the ability of actors from different cultures to arrive at shared 
meanings from shared texts and experiences and to test whether such differences matter 
in issues of international relations as well as whether intercultural adaptation attenuates 
the effects of such differences. The research questions and hypotheses, as stated in 
Chapter One: Introduction, are as follows: 
Q1: Can cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of actors from 
different cultures to arrive at shared meanings of shared texts and events? 
 
Q2: Can the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 be expected to matter 
in the conduct of international relations? 
 
Q3: Can intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which such 
differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
 
H1: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and events. 
 
H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation meaningfully affects changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
 
As noted in Chapter One: Introduction, the research will proceed in four stages: 
1. Identify several cultural differences that might matter within international 
relations. 
2. Investigate these differences within a non-IR research frame (Global Christian 
Reasoning (GCR). 
3. Assess whether such differences have an impact within the same epistemic 
community (GCR). 
4. Apply any remaining differences to three IR case studies and assess H1 and H2 
through process tracing and counterfactual analysis. 
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Step One: Identifying Cultural Differences 
There are many different values frameworks that could be used in exploring 
cultural difference. For example, Yoshida and Fisher-Yoshida (2015) list the following: 
• power distance  
• individualism vs. collectivism (or communitarianism) 
• masculinity vs. femininity 
• uncertainty avoidance 
• pragmatic vs. normative 
• indulgence vs. restraint 
• universalism vs. particularism 
• neutral vs. emotional 
• specific vs. diffuse 
• achievement vs. ascription 
• sequential vs. synchronic, and 
• internal vs. external control (242–44). 
Of these many potential frameworks for cultural difference, and the additional 
frameworks identified in the literature review, four frameworks will be utilized: (1) the 
first relates to deep motivations and will be called shame/honor, guilt/innocence, and 
fear/power; (2) the second covers various orientations to time and will be called time 
orientation; (3) the third relates to perceptions of authority and will be called authority; 
and (4) the fourth relates to interpretations of human nature and will be called human 
nature. These four have been selected based on the researcher’s assertion that they can be 
observed, are relatively complex, and represent a broad range of potential cultural 
differences. Each of these will be briefly described here. 
Shame, Honor / Guilt, Innocence 
The first framework for cultural difference that will be explored in this 
dissertation is shame, honor / guilt, innocence / fear/power. Benedict ([1946] 2005) 
introduced the idea of shame as a cultural construct in 1946 while offering a contrast 
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between Japanese approaches to shame and American approaches to guilt.20 She notes, 
“In anthropological studies of different cultures the distinction between those which rely 
heavily on shame and those that rely heavily on guilt is an important one” (222). Several 
of her descriptions help to paint the picture of this framework: 
• “True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true 
guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other 
people’s criticism. . . . In a nation where honor means living up to one’s own 
picture of oneself, a man may suffer from guilt though no man knows of his 
misdeed and a man’s feeling of guilt may actually be relieved by confessing his 
sin.” (223) 
• “Shame has the same place of authority in Japanese ethics that ‘a clear 
conscience,’ ‘being right with God,’ and the avoidance of sin having Western 
ethics.” (224) 
• “A failure to follow their explicit signposts of good behavior, a failure to balance 
obligations or to foresee contingencies is a shame (haji). Shame, they say, is the 
root of virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good 
behavior.” (224) 
Grove (2015a, 394) clarifies that “shame is about judgments, actual or anticipated, 
by others within one’s group. Guilt is about one’s self-judgment.” 
Shame is especially active in collectivist cultures, those in which people feel a 
pervasive interdependence with members of their ingroup. Guilt is especially 
active in individualist cultures, in which individuals are encouraged to become 
independent of others. In fact, in strongly collectivist cultures, a distinction 
between shame and guilt might be meaningless. After all, in those cultures 
individuals are encouraged not to develop an internal perspective that differs in 
any way from that there ingroup. In the absence of internalized values and norms 
with which the individual uniquely identifies, guilt cannot take root. (Grove 
2015a, 395) 
Condon and Yousef (1975, 116) explain that in shame cultures, “pressures to 
conform to the norms of the society are explicit and are exerted from without,” while “in 
guilt cultures, there is an internalized sense of ‘wrong’ so that one who feels guilty 
 
20 Muller (2001) and Georges (2016) indicate the presence of a third motivational value set: fear and power. 
However, as this structure relates to perceptions of the metaphysical, it can be more difficult to assess and 
so the present dissertation will only investigate shame, honor and guilt, innocence. 
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punishes himself.” However, they note that “it is not always easy to make this neat 
distinction” (116). 
One complication in this idea is the notion that the definitions of shame and guilt 
themselves are distinct in individualistic and collectivist cultures (Wong and Tsai 2007) – 
an observation that resonates with Ting-Toomey (1999), who gives analytical primacy to 
individualism and collectivism. Wong and Tsai recommend that shame be understood 
within its own context, contending that “negatively evaluating the self, a core component 
of shame, is not universally viewed as harmful to psychological well-being. Indeed, 
negative views of the self may have informational and motivational significance in 
collectivistic contexts. For these reasons, shame may be viewed more positively in 
collectivistic contexts” (214). This does not suggest that shame is positive but rather that 
the ability to recognize and be motivated by shame is not negative. Furthermore, this can 
indicate that shame not only can be a strong motivating factor but might be perceived as a 
very legitimate motivating factor in shame-oriented cultures. The distinction between 
understanding shame and guilt in their own contexts may also be important in the attempt 
to identify them in practice: “Western models of shame and guilt view shame as the ‘bad’ 
and guilt as the ‘good’ moral emotion, in part because of their different psychological 
social and physical consequences” (Wong and Tsai 2007, 217). 
Honor is an opposite to shame and reflects on a person’s nuclear and extended 
family (Grove 2015a). Face negotiation and face work are related to the idea of shame 
and honor: “The term face refers to identity respect issues and other consideration issues 
within and beyond the intercultural encounter process. . . . It is tied to a claimed sense of 
social esteem or regard that a person wants others to have for him or her. . . . The term 
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facework refers to the specific communication behaviors that we engage in to ‘save’ our 
own and/or others’ face” (Ting-Toomey 1999, 37–38). For this reason, facework may be 
used to identify attempts to protect “vulnerable emotions such as pride and shame or 
honor and dishonor” (38). 
Friedrichs (2016) draws on Leung and Cohen (2011) and Kim Cohen and Au 
(2010) to the address the motivating power of the worth orientations of honor, face, and 
dignity. Friedrichs observes that “as the most ancient form of self-worth, honor culture 
remains the default condition in most of the world. We may assume that all those 
societies that have not transitioned to face culture millennia ago or to dignity culture 
more recently remain honor cultures” (75). Friedrichs goes on to posit likely relational 
conditions between face, dignity, and honor cultures. 
Operationalizing the Shame, Honor / Guilt, Innocence Framework 
As can be observed in the above discussion, shame, honor / guilt, innocence, face, 
and dignity are interrelated constructs that have been operationalized in different ways by 
different authors. Decisions about how the constructs are operationalized will result in 
attention being paid to different phenomena. For the sake of this dissertation, this 
framework set will be provisionally operationalized as follows: 
Shame, Honor will be indicated when the primary moral motivation ascribed to 
an individual or group relates to the standing of that individual or group before others. 
The shame, honor side of the continuum has several expected corollaries that may appear, 
including any of the following: 




2. concern with external judgment: External, rather than internal, moral judgment is 
of primary concern. 
3. negative view of confession: Confession is viewed as detrimental rather than 
restorative. 
4. collective implications: Even clearly individual actions are believed to have the 
power to degrade the standing of a group. Similarly, individual rightness cannot 
necessarily overcome corporate wrongness. 
Guilt, Innocence will be indicated when the primary moral motivation ascribed to 
an individual or group relates to the internal judgment of rightness. The guilt, innocence 
side of the continuum has several expected corollaries that may appear, including any of 
the following: 
1. concern with standards: Right or wrong standing is determined in relation to 
some standard, whether internally or externally derived. 
2. concern with internal judgment: Internal, rather than external, moral judgment is 
of primary concern. 
3. positive view of confession: Confession is viewed as cathartic and/or restorative 
and is generally viewed as positive. 
4. individual implications: An individual’s right or wrong standing is dependent on 
the actions of the individual rather than the group. Similarly, the individual does 
not have the ability to degrade the standing of the group. 
Time Orientation 
The second framework for cultural difference that will be explored in this 
dissertation is time orientation. Schoeffel (2015, 471) indicates that variation in 
perceptions of time produces misunderstandings between people of different cultural 
backgrounds: “International colleagues need to develop the competence of recognizing 
and switching between various time concepts.” There are multiple types of time 
orientations. Hall (1959, 6–9) draws attention to several such categories: “Not only do we 
Americans segment and schedule time, but we look ahead and are oriented almost 
entirely toward the future. . . . Time with us is handled much like a material. We earn it, 
spend it, save it, waste it. To us it is somewhat immoral to have two things going on at 
 
97 
the same time.” Two schema of time orientation are considered here: (1) temporal 
orientation (past, present future) and (2) sequence, synchronicity / time, event. 
Temporal Orientation (Past, Present, Future) 
The first time orientation of interest is temporal orientation. Hall observed of 
Americans: 
While we look to the future, our view of it is limited. The future to us is the 
foreseeable future, not the future of the South Asian that may involve centuries. 
Indeed, our perspective is so short as to inhibit the operation of a good many 
practical projects such as sixty- and one-hundred-year conservation works 
requiring public support and public funds. . . . The American’s view of the future 
is linked to a view of the past, for tradition plays an equally limited part in 
American culture. As a whole we push it aside or leave it to a few souls who are 
interested in the past for very special reasons. . . . (Hall 1959, 6–9) 
 
Kluckhohn and Strotbeck (1961) further developed the idea of past, present, and 
future-oriented cultures in their time dimension. Condon and Yousef (1975, 108–11) 
argued that past, present, and future focal points are cultural values orientations. 
Trompenaars (1994) relayed Cottle’s (1967) findings from the circle test, which 
investigated past, present, and future zones, in which four configurations emerged: (1) 
absence of zone relatedness, (2) temporal integration, (3) a partial overlap of zones, and 
(4) zones that touch but do not overlap. Additionally, there is variation of the relative 




Figure 3. Trompenaars’s Model of Thinking about Past, Present and Future. 
(Grove 2015b, 861). Originally published in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012, figure 9.1, p. 156); 
adapted from Cottle, T.J. (1967) The Circles Test: An investigation of perception of temporal relatedness 
and dominance. Journal of Projective Technique and Personality Assessments, 31, 58–71. 
 
Temporal orientation remains a current area of inquiry. The GLOBE project 
operationalized the future orientation as “the extent to which individuals engage (and 
should engage) in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and 
delaying gratification” (“2004, 2007 Studies - GLOBE Project” n.d.). 
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Sequence, Synchronicity, Time and Event 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012) argue for understanding the 
differences between sequential and synchronic orientations toward time. These are 
related to Hall’s (1959) conceptualizations of monochronic and polychronic time, 
respectively. In short, people from sequential time cultures tend to have “a ‘crucial path’ 
worked out in advance with times for completion of each stage,” whereas people from 
synchronic time cultures “track various activities in parallel” (152). These differences go 
further than they may first appear – the sequential orientation emphasizes time as 
“tangible and measurable,” while the synchronic orientation holds to a conceptualization 
of time as “continuous and diffuse” (171). 
Additionally, Brislin and Kim (2003) built on Hall’s earlier conceptualizations of 
time (e.g., Hall and Hall 1990) to consider the intersection between 
polychronic/monochronic time and clock/event time. Whereas clock time people are 
concerned with the literal time on the clock, event time people “organise their days 
around various events and participate in one event until it reaches its natural end and then 









Table 7  
Polychronic vs. Monochronic and Clock vs. Event Time 
 
Brislin and Kim (2003, 370) 
Operationalizing the Time Orientation Framework 
The above discussion introduces two different forms of time orientation: temporal 
orientation (past, present, future) and sequence/synchronicity, time /event. For this 
dissertation, cultural differences in Temporal Orientation will be provisionally 
operationalized so that it can be indicated as follows: 
• past: When the primary temporal reference point is the past – especially the long 
ago past. 
• future: When the primary temporal reference point is the future – especially the 
far future. 
• present: When the primary temporal reference point is either atemporal, that is 
neither time-future nor time-past is perceived, or the very near past and very near 
present. 
For this dissertation, differences in sequence/synchronicity and time/event will be 
indicated as follows: 
 Clock Time Event Time 
 Emphasis is on time; time sensitive 
Schedule evolves around the clock 
Emphasis is on people; time 
insensitive 
Schedule evolves around events 
Polychronic 
(P-time) 
Doing more than one activity 
at a time 
Cell 1: The US 
-Pace of life is fast 
-The US has been traditionally M-
type; however, is moving toward P-
time 
Cell 2: Latin America, 
Mediterranean countries 
-Pace of life is slow 
-Not overly keen to schedule (cf. 
rubber time, island time, etc.) 
-Business and social activities often 
mix 
   
Monochronic 
(M-time) 
Doing one activity at a time 
Cell 3: East Asian countries 
-Pace of life is fast 
-Traditionally Asian countries have 
been event time; however, economic 
development and other changes have 
led them into a clock time orientation 
Cell 4: Non-industrialized cultures 
where resources are abundant 
-Pace of life is slow 
-People work hard and socialize, but 
unlike P-time, work and 
100ocializing do not mix 
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• synchronous: When time is perceived as multi-channeled and/or lacks clear 
sequential structure, especially if time is considered abundant. 
• sequence: When time is perceived to be linear, with choices that must be made in 
order. 
• time: When time is primarily understood according to a calendar and clock 
system. 
• event: When time is primarily understood according to events, with clock time 
being unknown, unimportant, or deemphasized. 
Authority 
The third framework for cultural difference that will be explored in this 
dissertation is authority. Authority, and cultural attitudes thereto, can be conceptualized 
in several different ways. Condon and Yousef (1975) argue for three patterns of 
authority: democratic, authority-centered, and authoritarian (76). They root the 
experiences of these different approaches within the family and then extrapolate it out to 
broader society. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012) draw attention to the sources 
of authority through the lens of status. Status, they argue, can either be achieved or 
ascribed (125ff.). Benedict (1934) introduces the idea of cultures in which authority is 
eschewed rather than sought after. 
Hofstede et al. (2010) draw attention to the concept of power distance, which 
relates to the question of whether inequalities in power are accepted in society or whether 
they are considered undesirable. Note that the question relates to differences in the 
acceptability of power differences, rather than the existence of them. These two concepts 
are brought together and understood as reflecting a dimension that “expresses the degree 
to which power is distributed and attributed to people in a cultural context based on their 
ascribed or achieved position” (Yoshida and Fisher-Yoshida 2015, 244). 
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Operationalizing the Authority Framework 
The above discussion highlights several different approaches to authority, which 
are provisionally operationalized as follows: 
• consent and involvement: Observed when those with authority are expected to 
receive input from those over whom they exercise authority. 
• authority-centered: Observed when some external authority is lifted above human 
authority and good-faith efforts are made by those in leadership to represent that 
authority above their own. 
• authoritarian: Observed when the instructions of those with authority are 
expected to be obeyed regardless of the wishes of those over whom they exercise 
authority. 
Importantly, the word democratic has been replaced by consent and involvement in this 
operationalization to avoid confusion with the political structures related to democracy 
and liberalism. This is appropriate in that Condon and Yousef’s conceptualization is 
focused on cultural structures at the family level and then extrapolates them outward, 
rather than starting at the political level and moving toward the family. 
Secondly, origins of authority (also understood to be status) will be provisionally 
operationalized as follows: 
• ascribed: Authority is recognized based on social standing, family, or some other 
trait, which cannot be earned by an individual. 
• achieved: Authority is recognized based on the achievements of an individual, 
which may raise her status above that of her family and peers. 
Third, power distance will be provisionally operationalized as follows: 
• high power distance: Will be understood to exist where power inequities are 
generally accepted and understood to be “normal” or “natural.” 
• low power distance: Will be understood to exist where power inequities are 
downplayed or diminished, especially when some other system such as 




The fourth framework for cultural difference that will be explored in this 
dissertation is human nature. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961, 11) introduce the 
question of “the innate goodness or badness of human nature” and suggest evil, good-
and-evil (neutral), good-and-evil (mixed), and good as four possible cultural responses to 
the question. Condon and Yousef (1975, 93) added three more areas to the consideration 
of human nature. Each is followed by the range of three positions they articulated: 
• Rationality: rational, intuitive, or irrational. 
• Happiness, pleasure: happiness as goal; inextricable bond of happiness and 
sadness; life is mostly sadness). 
• Mutability: change, growth, learning; some change; unchanging. 
This dissertation will only make use of the first framework: Good and Evil. 
Operationalizing the Human Nature Framework 
These frameworks are relatively self-explanatory and thus little is adjusted from 
Condon and Yousef’s conceptualization. Human nature regarding good and evil will be 
provisionally operationalized so that it may be indicated as follows: 
• human nature as good: Will be understood to be present in a culture that expects 
evil only as an aberration, rather than as the norm. The first or innate expectation 
is goodness. 
• human nature as good and evil (neutral): Will be understood to be present when 
the expectation is that the starting place is neutrality with capacity for good and 
evil. 
• human nature as good and evil (mixed): Will be understood to be present when 
the expectation is that good and evil are both present in a person – especially if 
these are viewed as both being necessary. 
• human nature as evil: Will be understood to be present when good is expected 
only as an aberration or as a developed state, rather than as the norm. The first or 
innate expectation is evil. 
 
104 
Importantly, “good” and “evil” do not require universal definitions for the purpose of this 
operationalization. They can be referential to each particular culture without 
compromising the integrity of the themes under examination. 
Narratological Frameworks 
The dissertation will primarily employ the cultural frameworks of shame, honor / 
guilt, innocence; time orientation; authority; and human nature. However, it is possible 
that either of these phenomena will not be present in the research or that other important 
phenomena will. Other such phenomena will only be considered relevant if using 
narratological frameworks can make sense of them. Narrative is important because it 
“does not merely list what happens” but “brings out or creates meaningful connections 
between events or experiences thereby rendering them (at least partly) intelligible” 
(Meretoja 2014, 89). Moreover, Meretoja argues that narrative is not merely the exercise 
of meaning-making for the purposes of relating history but can actually be a core part of 
the process of human formulation of ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
interpretations and understandings.. This argument fits well with Geertz’s (1977) 
attention to semiotics and meaning-making as a core function of culture. 
Hopf and Allan (2016) prove helpful in considering the turn to narrative (they use 
the term discourse). Allan explains “We propose to recover discourses of nationality 
identity—the set of categories that individuals use to understand the nation and 
themselves as members of a country (2016, 22). With interpretivists, we believe that 
these categories draw relational meaning from their position in a web of shared beliefs.” 
Reflecting on Berger and Luckman (1967), Allan argues that ideational integration within 
groups of people lead to a situation in which “people and institutions share similar ideas 
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about what reality consists of, how it works, and how everything is embedded in the 
overarching symbolic universe” (24). 
Metaphor can also be used to examine narrative in culture. LeBaron (2015, 497–
98) explains, “Understanding these metaphoric images and their rich provenance, 
including cues about intensity, relationship, attitude, perception, and position, is critical 
to effectiveness in intercultural conflict. . . . Finally, narrative is at the center of conflict, 
affecting how stories are held, told, received, and shifted.” 
Operationalizing the Narratological Framework 
The narratological framework will be open-ended. From a positivist perspective, 
this will be the least pleasing of any of the frameworks, as it is the most open to being 
criticized as phenomenological. However, as the framing for this dissertation is 
epistemologically critical-realist and therefore interpretivist, this does not pose an 
epistemological problem internally for the research. Nonetheless, if sufficient grounds 
can be found for comparison in the other cultural frameworks, those frameworks will be 
prioritized, potentially to the complete neglect of the narratological framework. The 
specific provisional operationalization of this framework will be through the following 
question: What meaning-making narratives does this cultural group employ that are 
likely to impact its ontological, epistemological, or ethical interpretation of another 
group? 
Step Two: Cultural Frameworks in Action within GCR 
The second step of the research phase of this dissertation project will involve the 
use of content analysis (Rubin et al. 2010; Berg and Lune 2012) to assess whether and 
how the four cultural differences operationalized above are present in global Christian 
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reasoning (GCR). The goal of this step of the dissertation will be to examine the effects 
of cultural differences in determining meaning from texts, in response to Q1. As stated in 
Chapter One: Introduction, four factors give rise to the selection of Christianity as the 
subject of this inquiry: 
1. The broad geographic and cultural spread of Christianity; 
2. The relatively recent history of the current iteration of the proliferation of 
Christianity, which means that much of the debate over intersections between 
theology and culture are recent (within the last 100 years, including much within 
the last 20 years); 
3. The relative availability of (English language) sources detailing the cultural 
differences in view, including many written by people with different backgrounds 
in multiple geographic regions of the world – not only by European-background 
North Americans; 
4. The tendency of Christianity to function as an indigenizing faith that adopts local 
language and (to some extent) thought and practice. 
For these reasons, GCR is explored as a text from which to observe cultural variation at 
levels of significant depth. 
Global Christian theology is complex. Authors not only come to different 
conclusions on the meaning of the texts involved but also regarding the very faith under 
consideration. Appendix 1 contains a sample bibliography, which represents the type of 
resources envisioned as sources of GCR to be reviewed: not all of those sources will be 
examined, and it is possible that some additional sources will be added. Texts will be 
selected based on the perceived likelihood of finding the types of differences sought. A 
diverse geographical and thematic set of texts may be selected. Not all selected texts need 
discuss the same passage(s) of Christian scripture, though if this is possible in some 
cases, direct comparisons may prove useful. It is not a goal of this project to generate a 
comprehensive text-set in any sense of the meaning. Instead, the goal will be to find 
evidences of as many cultural differences as feasible. 
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A systematic coding process (discussed below) will be utilized. Speech act theory 
and narratological inquiry will be utilized to examine how these four frameworks are 
present in and affect GCR. If one or more additional inductive frameworks (especially 
but not only narratological ones) arise and appear to be of relevance, they may be 
incorporated into the later stages of the research, though this is only an option rather than 
a requirement. Additionally, it is not necessary that authors of the text overtly state that 
the perspectives are linked to culture; however, such statements will certainly carry more 
weight. The sample coding table (Table 4) is proposed (note that far more frameworks 
will be utilized, as indicated by the lines with ellipses). 
The coding will largely follow an analytical plan based on Strauss (1987, 30, as 
cited in Berg and Lune 2012, 365–66): 
1. Ask the data a specific and consistent set of questions (365). In this dissertation, 
these questions will focus on the deductive cultural frameworks. Open ended 
questions such as “How does this author describe the affect of culture on 
understanding?” or “What narrative has shaped this conclusion?” will also be 
utilized and may lead to the creation of inductive frameworks. 
2. Analyze the data minutely (365). In this case, the research may vary from a strict 
reading of Strauss, as comparative analysis across cultural texts will require a 
breadth of resources. Illocutionary analysis will be privileged above locutionary 
concerns about semantics. 
3. Frequently interrupt the coding to write a theoretical note (366). This guideline is 
of particular importance so that the coding results not merely in thematic analysis 
but rather presses into more robust synthetic development. 
4. Never assume the analytic relevance of any traditional variable such as age, sex, 
social class, and so on until the data show it to be relevant (366). This will be 
particularly important regarding the importance of the cultural background of a 
particular author. 
Any inductive codes will be condensed through a process of axial coding (Berg 
and Lune 2012, 367). It is expected that this will already have been largely accomplished 
for the deductive codes, as they are employed from the outset. The theoretical notes 
generated through the process will similarly be refined. The sources to be considered will 
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be drawn primarily from those which focus on contextualization and area emphasis and 
secondarily, if necessary, those that focus on postcolonial discourse. 
Table 8  
Sample Step One Coding Results Table 
 
  (Author) 
Contextualization and area-emphasis works consider the question of whether and 
how Christianity can and should be adapted to fit into a given local culture and what 
elements cannot be adapted to the local culture. Every time Christianity takes root (or an 
attempt is made to root it) in a new culture, questions of contextualization abound. Walls 
(1996a, 2002, 1996b;) examines this phenomena through the question of how faith has 
been transmitted over time and what core elements remain as Christianity indigenizes 
(see also Walls and Ross 2008). Cook et al. (2010) examine this question as the 
development of local theology within a globalized church. This in turn gives rise to the 
notion that there are many different ways to indigenize Christianity. Due to historical and 
political realities, much of global Christianity has found it necessary to identify its 
characteristics against the backdrop of Western Christianity (e.g., Bediako 1995). 
Deductively Derived Categories 






- p. 1: corroborated by 
(Author, Date) external 
source 
p. 35: direct statement “. . 
.” 
time orientation - - - 
authority No evidence of 
Framework 2 
- - 
human nature - - p. 12: direct statement “. . 
.” 
Inductively Derived Categories (optional) 
Inductive Framework 1: 
_________________ 








Western Christianity, on the other hand, has not been nearly as forthcoming as 
identifying itself as a contextualized expression of Christianity (Richards and O’Brien 
2012). For this reason, area readings have developed. Examples include Africa (e.g., 
Adamo 2005), Asia (e.g., Sugirtharajah 1999), and Latin America (e.g., De La Torre and 
Aponte 2001). Additionally, non-majority groups within American society have 
developed group readings. Examples include African American (e.g., Cone 2010), Asian 
American (e.g., Liew 2008), Hispanic (e.g., González 1990), and Native American (e.g., 
Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001). 
It may be observed as well that GCR has a significant depth and breadth of 
engagement. Particularly important in this observation is the recognition that the range of 
possible interpretations vary from the concrete and practical to the highly abstract. Yet 
there is still an articulated central core – even if interpretations vary widely, all of the 
authors claim to be writing about the faith that traces its lineage to the first-century Jesus. 
The study of these various expressions is expected to demonstrate that cultural 
differences matter even within an epistemic community. 
Alternative Research Plan 
If insufficient cultural data is found in the main four frameworks, then 
narratological frameworks will be utilized. If insufficient data are found internally within 
GCR, even with narratological frameworks, then the research will conclude and all 
hypotheses will be rejected. 
Step Three: Assess the Effects of Cultural Differences within GCR 
Once a final code set from step one is generated, with sufficient evidence to 
justify the inclusion of various frameworks, the dissertation will continue to step three. 
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The coded frameworks will be interrogated in order to come to a conclusion on Q1 and 
H1. The goals of step three are twofold. First, the frameworks from step one (along with 
any new frameworks from step two) will be simplified and restated based on the step two 
textual evidence to prepare them for potential application in step four. Second, a plausible 
or affirmative decision regarding H1 will allow the research to move forward into step 
four. Findings will be generated on the qualitative, rather than quantitative, strength of 
the data. Quantitative analysis of the findings would be more appropriate for a 
methodological system employing quantitative text analysis (QTA). However, this 
project does not involve the thorough, computerized word-level analysis required for 
QTA. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the interpretivist and critical realism 
research perspectives to engage QTA for the types of meaning sought in the source texts. 
Interpretation as a hermeneutical project requires engagement with the way in which 
words are used, rather than merely noting the frequency of their presence. The 
phenomenological risks of reliance on interpretivist processes are mitigated in part by the 
utilization of deductive frameworks.21 
Assessing Meaningful Affect 
Several of the questions and hypotheses in this dissertation utilize the idea of 
meaningful affect when attempting to describe the effect of cultural differences on 
arriving at shared meaning. Speech act theory (Austin 1975; Searle 2011), which 
differentiates between the locution, the illocution, and the perlocution, will be used to 
assess meaningful affect. 
 
21 Perhaps it goes without saying, but statistical analysis is certainly open to its own interpretive errors. See 
Vigen (2015) for examples. 
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• Locution (dealing with what it says): When shared texts are in view, (as they 
are in this project), the locution remains constant. Any misunderstanding or 
difference that can occur at this level is due to linguistic translation and 
interpretation, which will not be engaged. This dissertation is instead focused on 
cultural phenomena at a higher level of analysis. 
• Illocution (dealing with what it does): If the actors do not believe that the author 
of the text intended the same illocution, the ability to arrive at shared meanings 
will judge to have been meaningfully affected. Regarding this dissertation, the 
question is specifically whether such affect is due to culture factors.  
• Perlocution (dealing with what effect it has): Moreover, if, (again due to 
cultural factors), the actors do not believe that the (implied or empirical) author of 
the text intended the same perlocution, the ability to arrive at shared meanings 
will have been meaningfully affected, even if the illocution is perceived to be the 
same by both parties. 
 The meaningful affect can thus be located at the level of illocutionary or 
perlocutionary distinctions. This will be considered sufficient evidence of the hypothesis 
if it is found that two actors could – due to differences in cultural preunderstandings (and 
not necessarily due to an illocutionary or perlocutionary misfire on the part of the author) 
– arrive at distinct illocutions or perlocutions of a text. Such a finding would be 
meaningful because one actor might perceive the other actor as being in non-compliance 
with the text for reasons that exist outside of either actor’s awareness. 
Alternative Research Plan 
If evidence of any of the four cultural frameworks is found in Step Two, but it is 
not possible to find meaningful effect demonstrated in the literature, then the effects of 
narrative differences will be considered. If narrative differences were not found, or if 
even with the consideration of narrative differences no meaningful effect was found, then 
the research will conclude and all hypotheses will be rejected. 
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Step Four: IR Case Studies with Counterfactuals 
In the fourth step of the research, Q2, Q3, H2, and H3 will all be in view. 
Following the assessment of the effects of cultural differences in step three, step four 
presents case studies particular to international relations. The case studies follow George 
and Smoke (1974) in presenting “focused comparison[s].” George and Smoke position 
their method as an integration of the best elements of statistical analysis (though without 
the use of mathematics) on the one hand and case studies on the other hand: “. . . For all 
practical purposes . . . only a small number of cases can be studied. All cases are 
approached by asking identical questions. This standardized set of questions or 
hypotheses ensure the comparability of results,” although they allow for additional 
questions to tease out the intricacies of any given case (96). Before continuing into the 
description of the case studies that will be pursued in step four, however, it is necessary 
to address the question of whether culture can be studied at the national level. 
Cultures vs. States 
One of the great obstacles to cultural research in international relations is 
precisely that there is no precise overlap between cultural groups and states. The concept 
of nationality confuses this differentiation when applied to the idea of the nation state. 
This difficulty has been observed by researchers of culture: 
A ‘nationality’ is a major, sentimentally unified, group. The historical factors that 
lead to the feeling of national unity are various—political, cultural, linguistic, 
geographic, sometimes specifically religious. True racial factors also may enter 
in, though the accent on ‘race’ has generally a psychological rather than a strictly 
biological value. In an area dominated by the national sentiment there is a 
tendency for language and culture to become uniform and specific, so that 
linguistic and cultural boundaries at least tend to coincide. Even at best, however, 
the linguistic unification is never absolute, while cultural unity is apt to be 
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superficial, of a quasi-political nature, rather than deep and far-reaching. (Sapir 
1921, 227–28, notes)22 
The particular difficulty is spelled out well by Condon and Yousef: 
A nation is a political entity which may contain within it many quite different 
cultures; similarly, national borders may politically distinguish areas which are 
culturally identical. The lines drawn in Europe during the last century slicing up 
Africa into European colonies produced some nations which contain many 
different cultures, and cruelly divided unified cultures into separate nations. 
Within the United States, we may say there are different cultures or, as is more 
commonly said, different subcultures. (Condon and Yousef 1974, 49) 
 
Hall also certainly expected culture to be at play in international relations: 
Apart from power, culture still plays a prominent visible role in the relations 
between Russians and the West, for example. Culture has always been an issue, 
not only between Europe and Russia, but among the European states as well. . . . 
The frequently heard argument that cultures are not unique is one of the 
irrationalities discussed in the chapters to follow. . . . On the horizon are the 
multiple cultures of Africa and the emerging nations of Latin America demanding 
to be recognized in their own right. In all these crises, the future depends on 
man’s being able to transcend the limits of individual cultures. To do so, however, 
he must first recognize and accept the multiple hidden dimensions of unconscious 
culture, because every culture has its own hidden, unique form of unconscious 
culture. (Hall [1976] 1989, 1–2) 
The research design must reflect three observations, which create a daunting 
whole: (1) culture is expected to impact the conduct of international relations in an 
increasing, not decreasing, way; (2) cultural differences are largely invisible even though 
they are significant; and (3) people groups (cultures) do not map well on to nation states. 
Given these realities, for example, a Correlates of War regression would be poor research 
design, even though it is appealing for its parsimonious structure. Instead, this 
dissertation will undertake (so long as Step Two and Step Three are successful) to create 
a realistic scenario in which the potential impact of culture can be clearly observed. 
 
22 Race for Sapir might be better understood as ethnicity today 
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In so doing, the particular factor to be observed will be the capacity of one actor 
to successfully navigate cultural differences – that is, to mitigate the very differences this 
dissertation argues exist and are influential. This design will also either lend credence to 
or cast doubt on Schoeffel’s (2015, 471) assertion that “all actors need to develop 
intercultural competence . . . [intercultural competence trainings] enable both partners to 
develop intercultural competence—a key to sustainable international collaboration.” The 
issue of culture vs. state levels of analysis thus addressed, attention to the case studies 
themselves resumes. 
Case Selection Criteria 
This dissertation will present three case studies. Two are selected with a most 
similar systems design and one with a most different systems design (Dickovick and 
Eastwood 2013). In this case, the systems refer not to the states themselves but rather to 
the dyadic pairings within the case. Three cases have been selected: US/Iraq 1990 (Miller 
1990; Reed 1990),23 US/Iraq 2003 (Harvey 2012), and finally US/Russia after September 
11 (particularly the unsuccessful reset prompted by Russia’s offer of assistance24 (Devold 
2008)). The first two cases are “most similar” in that they involved the same actors and 
both led to an invasion of Iraq by the United States. The third case is “most different” in 
that a different dyad actor is involved (Russia) and that no war between the dyad 
members immediately followed. 
 
23 With appreciation to Rana Nejem for bringing this to the author’s attention 
24 “When Putin offered his assistance, we effectively responded ‘no thanks,’ thinking in particular of his 
bloody, ongoing, scorched-earth war against the Chechens. We did it for the right reasons. Nonetheless, it 
infuriated Putin. This was the last moment when any real rapprochement with Putin’s Russia was possible” 




After presenting a résumé of the cases under consideration, a counterfactual will 
be generated for each case through which to test Q2, Q3, H2, and H3. Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2006) prescribe that counterfactual analysis must represent real, plausible 
possibilities, should be presented through narrative, must be supported by the record, and 
will work well with process tracing. Several difficulties may be overcome in this way. 
First, it is likely impossible to know what the actual cultural values frameworks of the 
particular relevant actors was at the time of the events; instead, plausible frameworks can 
be assigned based on the likely best fit as supported by the record in Step One and Step 
Two of the research. Second, the primary counterfactual design will be the introduction 
of intercultural adaptation into one party’s reasoning. 
Consequently, the case studies will be presented as follows: 
1. A résumé of what actually happened (according to available records) 
2. Identification of plausible cultural values to each party in the dyad 
3. A counterfactual narrative in which one actor (identified upfront) employs the 
capacity for intercultural adaptation 
Importantly, no change will be made to the plausible cultural values in the counterfactual 
case. This would violate the requirement from Capoccia and Kelemen that a 
counterfactual be plausible. It is not plausible, for example, that a culture could have 
elected at some critical juncture to suddenly switch from one view of time to another or 
from one view of human nature to another. However, the development of intercultural 
competence into the ability to perform intercultural adaptation is not only plausible but 
has been demonstrated repeatedly (Hammer 2012). It would be plausible, on the other 
hand, that a state could employ interculturally adaptive decision making. This possibility, 
then, is where the counterfactual must focus. 
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Case Study Design 
As per George and Smoke (1974), each case will be asked the same set of 
questions. First, the potential impact of actors’ cultural differences will be assessed 
through process tracing. Each of these questions will be asked of each of the case studies: 
1. Did differences in the shame, honor / guilt, innocence dimension affect the actors’ 
understanding of the situation? How so? 
2. Did differences in the time orientation dimension affect the actors’ understanding 
of the situation? How so? 
3. Did differences in the authority dimension affect the actors’ understanding of the 
situation? How so? 
4. Did differences in the human nature dimension affect the actors’ understanding of 
the situation? How so? 
The answers to such questions will be presented based on the available evidence as 
regards the four tests of process tracing, as seen in Table 9. 
Table 9  
Process Tracing: Four Tests for Causation 
 
Bennett (2010, 210). The typology creates a new, two-dimensional framing of the alternative tests originally formulated by Van Evera 
(1997: 31–32). (b) In this figure, ‘‘establishing causation,’’ as well as ‘‘confirming’’ or ‘‘eliminating’’ a hypothesis, obviously does 
not involve a definitive test. Rather, as with any causal inference, qualitative or quantitative, it is a plausible test in the framework of 
(a) this particular method of inference and (b) a specific data set. 
 Sufficient to Establish Causation 





Straw in the Wind  
Passing affirms relevance of hypothesis but 
does not confirm it. Failing suggests 
hypothesis may not be relevant, but does not 
eliminate it. 
Smoking Gun 
Passing confirms hypothesis. 
Failing does not eliminate it. 
Yes 
Hoop 
Passing affirms relevance of hypothesis but 
does not confirm it. Failing eliminates it. 
Doubly Decisive 
Passing confirms hypothesis and 
eliminates others. 
Failing eliminates it. 
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Second, regarding the potential impact of intercultural competence and using the 
counterfactual condition of intercultural adaptation, each of the cases will be asked a fifth 
question, again using process tracing: 
5. Under ceteris paribus conditions, would adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one 
member of the dyad have changed the outcome of this event?25 
A limitation here is clearly in order: Although this dissertation is constructivist in 
theoretical orientation, it is sympathetic to Neoclassical Realism, and it is understood that 
there are many factors (structural, state-society relations, etc.) at play. Thus, the expected 
impact will be attenuated by the presence of such factors. Consequently, doubly decisive 
outcomes are unlikely due to the commitment to equifinality. 
Alternative Research Plan 
If the research has advanced through Stages Two and Three, no alternative 
research plan is needed for Stage Four. The counterfactual design either will or will not 
demonstrate (with varying potential levels of certainty) through process tracing, that 
intercultural competence would have proved to be a mitigating factor. Either outcome is 
acceptable for completing the research program. If the research does not advance through 
Stages Two and/or Three, then Stage Four will not be undertaken and the hypothesis will 
be unconfirmed. 
Limitations 
There are several important limitations in this project. First, the goal of this 
project is not to describe any particular culture, although cultural frameworks will be 
assigned in the case studies. Second, the goal of the project is not to suggest that cultures 
are unchanging or static (Martin, Nakayama, and Flores 2001). Third, it will not result in 
 
25 Adaptive frame-shifting capacity is described in Appendix A: Adaptive Cross-Cultural Frame Shifting. 
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predictive modeling of how particular cultures might interpret and/or apply a text. Fourth, 
despite the use of GCR, this project does not intend to privilege Christian interpretations 
of the world over others but rather uses these as a text to demonstrate difference. 
Conclusions 
The findings of this dissertation may be very important for the conduct of 
international relations. Consider the case of an illocutionary or perlocutionary misfire 
between actors of states as proposed above. If the reason for the misfire is due to cultural 
factors outside of the actors’ awareness(es), and if attention could be brought to such 
factors, it would be important to do so. Alternative explanations may have damaging 
consequences. For example, if the explanation given is that “the other actor is a bad faith 
actor,” it can have significant ramifications in the conduct of international relations. On 
the other hand, being perceived as a bad faith actor when one believes oneself to be a 
good faith actor can itself have significant ramifications. As an example, if two states 
agree on the locution of the UDHR, but due to cultural preunderstandings arrive at 
distinctly different perceptions of illocutions or perlocutions, they might both believe 
themselves to be in compliance while accusing the other of violations of human rights. 
There, of course, are bad faith actors, and this project in no way intends to explain these 
away. Rather, the intent is to clarify whether culture may be an “invisible factor” and to 
seek to make it (more) visible, if indeed it is there. 
If culture matters in international relations, this dissertation should identify a path 
forward in determining how and why. By approaching the topic “from the side” rather 
than merely building on top of the stalled-out culture/IR nexus, there is greater potential 
to contribute to an important but underdeveloped conversation. 
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The research proposed above will involve several distinct phases. First, the 
cultural frameworks identified in this proposal must be defined from the literature which 
is selected from GCR in order for the analysis to be completed. Second, a systematic 
analysis of that sample must be undertaken, applying the cultural frameworks to 
phenomena discussed in the GCR text. Third, the results of the systematic analysis must 
be applied to Q2 and H1 using speech act theory. Fourth, this information must be 
brought forward and applied to the counterfactual case studies so that their validity can be 
assessed. Fifth, the utility of intercultural adaptation will be assessed through the case 
studies. At this point, there is no intention to involve human subjects in the research, 
which appears to be accomplishable using written records alone. 
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CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS OF CULTURE WITHIN GLOBAL CHRISTIAN 
REASONING  
In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, four deductive frameworks were 
operationalized to serve as the basis for analysis of culture in the context of the relevant 
Global Christian Reasoning (GCR) literature. This chapter investigates those cultural 
frameworks in action within GCR and explores whether such differences have 
meaningful effects. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that cultural differences 
“exist” in the real-world and that they have effect even within an epistemic community. 
As discussed in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, the forthcoming chapter is 
interested in the quality of differences demonstrated, rather than in any type of 
quantitative analysis. Moreover, as this dissertation intends to use GCR as a 
methodological tool, as opposed to serving as a dissertation about GCR, this research 
section is intended to be exemplary rather than comprehensive. Consequently, once a 
noticeable basis of findings was observed to be evident within a particular framework, no 
further effort was made to locate all remaining sources relevant to that framework’s 
presence in GCR. 
As noted in the previous chapter, much of what was found in the literature is 
positioned in relation to or against Western Eurocentric frameworks. Thus, the 
traditionally Western or Anglo-American views are often written without reference to 
culture, whereas the non-Western perspectives are often written to engage with the 
heretofore dominant (even hegemonic) so-called cultureless claims of the West. The 
various cultural values of the West thus are often implicitly used by Western authors and 
explicitly examined by non-Western authors. The implicit values used by Western 
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authors does complicate this project somewhat, in that it makes it much more difficult to 
definitively argue that the Western approaches are in fact using the frameworks in 
question. However, there are several authors who draw specific attention to these issues – 
often from a missions studies (missiological) vantage point. The plan of this chapter is as 
follows: first, findings are presented regarding the four deductive cultural frameworks 
identified in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach.26 Second, inductive frameworks 
will be briefly discussed. Third, the effects of such cultural differences are examined. 
Cultural Frameworks in Action 
Framework 1: Shame, Honor / Guilt, Innocence 
General Findings 
There is substantial evidence that the shame, honor/guilt, innocence framework is 
represented within the GCR epistemic community.27 Indeed, of the frameworks 
investigated for this dissertation, shame, honor / guilt, innocence appeared to be the 
subject of the most developed scholarly conversation. Kraus (1990) is identified by both 
Singgih (1995) and Lei (2009) for drawing specific attention to the cultural issue of 
 
26 Note that the often-used collectivism/individualism framework is intentionally not utilized in this 
dissertation. The primary reason for this is that, as is such a widely used framework, it has been applied to 
so many different phenomena that it is a concept in risk of meaning everything and thus telling its user 
nothing. This would make it unwieldy to apply in Chapter Five: Case Studies With Counterfactuals. For the 
interested reader, a useful explanation of the concept is offered by Ting-Toomey (1999), who centers 
individualism/collectivism in her treatment of intercultural communication. 
27 These authors discuss shame and honor within GCR. They are listed as follows: Author (Date), cultural 
context influencing the author as regards this subject: Chadwick (2006), East and North Africa; Chan 
(2014), Singapore; Elmer (1993, 2002) United States, South Africa, and Zimbabwe; Fortosis (2012), 
Mexico; Hesselgrave (1991), Japan; Hiebert (2008, 111), India, United States; Kraus (1990), Japan; 
Lausanne Committee (1980a), comprised of scholars and/or practitioners from around the world; Lei 
(2009), Asian American; Merz (2020), Netherlands, West Africa; Muller (2001) several Muslim-majority 
countries; Plueddeman (2009), US, Nigeria; Priest (1994), the Aguarana people; Richards and O’Brien 
(2012), United States; Rah (2009), Korean American; Singgih (1995), Indonesia; Sugirtharajah (1999), Sri-
Lanka, India, England; Tennent (2007), United States, University of Edinburgh’s Centre for the Study of 
Christianity in the Non-Western World; Wu (2012, 2015, 2016), East Asia; Yong (2012), Malaysian 
American; You (1997), Korean. 
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shame in Christian reasoning.28 Kraus first introduces the concept as the following two 
competing ways Christians can understand the justification29 God accomplishes through 
Christ: 
• As guilt: “In moralistic or legalistic cultures alienation is often experienced as 
strong feelings of guilt in the presence of God, the Righteous Judge. In such 
societies emphasis on reconciliation as justification, that is, the removal of guilt 
and guilt feelings is understandable and important. This, of course, has been the 
predominant theological motif in Western theology . . . ” (1990, 181). 
• As shame: “In cultures where individuals find their self-identity and approval 
through inclusion in the group, exclusion and alienation from the group are the 
most dreaded results of wrongdoing[.] Shame, experienced as feelings of 
embarrassment, unworthiness, and remorse, follows the realization of 
wrongdoing. Again, the biblical concept of reconciliation clearly speaks also to 
this kind of alienation which sin has caused” (1990, 181). 
Kraus also introduces the pairing of fear and power (such as over sorcery and 
magic), which are not part of the present project but bring the third element in the triad of 
cultural concerns represented by Muller (2001) and Georges (2016): shame, honor / guilt, 
innocence / power, fear. Kraus was an American Anabaptist missionary in Japan, and he 
views the concept through the lens of American anthropologists such as Benedict and 
Mead. However, what makes Kraus interesting is that he appears to have served as a 
reference point for both Singgih (1995), who argued as an Indonesian for an Indonesian 
hermeneutic, and for Lei (2009), who argues for an Asian American understanding as an 
Asian American. Both also offer critiques of Kraus. 
One of the most interesting findings in this framework is that authors such as Lei 
(2009), Singgih (1995), and Wu (2016) indicate that failure to appropriately contextualize 
 
28 Tennent (2007) identifies Nida 1954, Kasdorf 1980, Hesslegrave 1983, Wiher 2003, and You 1997 as 
important historical contributors to the understanding of shame and guilt approaches. 
29 Justification is a common theological category in GCR. For the reader unfamiliar with the term, here is a 
typical treatment: “Justification is not only one of the great benefits of the death of Christ but is also a 
cardinal doctrine of Christianity because it distinguishes it as a religion of grace and faith. And grace and 




Christianity on the basis of issues of shame and honor may lead to an incomplete or 
inadequate understanding of Christianity. Lei and Singgih both affirm Kraus’s example 
of an illocutionary misfire:30 in a shame culture, “to say ‘I forgive’ implies that I affirm 
the other person’s badness, and thus forgiveness reaffirms his or her shame” (Kraus 1990, 
212). Singgih adds, “To say ‘I forgive’ affirms the other person’s badness, thus adding to 
their shame; on the other hand, only a forgiveness that covers the past and a genuine 
restoration of relationship can banish shame. What banishes shame is a restoration of 
communication established through loving identification, where the worth of each can be 
mutually affirmed” (78). Consequently, for Kraus, Singgih, and Lei, one of the core 
messages of Christianity – often proclaimed in the West as “Jesus forgives your sins” – 
may actually be interpreted in non-Western shame and honor contexts as “Jesus affirms 
your badness,” thus being interpreted in the opposite way of that intended. This type of 
disconnect demonstrates that even within the GCR epistemic community, cultural 
differences can lead to very different interpretations. The following four sections contain 
a sample of ideas relevant to each operationalization (from Chapter Three: 
Methodological Approach) of the shame, honor / guilt innocence framework. 
Facework vs. Standards 
Facework appears strongly in GCR. Richards and O’Brien (2012, 116) state the 
issue simply: “A critical value in this sort of culture is preserving ‘face,’ or the honor 
associated with one’s name.” Wu (2012) is perhaps the most comprehensive and argues 
(following Lin Yutang) that “face” is nearly impossible to define. Wu continues, stressing 
that “face must be protected and given in order to maintain harmony in a group. In 
 
30 That is, when words are interpreted to do something other than what the author intended them to do. 
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different contexts, the rules and signs for recognizing face may differ. A person loses face 
when she or he claims to have certain characteristics but others do not acknowledge that 
claim. . . . One’s face is contingent on one’s role within a group and the expectations of 
the community” (152). Moreover, “to identify with a group implies an acceptance of its 
face standards. . . . Face functions as a social control, regulating moral behaviour. Lack of 
conformity to communal norms raises doubts about one’s group identity. Loss of face 
brings a sense of isolation” (155). Furthermore, “face can be gained or lost” (157), 
though the processes for this can be very complicated. He summarizes the concept: 
People are concerned with reputation or ‘face.’ Individuals are sensitive to the 
opinions of others. Every group makes judgments about the value or worth of 
other people relative to some group standard. These social assessments largely 
determine a person’s social status and public identity. (Wu 2016, 376) 
 
However, the idea of face is not merely social. Wu explains the theological 
significance of the idea: 
God’s own honor is bound up in the cross. In that sense, Jesus saves God’s “face.” 
As I suggested, this is true in two ways. On the one hand, sin raises the need for 
God’s own vindication. This requires that He manifest his supreme worth in all 
the earth. God’s character is far more than a foil that exposes our sin. God’s honor 
is an end in itself. The cross saves God’s “face” from the shame of His people. On 
the other hand, the cross protects God from the shame of breaking his covenant 
promises. (Wu 2016, 379) 
This view contrasts significantly with the understanding that humanity has failed 
to live up to God’s righteous standards and that the work of Jesus is in response to this 
violation of such standards. Consider, for instance, Erickson’s treatment of God’s work 
through Christ: 
Humankind has a twofold problem as a result of sin and the fall. On the one hand, 
there is a basic corruption of human nature; our moral character has been polluted 
through sin. This aspect of the curse is nullified by regeneration which reverses 
the direction and general tendencies of human nature. The other problem remains, 
however: our guilt or liability to punishment for having failed to fulfil God’s 
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expectations. It is to this problem that justification relates. Justification is God’s 
action pronouncing sinners righteous in his sight. It is a matter of our being 
forgiven and declared to have fulfilled all that god’s law requires of us. This is an 
issue of considerable practical significance, for it deals with the question, How 
can I be right with God? How can I, a sinner, be accepted by a holy and righteous 
judge? (Erickson 2001, 318) 
 
These two perspectives are quite different. Whereas, for Wu, Jesus’s work on the cross is 
about God’s face; for Erickson (2001, 246), it is about the “consequence or ‘wages’ of 
sin.” The difference in focus appears closely linked to the operationalized framework: the 
one cultural group is focused on facework, the other on standards. 
The consequences of face also have practical consequence in the Christian 
community. Singgih argues that parishioners will in some cases refuse pastoral care 
because receiving the care may impact their face. Wu (2015) argues that communication 
strategies must account for the importance of face – including, in particular, the 
potentially negative impact of losing face. Hesselgrave (1991, 610–11) contrasts these 
concerns for face with the Western preoccupation on standards and observes that Western 
missionaries are particularly frustrated by a cultural system in which moral weight only 
seems to appear once someone is caught (bringing shame). The emphasis in the West is 
around individual management of principles and guidelines, rather than facework 
(Tennent 2007, 81). One caveat must be noted: You (1997) cautions against calling 
cultures “guilt cultures” and “shame cultures” – an essentialization – and his warning 
corresponds with Merz (2020), who warns against the risk of overapplication of such etic 
categories. Still, the potential effects of the difference between standards and facework as 
a basis for being in the world are very significant. As Wu explains, 
Chinese non-Christians frequently have the same reaction to a traditional gospel 
presentation: “What does that have to do with me?” This should not be surprising. 
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The standard Chinese translation . . . translates “sin” as “crime.” Naturally, 
Chinese reply, “I’m not a criminal. I’ve never stolen anything nor killed anyone.” 
To many Westerners, this response seems perplexing. However, many cultures do 
not stress law-imagery as much as Westerners do. When making moral decisions, 
people rarely if ever appeal to a “universal law” or even to a god who will judge 
them. I doubt there was ever a morning that Chairman Mao woke up with Martin 
Luther’s stricken conscious and cried out, “How will a holy God ever accept me?” 
In cultures that do not emphasize legal metaphors, how can people make sense of 
salvation? (Wu 2016, 375) 
 
Consider the contrast here with Erickson’s (2001, 318) statement repeated here: “How 
can I be right with God? How can I, a sinner, be accepted by a holy and righteous judge?” 
The divergent focus between facework and standards demonstrates the importance of the 
shame, honor / guilt, innocence framework in GCR. 
External Judgment vs. Internal Judgment 
Like facework, the distinction between internal and external judgment is found in 
GCR. Priest, for example, articulates the issue of contrast in the following terms: 
Rather than rejoicing in their great ally, conscience, [missionaries to people of 
other cultures] are more likely to express bewilderment, confusion, and dismay at 
the total lack of conscience, guilt, and sense of sin which they find. Even the 
consciences of native Christians seem not to be what they ought. Again and again 
one hears such refrains as, ‘These people don’t feel guilt for their sins, only 
embarrassment if they’re caught.’ (Priest 1994, 292) 
 
Singgih expresses the concept from within a culture where external judgment is used: 
When someone disrupts the harmony of the society and feels trapped in shame, 
either the person withdraws from social life or people start to put a distance 
between them and the person. This is not done because of a judgmental attitude 
towards the person, but with good intentions, namely not to make the person 
concerned more ashamed than what he/she already suffers. This is the main 
reason why we should pay attention to shame-feeling, because when a person is in 




Note the pastoral31 implications in Singgih – these are not merely philosophical concepts 
but applied ones. This strengthens the argument that these cultural differences are not 
merely intellectual diversions but that they, in fact, speak to the lived practice of 
culturally different groups, even within the same epistemic community. This suggests 
that cultural differences may be expected to impact actual conduct in addition to thinking. 
Lei offers a response to the difficulty Singgih highlights – that pastoral visits can actually 
increase suffering by increasing shame. She posits, 
A visit from the church to those in shame in this understanding may initially cause 
the person to feel more ashamed, but presumably when the visitors help the 
person to identify the source of their shame, and explain as well as embody 
Christ’s loving identification, the harmful effects of shame would be neutralized. 
(Lei 2009, 107) 
 
Richards and O’Brien (2012, 114) offer a useful contrast between internalized 
standards and the great importance of social (external) judgment in understanding one’s 
right-standing, explaining, “Rules and laws are established to guide people in the right 
path. But ultimately the goal is that people internalize the code of conduct so that it 
becomes not a matter of external influence but of internal guidance.” They further 
explain:  
One should not regret actions that, in the words of Dayanand Pitamber, ‘have 
been approved by those considered significant.32 When a person performs any act 
in the interest of the community, he is not concerned about the wrongness or 
rightness of the acts.’ If a person commits violence that is approved by the 
community, then he has no reason to feel shame (and certainly not guilt) 
(Richards and O’Brien 2012, 116) 
Wu carries on this theme of the importance of the external judgment for understanding 
right-standing: 
 
31 That is, those implication related to the practical leading and teaching of Christians 
32 This seems likely to be consequential in the next chapter. 
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Contrary to common perception, honor and shame have both subjective and 
objective dimensions. People are familiar with the subjective side of honor-
shame. For example, psychologically, a person can feel “ashamed.” Or, one 
personally feels a sense of honor. However, there is another aspect of honor-
shame. Objectively, we—as sinners—dishonor God and “shame” his name before 
a watching world. Likewise, our peers might (dis)honor us (regardless of our 
personal feelings). Within our community, we may have an objective high status . 
. . quite independent of our subjective, psychological state. (Wu 2016, 377) 
 
The contrast between these conceptualizations of one’s standing in terms of rightness 
with the West, where standards are internalized, is noticeable: 
In a highly individualistic culture the ethical values and social mores of the larger 
society must be reinforced through a process of internalizing codes of conduct so 
that the reference point is more internal and personal rather than external and 
public. (Tennent 2007, 81) 
 
Clearly these ideas not only exist but also appear to be quite powerful in both their 
differentiation and their practical effects. The external judgment vs. internal judgment 
operationalization of the shame, honor / guilt, innocence framework is thus seen to exist 
in practice in GCR and leads to culturally divergent interpretations of shared 
commitments within the GCR epistemic community. 
Negative View of Confession vs. Positive View of Confession 
There did not appear to be much explicit contrast in the literature between the 
negative and positive views of confession. Richards and O’Brien do, however, share a 
helpful set of contrasting statements about the topic, suggesting “Because Westerners—
especially Americans—assume we should be internally motivated to do the right thing, 
we also believe we will be internally punished if we don’t. . . . [there is a] Western 
assumption that internal guilt will convict a wrongdoer of his crime.” (Richards and 
O’Brien 2012, 115) Furthermore, Richards and O’Brien explain “In the West, we know 
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right from wrong objectively, and we typically assume that our wrongdoings will find us 
out because our consciences won’t let us rest until we confess” (116). 
This positive view of confession noted here stands in contrast with the modes of 
restoration required in a shame, honor context. Singgih (1995, 75) argues for the need of 
something to neutralize feelings of shame but never calls for confession. Kraus (1990, 
212) articulates the underlying difficulty: “When guilt is objectified, the offender can be 
pardoned. When shame is objective, the offender can only be excluded.” 
One other twist on confession is the idea that at times it can and should be 
corporate, rather than individual. Rah (2009, 203) explains, “Corporate confession begins 
with awareness—the awareness of the reality of corporate sin.” This may also connect 
with the cultural frameworks of individualism and collectivism. Rah argues that 
individualism can be a barrier to corporate repentance. 
Collective Implications vs. Individual Implications 
The final operationalization of the shame, honor / guilt, innocence framework 
relates to the distinction between collective and individual implications of wrongdoing. 
Lei helps locate the collective implications of shame in Confucian roots, noting, 
Every person is integrated into a network of relationships. Accordingly, perfecting 
oneself necessarily means perfecting others, and transformation involves “an 
ever-expanding series of concentric circles enveloping first the self, then the 
family, community, nation, until the whole cosmos is transformed.” (Lei 2009, 
101) 
 
For Lei, the collective implication is one of the most obvious impacts of shame 
orientation: 
Shame results when someone disrupts the harmony of the society, and 
consequently the person withdraws from social life or people start to put a 




As Wu explains further, 
An honor-shame worldview is more collectivistic than individualistic. In 
“collectivistic” contexts, one’s group largely shapes a personal sense of identity. 
In addition, the community’s needs are generally prioritized over an individual’s 
concerns. Even in sports subculture, we see this dynamic at work. People 
celebrate a victory by yelling, “We won the championship!!” We might say, 
“Excuse me, you said ‘we’? You were not on the field.” (Wu 2016, 376) 
 
Accordingly, one can better grasp the difference between guilt and honor-shame. 
Whereas guilt emphasizes what someone does wrong, honor and shame highlight 
who a person is. The latter is a broader category. Our identity is determined by 
both what we do and our relationship with others. For example, one is a daughter, 
C.E.O., or teacher in relationship to other people (e.g., parents, a company, or 
students). (Wu 2016, 377) 
 
As with the other operationalizations of the shame, honor / guilt, innocent framework, 
these examples demonstrate that the framework is present in GCR and is leading to active 
differences in understanding. 
Conclusions 
In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, the shame, honor / guilt, innocence 
framework was defined from non-GCR sources. Four principle manifestations of the 
framework were anticipated: facework vs. standards, external vs. internal judgment, 
negative vs. positive view of confession, and collective vs. individual implications. In this 
section, it was observed that differences related to shame, honor / guilt, innocence clearly 
exist within the GCR epistemic community. Moreover, they appear to lead to 
significantly different understandings of core theological themes. The question of 
meaningful effect will be addressed at the end of the chapter. 
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Framework 2: Time Orientation 
General Findings 
Where differences in time orientation are visible in GCR, the depth of difference 
in particular is striking.33 Two other important inductive frameworks that arose from the 
consideration of time are land and suffering, which are reported later in this chapter. 
There is an important connection between time, land, and suffering, however, and Rah 
(2009) addresses this connection through the concept of mobility: 
Mobility, and the speed of that mobility, result in the ability and the power to 
disregard and disconnect from suffering. There is no space or time for the 
theology of celebration to intersect with the theology of suffering. . . . Our 
constant motion, and the high speed of that movement, heighten the dully of our 
senses and the increasing disconnect with suffering. The power of spatial mobility 
is the power to ignore or disregard suffering. (Rah 2009, 148) 
 
It follows from Rah that a cultural orientation toward the present or the future 
may not value the things of the past and may focus on what will be or what could be 
rather than what has been and what is. The most striking cultural expressions of time 
were presented by Native American (American Indian) and African voices. Kidwell, 
Noley, and Tinker affirm the link between time and space as pertains to those cultures: 
Christianity portends teleology. Time, or history, is going someplace. . . . 
American Indian traditions are spatially based rather than temporally based. 
Indian people live their lives in accordance with the cycles of nature. While 
 
33 The following authors discuss time orientation within GCR. They are listed as follows: Author (Date), 
cultural context influencing the author as regards this subject: Chan (2014), Singapore; Chow (2016), 
Chinese American; De la Torre and Aponte (2001), Cuban American and Puerto Rican American; Deloria 
(2003) Native American; Dyrness and García-Johnson (2015), United States, Honduras; Elmer (2002), 
United States, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Hesselgrave (1991), United States, Japan; Hiebert (2008), United 
States, India; Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker (2001), Native American; Lane (2002) United States, 
multicultural context; Lausanne Committee (1980b), which is comprised of scholars and/or practitioners 
from around the world; Lingenfelter and Mayers (2003), United States, Pacific Islands, United States, 
Guatemala; Malina (1989), United States; Mbiti (1978), Africa (especially Akamba); Rah (2009), Korean 
American; Reese (2006), United States and Zimbabwe; Richards and O’Brien (2012), United States; 




western scientists see space and time as two distinct dimensions of reality, Indian 
cultures value their association with the homelands. (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 
2001, 13) 
 
Deloria (2003, 70) complexifies time, arguing that “time has an unusual limitation. It 
must begin and end at some real points, or it must be conceived as cyclical in nature, 
endlessly allowing the repetition of patterns of possibilities.” Regarding the link between 
space and time, “space generates time, but time has little relationship to space” (70). This 
is because “whereas religions that are spatially determined can create a sense of sacred 
time that originates in the specific location it is exceedingly difficult for a religion, once 
bound to history, to incorporate sacred places into its doctrines” (70). 
Rah argues that one of the differences between White American theology and 
both African American and Native American Theology can be found in the ability of 
White culture to physically remove oneself (or one’s people) from a place of suffering. 
Katongole (2017) further develops the link between suffering and time orientation. 
Reflecting on Stearns’ (2011) Dancing in the Glory of Monsters,34 Katongole argues that 
when becoming forward-looking is a requirement of hope, then this presents an 
unsatisfactory eschatology for those experiencing suffering – indeed, Katongole 
characterizes the disruption of war which Stearns writes about as “the loss of future” 
(28). This raises, for him, the question of whether there is an eschatology35 of the present 
– and indeed he argues that both Paul and Peter36 offer a form of hope which is not bound 
 
34 Stearns details the conflict in Congo from 1996 forward. 
35 Eschatology is a branch of (Christian) theology dealing variously with the end times, the pinnacle of 
history, and the general program of God vis-à-vis humanity. The third meaning is the most appropriate 
here. 
36 St. Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, and St. Peter, who was one of the original followers of Jesus 
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up in the future but which is fulfilled in the midst of present sufferings. Consider how 
different this focus is from that of (American) Hodges (2004), who writes, 
Thus, by faith we triumph over the world again, just as we did when we initially 
placed faith in God’s Son for eternal life. This additional victory occurs whenever 
I keep His commandments as a result of my continuing faith in His name. Victory 
over the world, therefore, is the true heritage of those who are born of God. (57; 
emphasis in original) 
 
For Hodges, victory, not suffering, is the primary present experience of the Christian. 
Temporal organization is an area of noticeable disagreement. Mbiti (1978, 24) 
posits that time is not always organized as past, present, future, instead arguing that for 
some groups, such as the Akamba, “what has not taken place, or what is unlikely to occur 
in the immediate future, has no temporal meaning—it belongs to the reality of ‘no-
Time.’” Another element of temporal focus, which does not necessarily go by the 
language of “time,” has to do with the veneration of ancestors. Chow (2016) suggests that 
there is a link between Mbiti’s (1978) engagement with the concepts of time in Africa 
and Chan’s (2014, 190) argument that “for the family in East Asia, family solidarity is 
experienced not just with those present but with those who are dead.” 
Regarding the question of the conceptualization of time, Malina engages 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and argues that time concepts must be taken into 
account when exegeting scripture, noting, 
There surely are differences between pre-Einsteinian, pre-Industrial Revolution, 
pre-Enlightenment, pre-Newtonian, pre-monastic Mediterranean perceptions of 
time and the perceptions of time common to most contemporary American Bible 
readers, professional and non-professional. I hope I have touched upon the more 
obvious and important ones. And I hope I have adequately indicated that the 




Thus, it can be observed that conceptualizations of time are quite important and divergent 
in GCR and for quite a few different reasons. Chapter Three: Methodological Approach 
operationalized time orientation in three ways: past, present, future; synchronous vs. 
sequence; and time vs. event. These are each examined in turn. 
Past, Present, Future 
Mbiti (1978, 24) argued that the Akamba had an understanding of time that is 
two-dimensional: “a long past, and a dynamic present.” According to Mbiti, 
The ‘future’ as we know it in the linear conception of Time is virtually non-
existent in Akamba thinking. My findings from other African people have not 
yielded any radical difference. The future is virtually absent because events which 
lie in the future have not been realized and cannot, therefore, constitute Time 
which otherwise must be experienced. . . . Time as a succession or simultaneity of 
events ‘moves’ not forward but backwards. People look more to the ‘past’ for the 
orientation of their being than to anything that might yet come into human 
History. For them History does not move towards any goal yet in the future: 
rather, it points to the roots of their existence, such as the origin of the world, the 
creation of man, the formation of their customs and traditions, and the coming 
into being of their whole structure of society. The ‘present’ must conform to the 
‘past’ in the sense that it is the ‘past’, rather than any distant future, by means of 
which people orientate their living and thinking. (Mbiti 1978, 24–25) 
 
 Chow (2016) engages Mbiti, recognizing that some scholars have argued with 
Mbiti’s characterization of time. However, Chow believes that those scholars 
misunderstand Mbiti’s point, suggesting, 
According to Mbiti, there is a tension between the African understanding of time 
as two-dimensional (a long past and a dynamic present) and the New Testament 
understanding of time as having two ages (the present age and the age to come). 
Previous missionary endeavours in Africa have failed to recognise this tension, 
resulting in many African Christians disappointed and disillusioned by a 
parousia37 that never seemed to be happening. Instead, he argues that African 
Christians can benefit from a more relevant eschatology which is mindful of the 
role of Christ and of the sacraments. These enable a convergence of time and 
space – the latter in terms of both physical and spiritual worlds. Moreover, it 
 
37 The second coming / return of Christ 
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helpfully engages the living-dead in African thought with the Christian notion of 
the communion of saints. (Chow 2016, 209) 
 
The Lausanne Committee had a similar take to Mbiti, and like Chow, the 
committee argued that this distinction could have very real effects on people’s 
understandings of the message of Christianity: 
One particularly interesting contrast is that in many traditional concepts time does 
not progress into a future bliss in which the past is put right. Rather than having 
hope in the future, people may identify with the past and hope to attain unity with 
generations past. But most of people’s real attention is focused on the present, 
upon the immediate physical realities of this life as the important indicators of 
spiritual reality. It has been suggested that, in some cases, the future takes on a 
quality of non-reality. In these cases, it is exceedingly unwise to present our major 
appeal for accepting Christ upon the possibility of receiving future salvation in 
another world. Defining salvation as going to heaven after death in such 
circumstances may provoke resistance to the gospel rather than attract people to 
Christ. (Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization 1980b, sec. 5,D,i) 
 
Dyrness and García-Johnson (2015) present a complex understanding of future-
orientation around the idea of mañana theology, in which future orientation indicates 
leaving the future to God and instead focusing the Christian community’s efforts on 
transformation of the present. They explain the contrast this way: 
In Western eschatology the categories ‘time’ and ‘history’ are future and linear; 
they constitute the main framework by which the West has come to develop its 
doctrine of human progress. Meanwhile, communities in the majority world (and 
the diaspora) think and live eschatologically and sacramentally based on a hope 
that focuses on the present and aims at the flourishing of the community. The 
eschatological sense of community subsumes both ancestry and progeny; hence, 
human flourishing implies recovering the dignity of ancestors and caring for the 
well-being of their families. Hope implies a future but not in the deterministic and 
progressive way the West has come to understand it. (Dyrness and García-
Johnson 2015, 147) 
 
Both Dyrness and García-Johnson as well as De La Torre and Aponte (2001, 94) see the 
eschatological future as a call for liberation in the present: “The eschatological hope for a 
‘here-after’ justice is a directive to be established in the here and now.” This contrasts 
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with Rah’s (2009, 63) observation that the White American church focuses primarily on 
the near-future. Past, present, and future orientations are thus clearly seen to be 
operational within GCR and serve as a site of contested meaning. 
Synchronous vs. Sequence 
The process of representing Christianity indicates the necessity of introducing 
time, though Sunquist (2017) introduces time as relational – rooted in the creative person 
of God. He expects that Christianity necessarily interrupts cyclical, non-linear thinking, 
explaining that “the gospel message is a message of hope that is being fulfilled in linear 
time. Time began, and time will end. And the end of time means judgment, promise, and 
glory” (139). Sunquist argues that non-linear conceptions of time exist primarily among 
“Hindus, Buddhists, and those who worship according to the cycles of nature” (137). 
Hiebert (2008, 338) affirms that, in an Indian worldview, “time is a continual rerun of 
persons and events. The universe repeats itself in an almost unending series of epochs of 
prosperity and decay, of existence and nonexistence.” Hiebert contrasts this with an 
American view of time in which “time, like other dimensions of the world, is linear. It 
extends along a uniform scale into the future and past without repeating itself” (338). The 
linear conceptualization of time is also linked to the commodification of time as follows: 
“In the West, time is a hot commodity. Most of us consider it a limited resource. . . . 
Because time is both limited and important, we talk about it as if it were a commodity 
that can be saved, traded or spent like money” (Richards and O’Brien 2012, 136). Note 
the contrast with a Native view of time in which “Native time is oriented to the repetition 
of events” (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001, 13). Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker continue, 
“In the cyclical patterns of time in Indian communities, human beings are simply part of 
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the ongoing process of repetition of events in the environment—hunting seasons, 
agricultural cycles. What is important is that these events reoccur on a regular basis” (13–
14). Thus, synchronous and sequential views of time are also seen to be present and 
active sites of contested interpretation and meaning within GCR. 
Time vs. Event 
The question of whether time is best understood as a quantifiable and limited, 
linear resource or as an ongoing process of repetition may also link to the question of 
whether priority is given to time or event. Richards and O’Brien (2012, 140) explain that 
“in the West, the correct time is usually connected to a clock. Westerners today view time 
as discrete (meaning separate units) and thus quantifiable,” whereas “in the non-Western 
world, by contrast, the correct time is often connected to a condition or situation.” This 
contrast may be connected to Reese’s (2006) observation that time is one of the few 
natural resources that are still free for many in Africa. Thus, the desire to treat time as 
abundant may be linked to a desire to experience abundance. Lingenfelter and Mayers 
(2003, 41) summarize the differences between time and event orientation as follows: 
Time Orientation: 
• Concern for punctuality and amount of time expended. 
• Careful allocation of time to achieve the maximum within set limits. 
• Tightly scheduled, goal-directed activities. 
• Rewards offered as incentives for efficient use of time. 
• Emphasis on dates and history. 
Event Orientation: 
• Concern for details of the event, regardless of time required. 
• Exhaustive consideration of a problem until resolved. 
• A ‘let come what may’ outlook not tied to any precise schedule. 
• Stress on completing the event as a reward in itself. 
• Emphasis on present experience rather than the past or future. 
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Differences in time and event orientations are thus also seen to be present in GCR, 
although these differences appear to be more practical than epistemological. 
Conclusions 
In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, the time orientation framework was 
operationalized to include past, present, future; synchronous vs. sequence; and time vs. 
event variations. Each of these was found to be active within GCR. This section has 
demonstrated that differences in time orientation are clearly visible in GCR and 
contribute to real differences in theological and practical concerns – some which extend 
far beyond the original operationalization (i.e., the inclusion of suffering, land, and time). 
Although some of the sources may take a West vs. The Rest approach to conceptions of 
time, it is clear that there are actually many different variations. Differences in time 
orientation are thus confirmed to “actually exist” within the GCR epistemic community 
and to have both epistemological and practical consequences. The question of meaningful 
effect is addressed later in this chapter. 
Framework 3: Authority 
General Findings 
Human authority, its sources, and its use take on significantly varied expressions 
around the world in GCR.38 West explains why the concept is so important: 
 
38 The following authors discuss authority within GCR. They are listed as follows: Author (Date), cultural 
context influencing the author as regards this subject: Elmer (1993; 2002), United States, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe; Forman (1974), South Pacific; Hesselgrave (1991), United States, Japan; Hibbert and Hibbert 
(2019), Millet of Turkey; Hiebert (2008), United States, India; Irvin (2007) Argentina; Kidwell, Noley, and 
Tinker (2001), Native American; Lane (2002), United States, multicultural context; Lee (2007), Korea; 
Lingenfelter (2008), United States, Pacific Islands; Lingenfelter and Lingenfelter (2003), US, Pacific 
Islands; Lingenfelter and Mayers (2003), United States, Pacific Islands, United States, Guatemala; Ninan 
(2012), India (Dalit); Pleuddemann (2009), United States, Nigeria; Roembke (2000), Western Europe, 
Africa, Asia, Middle East, and Eastern Europe; West (1984), United States and China; Wu (2016), East 
Asia; Yeo (2017), Chinese American. 
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Society is the scene of power conflicts. It is the area where people compete to 
master one another and the environment around them to produce more power and 
wealth for themselves — and where the poor and the weak struggle to survive and 
propagate on whatever terms they can. Structures of public life grow out of this 
conflict, sometimes by agreement, more often imposed by the strong on the weak: 
structures of production and exchange and the exploitation of labor, structures of 
government expressed in laws and the powers of enforcement. (West 1984, 407) 
 
While West speaks in terms that sound familiar to the political science realist, this is, for 
him, a clearly theological area of inquiry: 
This world of social power has its own relation to God and his purposes. Culture 
may contain it somewhat, but never wholly. Ideologies may rationalize it but 
never without distortion. It has its own dynamic, rooted in God-given human 
capacities to bring forth the fruits of the earth for the common good, and in human 
misuse of those capacities to dominate others and despoil the earth. The test of 
any theology, on whatever continent, is its insight into the working of this human 
power in relation to the divine power revealed in the work of Christ — through 
and behind all the cultural and ideological masks with which we hide it. (West 
1984, 407) 
 
One corollary theme that emerges alongside questions of authority has to do with 
the relative positioning of the authority of men and women. While the present project will 
not further engage the gendered dynamics of authority (not because it is unimportant but 
because the scope is so large), it is useful to notice that Yeo believes this is an area of 
cultural hermeneutics, contending that, 
Many Western Christians misread 1 Timothy 2, 1 Corinthians 11, and Ephesians 5 
as reinforcing patriarchal values and the submission of women, yet Asian and 
Asian American feminist theologians offer a variety of alternative readings that 
are creative and powerful. (Yeo 2017, 330) 
 
In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, authority was operationalized in three 
different ways: first, as the range between consent and involvement, authority centered, 
and authoritarian; second, along the continuum of ascribed and achieved status; and third, 
 
140 
along the continuum of high and low power distance. Each of these is explored for their 
representation in GCR in turn. 
Consent and Involvement vs. Authority Centered vs. Authoritarian 
The first operationalization of authority relates to three positions of preferred 
authority structures. For Hiebert, the Western understanding of the consent of the 
governed is a cultural artifact, rooted in deeper understandings of what it means to be 
human: 
Modernity is based on the assumption that all humans by their very nature are 
equal, and that they have rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (Bloom 
1987, 162). Its emphasis on the equal worth of all individuals is regarded as the 
essence of being human, and not given or modified by law or democratic vote. 
This assumption has led to emphasis on democracy in which people consent to be 
governed, and in which science and the humanities can conquer nature, providing 
prosperity and health. (Hiebert 2008, 200) 
 
Hibbert and Hibbert (2019) also found a consent of the governed approach to authority, 
but it appears to have different underpinnings from the Western Modernist approach that 
Hiebert described. They note that the Millet people of Turkey demonstrated an 
unexpected contrast to their larger cultural context: 
Strikingly, interviewees spent a disproportionate amount of time talking about just 
one quality of pastors—that pastors should not lord it over others or consider 
themselves better than others. They saw this as the biggest problem among Millet 
church leaders. Interviewees characterized pastors like this as being people who 
no longer respect or listen to the views of people in their congregations, but 
instead often get angry, are impatient, and fall into sins like drunkenness and 
adultery. (Hibbert and Hibbert 2019, 248) 
 
Yeo (2017) suggests a style which may fit in the authority-centered approach – in 
that both government authority and scriptural authority are centered. He argues that the 
conflict between these sources of authority allows some Christians a way forward: 
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Sensitivity to the imbalance of power in the world is one of the understandings or 
presuppositions that Asian Christians bring to the Bible as they read cross-
culturally. The book of Romans is often read in Asian contexts, as it may have 
been in the original Roman imperial context, as a political ‘hidden transcript’ 
(James Scott) of resistance to oppression that addresses, for example, the 
Malaysian occasional Islamic oppression of other racial and religious groups. 
(Yeo 2017, 329) 
 
Hibbert and Hibbert, meanwhile, explore the question of “paternalistic,” or 
authoritarian, leadership, contrasting between its good and destructive applications in the 
following terms: 
In the benevolent form of paternalism, followers show loyalty and deference 
towards the leader because they respect and appreciate the leader’s genuine 
concern for their welfare. In the exploitative form of paternalistic leadership, 
which is one that is more obviously marred by human sin, the leader’s overt 
behavior is nurturing, but the care that is expressed towards followers is solely for 
the purpose of getting them to do what the leader wants them to. (Hibbert and 
Hibbert 2019, 244) 
 
Hibbert and Hibbert also lean on the GLOBE study for explication of some of these 
themes. 
Ascribed vs. Achieved 
The second operationalization of authority, ascribed vs. achieved status, may 
connect to honor and shame, which was discussed previously. Wu (2016) explains how 
the regulation of honor and shame connect to both ascribed and achieved identities. In a 
shame and honor context in particular, he suggests that 
vertical, hierarchic relationships are often more influential than horizontal (i.e., 
peer) relationships. As a result, those who have an honor-shame perspective have 
a great respect for authority. We can remember these three features using 
alliteration: reputation, relationships, and role (which entails rank and 
responsibilities). 
Cultures have manifold ways of conveying, assessing, and regulating 
honor and shame (Wu, 2013: 6). There are two ways to get (or lose) honor (or 
shame). First, it can be achieved (based on individual distinctions like getting 
good grades or winning a sports competition). Second, it can be ascribed (based 
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on one’s social position, relationships, titles, etc.). For example, if your last name 
was “Clinton” or “Obama” or “Hilton,” you would get a certain respect and 
attention from people regardless of my [sic] individual achievements. (Wu 2016, 
376) 
 
Hiebert contrasts the ascribed and achieved approaches to status as follows: 
Ascribed Status: 
• Security and meaning are found in the groups to which one belongs and in the 
relationships one has with others, rather than in the material possessions one 
acquires. The building of relationships, particularly those to which one is born, is 
of greatest importance, for they are a measure of an individual’s status and power. 
(Hiebert 2008, 340) 
 
Achieved Status: 
• Personal achievement, not illustrious background, is the measure of an 
individual’s worth and social position. Hard work, careful planning, efficiency, 
and saving of time and effort are intrinsically good. . . . Achievement is closely 
tied to social mobility. People should be allowed to rise to their levels of ability 
and not be tied down by their kinsmen or their past. (Hiebert 2008, 343) 
Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker (2001) identify still another approach, which leans 
more toward the ascribed status approach but with more individuation that might occur in 
some ascription oriented cultures anticipated by Hiebert: 
Kin relationships structure the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of 
individuals toward the group. In [American] Indian communities, people are 
valued not for what they achieve for themselves but for what they contribute to 
the stability and continuity of the group. At the same time, tribal societies 
recognize the uniqueness and personal identity of individuals. These sources of 
individual identity and power are found in the relationship between the individual 
and the spiritual world. (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001, 15) 
 
Thus, the range of ascription to achievement is noted within GCR. 
High Power Distance vs. Low Power Distance 
In the final operationalization of cultural approaches to authority considered here, 
Plueddemann (2009) draws on Hofstede (1991), and on Trompenaars and Hampden-
 
143 
Turner (1997) and the GLOBE study.39 Plueddemann draws on these sources to explore 
power distance and summarizes as follows: 
In high-power-distance cultures both leaders and followers assume that the leader 
has more authority, respect and status symbols. The leader has the right to make 
unilateral decisions that will be obeyed without question. In these societies, 
employees do not question managers, students do not challenge teachers, and 
children obey parents or other elders without question. The opposite is true in 
low-power-distance cultures. Children expect parents to give them a rationale for 
their decisions. Employees are invited to give suggestions to management, and 
teachers are glad when students raise difficult questions. 
Formal authority tends to be centralized in high-power-distance societies. 
Bosses are not questioned, and decisions are communicated from the top. For a 
leader in a high-power-distance culture to ask the advice of a subordinate could 
signal that the boss doesn’t know how to lead. 
Leaders in low-power-distance cultures prefer a consultative, participative or 
democratic decision-making style. Power is delegated to team members or to 
subcommittees. In very low-power-distance cultures, subordinates would expect 
to vote on each significant decision. 
In high-power-distance cultures, people assume that their leaders will have 
special privileges such as their own parking space, a corner office, finer clothes, a 
private dining room, a much higher salary and maybe a chauffeured car. None of 
this will be expected of leaders in low-power-distance cultures and, in fact, would 
irritate employees. (Plueddemann 2009, 95) 
 
Plueddemann thus presents practical examples of tensions brought about by the 
difference in interactional styles and assumptions between people from high- and low-
power distance cultures. While he does not believe that one is preferred in the biblical 
text, he does engage in a historical tracing of what he perceives to be a move from high- 
to low-power distance (102). 
Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker (2001) explain an egalitarian (low power distance) 
social structure using a geometric circle as a starting place, noting, 
The fundamental symbol of plains Indian existence is the circle, a polyvalent 
symbol signifying the family, the clan, the tribe, and eventually all of creation. As 
a creation symbol, the importance of the circle is its genuine egalitarianness. 
 




There is no way to make the circle hierarchical. Because it has no beginning and 
no end, all in the circle are of equal value. No relative is valued more than any 
other. A chief is not valued above the people. (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001, 
47) 
 
So profound is the influence of the circle that its importance carries on beyond humanity: 
“There is no hierarchy in our cultural context, even of species, because the circle has no 
beginning nor ending” (50). Hiebert finds a similar organizing principle behind American 
egalitarianism – mainly that taxonomic interpretations carry into social organization. He 
states that in an American worldview: 
There are fundamental differences among categories within a single taxonomy or 
domain, but within each category things are more or less the same and equal: they 
are of the same kind. In the hierarchy of life, all people belong to the same 
category, ‘homo sapiens’; therefore they are equals. The ideal society is one in 
which all people have equal opportunities. Every person should have the right to 
contract and to break relationships and the right to be respected as an autonomous 
person. (Hiebert 2008, 340) 
 
For Hiebert, there is an important contrast between the American worldview and an 
Indian worldview, in which 
segments in any continuum are organized on the principle of hierarchy, and 
hierarchy is both necessary and good. The caste system is only part of a larger 
social order that extends up through the spirits and down through the worlds of 
animals and plants. Each person has a unique place in this order (Hiebert 2008, 
340) 
 
Indeed, this understanding within an Indian perspective gives rise to a Christian theology 
among the Dalit (untouchable), which rejects the hierarchy imposed by the caste system 
(Ninan 2012). Yeo observes, 
The book of Ruth is read by dalit Christian women to overcome their ‘thrice-
oppressions’: pollution, powerlessness, and poverty. . . . In all these cases, the 
Bible not only speaks comfort, deliverance, and freedom to Asian Christians but 





The high-power distance view is not limited to India, however. Forman (1974) 
discusses at length the question of the relative power and prestige of the pastor and 
village chief in the South Pacific. While there was certainly variation from area to area, 
he notes that despite some limitations on the pastor in Samoan society, 
the high prestige, however, continued in all cases. In fact, prestige was so 
important that any suggestion for improvements in the pastor’s work might be 
regarded as lèse-majesté. The suggestion at one time, that pastors in the Loyalty 
Islands take refresher courses to improve their knowledge and their work, was 
rejected as a proposal which showed inadequate respect for such men. In all of 
these areas, as in the Pacific generally, there was a strong tendency for men to 
enter the pastorate for the sake of prestige, and to look upon it as a rank rather 
than as a calling or task. 
Prestige and position have also been enhanced in all the islands by the 
traditional views of sacred power carried over from the older island religions. 
Some of the mana formerly attached to the priest or holy ruler has continued to 
hover around the Christian pastor. (Forman 1974, 426) 
 
Variations in high and low power distance are thus noted in multiple societies in GCR. 
Conclusions 
In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, authority is operationalized in three 
different ways, including authority structures, modes of status, and power distance. This 
section has demonstrated that there are profound cultural differences in understandings 
and applications of all three of these forms of authority within GCR. As with the previous 
two frameworks, cultural differences in authority are confirmed to “actually exist” within 
the GCR epistemic community. While the primary consequences of these differences 
appear to be practical (i.e., how is authority structured and implemented), some 
epistemological and even ontological differences are also noted. The question of the 
meaningful effect of these differences will be addressed later in this Chapter. 
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Framework 4: Human Nature 
General Findings 
Human nature is understood quite in many different ways in varying cultural 
contexts within GCR.40 The cognitive constructs supporting understandings around such 
understandings also vary. For example, rather than addressing the question of human 
nature as essentially good or evil, Chan (2014) notes that there are culturally different 
definitions of the human that must first be addressed, arguing that Western dualism 
cannot make sense of the Chinese spiritual holism. De La Torre and Aponte (2001, 78) 
suggest that Latino/a theologians affirm that though humanity was originally good, “due 
to humanity’s transgression, however, sin entered humanity.” At the same time, they 
suggest that while this view corresponds with traditional Western views, the Latino/a 
theological perspective defines the effects of sin in corporate and structural terms, rather 
than solely individual terms. Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker (2001, 46) also challenge 
dualistic thinking regarding good and evil, arguing that “American Indian dualism is a 
necessary reciprocity, not oppositional.” These authors show that even the framing of the 
question of whether humanity’s inherent condition is evil, good, or somewhere in 
between, is itself a cultural artifact. In Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, the 
question of human nature is operationalized in only one way, which consists of four 
 
40 The following authors discuss human nature within GCR. They are listed as follows: Author (Date), 
cultural context influencing the author as regards this subject: Chan (2014), Singapore; Chan-Thomas 
(2014), Malaysia, United States, Middle East, Singapore; Dunhua (2010), China; De La Torre and Aponte 
(2001), Cuban American, Puerto Rican American; Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker (2001), Native American; 
Lausanne (1980b), comprised of scholars and/or practitioners from around the world; Lei (2009), Asian 
American; Priest (1994), the Aguarana people; Reid, Newbigin, and Pullinger (1996), Australia, UK, 




different positions: human nature as good, human nature as good and evil (neutral), 
human nature as good and evil (mixed), and human nature as evil. 
Human Nature: Good vs. Good and Evil (neutral) vs. Good and Evil (mixed) vs. 
Evil 
Within GCR, variations of human nature reasoning are present, and cultural 
differences are clearly at play in these understandings. The cleanest statement of the issue 
may come from Zhuo, who explains the tension in the following terms: 
‘Sin’ and ‘sinfulness’ represent a core concept and a basic understanding of 
human nature in Christianity. Traditionally the origin of this concept is attributed 
to the Biblical story of the Fall which grew into a theory and became a central 
element in the sense of sinfulness in Western culture. Contrary to this, it is 
generally acknowledged that both the concept and sense of sin are absent in 
Chinese culture, and therefore the spiritual experience of confession and 
repentance are also absent. . . . Many Western scholars have for a long time 
regarded the concept of original sin as the greatest obstacle to any Chinese 
understanding of Christianity. The fact that the ideas of sin and repentance are 
absent from Chinese culture constituted the greatest barrier in the fusion of 
Christianity with Chinese culture. (Zhuo 1995, 81–82) 
 
It is always epistemologically risky to essentialize a “Chinese view” or a “Western view” 
due to reasons noted in the Chapter One: Introduction and Chapter Two: Literature 
Review of this dissertation. For example, within Chinese Confucian thinking, according 
to Chan (2014, 80) Mencius and Xunxi argued for different perspectives of the inherent 
condition of human nature, explaining that “the former sees human nature as essentially 
good but corrupted by its environment while the latter sees human nature as inherently 
wicked.” Still, Chan contends that the former appears to have one out, which leads to a 
significant disconnect between Western and Eastern understandings of sin. Chan-Thomas 
(2014, sec. 1) points out another complexity in the intersection between eastern and 
western ideas of sin: on the one hand, “the [Western] Christian belief in original sin and 
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depravity has always been alien and even offensive to many cultural Chinese”; but on the 
other hand, “they can certainly identify with sin in reality—in their own lives as much as 
in the lives of others.”. Nonetheless, the distinction between the underlying condition of 
humanity is really what is in view in this cultural framework, and possible differences 
that both Chan and Chan-Thomas observe appear to be significant. 
Dunhua (2010, 3-4) argues that there is considerable evidence of a divergence 
between a “doctrine of original sin and the theory of the goodness of human nature” that 
follows along cultural lines between “Chinese and Western cultures.” He argues that 
perhaps there is more agreement between these two views than originally appears, but 
this argument is complicated by Ruokanen’s (2010) response to Dunhua’s chapter, as 
Ruokanen clarifies and reaffirms elements of the cultural divergence. Zhuo (1995, 86) 
also affirms the divergence, arguing “the idea of original sin reveals basic differences in 
the cultures of China and of the West, their internal logic and evolution.” Indeed, Zhuo 
deconstructs the concept of original sin (which can be understood as either inherently evil 
or good and evil mixed) as a cultural artifact: 
The idea that the sin of the first ancestors is shared by the whole human race is a 
complicated cultural deposit of the Hebrew people. To recognize that the idea as 
understood on this level does not exist in the Chinese tradition is only the first 
step in our cultural encounter. (Zhuo 1995, 83) 
 
Zhou clarifies, however, that the Chinese view is also more complicated than human 
nature as good only. Instead, there is a more complex understanding in which “the 
recognition of the existence of this ‘darker side’ in human nature means that the Chinese 
cannot completely reject the idea of original sin” (82). Nonetheless, the goal of the 
“Confucian ethical-political vision begins with the cultivation of self and ends with a 
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total transformation of the cosmos” (Lei 2009, 100). This requires, according to Lei, a 
fundamental assumption that “human nature is the necessary and sufficient ground for 
perfection, which is achieved through education or cultivation of the self” (100). 
It is not only Chinese culture that has shown difficulty with the concept of 
original sin. Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker also address the question from a Native 
American perspective: 
The Christian concepts of original sin and salvation through Christ are antithetical 
to [American] Indian concepts of personal power based on dreams, visions, and 
initiation into esoteric knowledge of deity. Indian languages did not have words 
for these concepts of sin and salvation. (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001, 18) 
 
In similar departure from a traditional Western view, the Lausanne Committee, when 
considering the question regarding African Traditional Religions, concluded that in such 
contexts “the doctrine of original sin, or a sinful nature in man, is usually vague—when it 
is found at all” (Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization 1980b, sec. 5,C). 
Conclusions 
While the discussion of human nature certainly reveals that this is an active area 
of cultural disagreement within GCR, the framing and implications of the question are 
also challenged. The definition of human as well as the different lines of inquiry 
indicated by a focus on either original sin or innate disposition toward good or evil widen 
the scope of the question considerably. However, regarding the question at hand of 
whether cultural differences in the human nature framework are at play in GCR, the 
answer is clearly yes. Such differences are clearly observed in the relevant literature and 
are seen to be an active site of contestation. The question of meaningful effect of these 
differences will be addressed later in this chapter. 
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Inductive and Narratological Frameworks 
Due to the strong findings in the previous four frameworks, it is unnecessary to 
create a detailed set of inductive and/or narratological frameworks. However, a few 
comments are in order. One of the most striking frameworks that arose related to land, as 
noted in the “Time Orientation” section above. Deloria (2003, 113) connected land to 
spatial reasoning, and Rah (2009) connected it to the concept of suffering. Suffering, in 
turn, was a framework introduced by Katongole (2017). 
The links between these previous concepts also point to integrated and holistic 
knowing and being, as opposed to separated knowing. These issues were in turn raised by 
multiple authors (Kidwell, Noley, and Tinker 2001; Lausanne Committee for World 
Evangelization 1980a; Lei 2009; Hesselgrave 1991). The apparent distinction between 
the spiritual and material worlds was raised by several authors, including at least Yeo 
(2017) and Lei (2009). There were also multiple examples of collective implications for a 
variety of concepts, such as in Lei (2009) and Grant (2011). However, as noted at the 
beginning of the chapter, this dissertation is not examining individualism and 
collectivism. 
There are also a variety of works that were considered for review but ultimately 
not used because other works spoke more specifically to the questions at hand. Those that 
were not used focused on themes such as the process and historical context of 
theologizing – especially including the postcolonial context. Postcolonial GCR could 
provide fertile ground for a research project investigating the impact of the postcolonial 
experience on differences in political reasoning. 
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Thus far, this chapter has sought to establish the question of whether the cultural 
differences identified in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach are actually at play in 
GCR. This exercise is important for the overall dissertation because it demonstrates that 
these cultural differences (1) “exist” in the real world at least inasmuch as they are 
influencing real conversations, (2) play a role in explaining differences within an 
epistemic community, and (3) may have relevance for other areas of inquiry. Regarding 
this third point, the particular issue of interest in this dissertation is whether such cultural 
differences might affect International Relations. Before that question can be considered 
(in the Chapter Five: Case Studies with Counterfactuals), this chapter concludes by 
assessing whether these cultural differences have any demonstrable meaningful effect 
within the epistemic community in which they are found (GCR). 
Meaningful Effects of Cultural Differences 
This section of the chapter seeks to respond to the question of whether the 
differences observed in the first half of the chapter have any meaningful effect on the 
attempt to arrive at shared meaning. This is done through examination of differences in 
illocution and/or perlocution regarding shared texts. The Bible Knowledge Commentary 
series, edited by Walvoord and Zuck of the Dallas Theological Seminary, are selected to 
represent a typically (Euro-)American view and are brought into conversation with other 
authors. 
Framework 1: Shame, Honor/Guilt, Innocence in Romans 1:23, 2:23, and 3:23 
There are clear effects of the shame and honor framework within the GCR 
epistemic community. Practically, “Western missionaries often complain that in an 
honor-and-shame based culture there is no sense of absolute right or wrong, that sin is 
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relative to communal norms, and so on. But this is using one culture-specific theory of 
ethics to judge another” (Chan 2014, 84). Such differences can also be observed in 
interpretation of scripture, such as romans 1:23, 2:23, and 3:23. 
Romans 1:23 
Representing an Asian perspective, Wu (2016, 378) suggests that Romans 1:23, 
2:23, and 3:23 each reflect sin as expressions of honor / shame. American author Witmer 
(1983), on the other hand sees, Romans 1:23 as people’s move toward foolishness, as 
they have rejected wisdom. However, for Witmer, no mention is made of shame or honor. 
He locates this within a larger passage (Rom. 1:18–23) that provides God’s justification 
for condemnation. Indeed, they do not even mention shame in this larger section. The 
opportunity to honor God is mentioned, but it is presented as a side issue in the larger 
context of understanding why God is justified when exercising condemnation. 
Wu summarizes Romans 1:21–23: “In essence, sin treats God as though He were 
not infinitely valuable” (377). Witmer summarizes Rom. 1:18–23 in this way: “God 
never condemns without just cause. Here, three bases are stated for His judgment of the 
pagan world,” the third of which (relating to Rom. 1:21–23) is “for perverting God’s 
Glory” (442). At the locutionary level, there is no meaningful disagreement. The same 
words of honor and glory appear in both texts. However, at the illocutionary level, there 
is clearly a divergent interpretation. Wu sees a confirmation that the major concern of 
Romans 1:18–31 “speaks of dishonor and shame.” In fact, Wu argues that Paul “never 
once uses law language” (377). Witmer, on the other hand, sees judgment and its just 
cause, as noted above. The illocutions (explanations of what the text does) offered here 




Wu (2016, 378) continues with an examination of Romans 2:23. This passage is 
in the context of the Mosaic Law. However for Wu, Paul, the author of Romans, 
still uses honor-shame language to describe sin. In Rom 2:23–24, he says, “You 
who boast in the law dishonor God by breaking the law. For, as it is written, ‘The 
name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you.’ ” Even at a 
grammatical level, one observes that breaking the Law is one means to 
dishonoring God. In other words, the main verb, “dishonor” (ατιμάζεις), indicates 
the core problem. “Breaking the law” (διά τής παραβάσεως τοΰ νόμου) is a 
prepositional phrase, which shows one particular way or circumstance that God is 
dishonored. Verse 24 gives the ground clause (γάρ . . . ) for v. 23 and confirms 
that honor-shame is the central issue (not law). (Wu 2016, 378; emphasis in 
original) 
 
Witmer considers the same passage in this way: 
You who brag about (“are boasting in”; cf. v. 17) the Law, do you dishonor 
God by breaking the Law? An honest Jew would have to respond to Paul’s 
questions by admitting his guilt and hypocrisy. (Witmer 1983, 447; emphasis in 
original indicates direct quotation of scripture) 
 
Again, while both authors agree at the locutionary level – the word dishonor 
appears in both – the illocutionary impact of the passage diverges, again along the lines 
laid out by the cultural framework shame, honor / guilt innocence. Moreover, there 
appears to be a perlocutionary divergence (dealing with what effect the text has) as 
Witmer expects that the implied audience would have responded by “admitting his guilt.” 
Wu, on the other hand, sees no such implication and instead anticipates that the 
grammatical structure would lead to an understanding of the problem of shame. 
Romans 3:23 
Wu (2016) concludes this argument with a shame/honor interpretation of Romans 




the simple fact is that as a sinner not a single human being by his own efforts is 
able to measure up to the glory of God. God’s glory is His splendor, the outward 
manifestation of His attributes. God desires that humans share that splendor, that 
they become like Him . . . . Yet their sin keeps them from sharing it. (Witmer 
1983, 451; emphasis in original indicates direct quotation of scripture) 
 
However, the illocutionary impact of the passage diverges widely from this point. 
Consider Wu’s examination of Romans 3:25–26: 
These observations lead to a surprising and disturbing conclusion: Jesus died for 
God. The atonement is necessary but not merely for the sake of human salvation. 
I am claiming more than simply “God wants to glorify himself.” Rather, if Christ 
did not die, God would not be righteous (cf. Rom 3:25–26). In that case, God 
lacks honor. God is shameful. The atonement is a God-centered act. Christ’s 
death vindicates God’s righteousness whereby he is able to save his people. God’s 
glory is not an obstacle to his main goal, that is, saving sinners. Saving sinners is 
a means to his main goal. God seeks face; as a result, he seeks sinners. God’s 
concern for His honor ensures that He will not forsake His people (cf. Ps 79:9; 
Ezek 36:22ff.). (Wu 2016, 379) 
 
Contrast this with Witmer’s reflection on the same passage: 
Paul was so insistent that God’s righteousness be recognized that (Rom. 3:26) he 
repeated (from v. 25) the words to demonstrate His justice (dikaiosynēs, 
‘righteousness’). God’s purpose in the redemptive and propitiatory death of Jesus 
Christ was so that He could be seen to be just (dikaion, ‘righteous’) and the One 
who justifies (dikaiounta, ‘the One who declares righteous’) the man who has 
faith in Jesus. God’s divine dilemma was how to satisfy his own righteousness 
and its demands against sinful people, and at the same time how to demonstrate 
His grace, love, and mercy to restore rebellious, alienated creatures to Himself. 
The solution was the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, God’s incarnate Son, and the 
acceptance by faith of that provision by individual sinners. Christ’s death 
vindicated God’s own righteousness (He is just because sin was ‘paid for’) and 
enables God to declare every believing sinner righteous. (Witmer 1983, 452; 
emphasis in original indicates direct quotation of scripture) 
 
These two interpretations are both strikingly similar and strikingly dissimilar. 
Again, there is not concern at the locutionary level. At the illocutionary level, there is 
much agreement – the authors agree that the text does something similar – it explains 
how God is interested in saving sinners and accomplishing something additional in 
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relation to God’s self. However, at this point the illocutions diverge once more. For 
Witmer, God’s own righteousness, a word which he employs consistently to mean a type 
of legal righteousness, is the objective of this passage. For Wu, God’s own honor is the 
objective. Thus, the divergence in the interpretation of the illocution of Paul’s speech act 
demonstrates once more that even where there was significant convergence, the cultural 
framework underlying the interpretation remains potent. Therefore, cultural differences 
along the shame, honor / guilt, innocence framework do have meaningful effect within 
the GCR epistemic community. 
Framework 2: Time Orientation in Ecclesiastes 3:1–8 
There are also clear differences wrought by differences in cultural understandings 
of time within GCR. Ecclesiastes 3:1–8 begins, “There is a time for everything, and a 
season for every activity under the heavens” (NIV), followed by fourteen couplets such 
as “a time for war and a time for peace” (v. 8). Glenn, representing an American 
perspective in The Bible Knowledge Commentary, reads this section as evidence that 
there is a time . . . for every activity under heaven (cf. 8:6). By the word “activity” 
Solomon meant people’s deliberate, willful acts. The Hebrew word for “activity,” 
always used of people, literally means “desire,” and then by metonymy “what one 
desires” (cf. Isa. 58:13). For these willful acts people are held accountable (cf. 
Ecc. 3:17). Each activity, wrote Solomon, has its proper “time” (point in time) 
and season (duration). (Glenn 2018, n.p.) 
 
Tamez, in her Latin American reading of the text, goes in rather a different direction, 
suggesting, 
Qoheleth [the preacher] affirms that everything has its propitious time (‘et in 
Hebrew, kairos in Greek) and hour. To make this affirmation, however, one must 
struggle against the chronological, oppressive times that have conspired against 
human beings. Qoheleth does not find, either in the present, the future, or the past, 
the reins to grasp in order to develop a viable utopia in which he can deposit his 
faith. . . . A chronological understanding of time does not provide a structure of 
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possibility; rather, the possibility comes through faith in the existence of mature, 
opportune time (‘et, kairos). (Tamez 1999, 76–77) 
 
Lumbala, in an African reading of the text, first clarifies how time is perceived by the 
implied reader he has in mind: 
The conception of time, further, is rather varied in Africa. We are familiar with 
several representations of time: linear time; cyclical time; mythical time, or the 
time of those in heaven which intervenes in all myths; and finally, human time. 
All of these times overlap, successively or in parallel, according to what life one 
is living or what story one is telling. . . . The most important thing about these 
times is not how long they last but what happens during their passage. Life 
expresses itself, grows, shrinks, and transforms, all behind the reality of time. 
(Lumbala 1999, 82) 
 
This discourse on time prepares the way for Lumbala’s reading of the passage: 
The rhythm of the phrase ‘a time for . . . a time for’ brings us also to appreciate 
the transformations and dynamism of life. It is not the moment but the event that 
counts; that which one does is more significant than how long the moment lasts. 
Therefore, let us grasp the time of living, for living is more important than all 
else. We dedicate all of time to everything that affects life. That is why we Bantu 
people have a reputation for long celebrations. This is good because for us, to 
celebrate is to live. (Lumbala 1999, 84) 
 
Thus, there are represented here three potential interpretations of time and three 
corresponding illocutive distinctions. The (Euro-)American view relies on a sequential, 
time-oriented understanding of time and argues that the text is communicating that 
everything has its appointed time and that there is an implication of accountability for 
misdeeds. The Latin American view, by contrast, rejects a sequential reading of time. 
This leads to the illocutive understanding that the passage points the way to a “time” out 
of sequential time in which it is appropriate to place hope. Finally, the African view 
emphasizes a rhythmic, synchronic, and event-oriented time, which draws one’s attention 
to the present. Interestingly, Lumbala later turns to confront the text and argues that its 
illocution is pessimistic “with regard to the general conception of the universe and 
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events” and rejects this with the following bold phrase: “The optimism of the Bantu 
people is radically opposed to the pessimism exhibited in Ecclesiastes” (85). Clearly, the 
speech act was interpreted very differently by these three authors. Thus, cultural 
differences along the time orientation framework do have meaningful effect within the 
GCR epistemic community. 
Framework 3: Authority in Exodus 20:1–17 
There are also clear effects resulting from cultural differences in understandings 
of authority within GCR. Exodus 20:1–17 presents the Decalogue, or the Ten 
Commandments. (Euro-)American Bible Knowledge Commentary author Hannah (2018, 
n.p.) introduces this section with this lofty claim: “One of the great events in the history 
of Israel, and perhaps in the history of all mankind, is the giving of the Law” (no page 
numbers). Soares-Prabhu (1999), writing with an Asian perspective on the text offers a 
similarly exalted introduction: 
The Decalogue of Exodus 20:1–17 is impressive. It surpasses all other similar 
collections in the Bible. . . . in its scope, its concision, and its authority. Its ten 
commandments cover all the basic areas of human life—relationship to God . . . , 
to human community . . . , and to material possessions. . . . It is wholly universal 
in its scope, valid always, everywhere, and for all. (Soares-Prabhu 1999, 50–51) 
 
However, despite this agreement and basic locutionary agreement on the text itself, there 
is significant illocutionary difference. Explaining what the text does, Hannah writes, 
The Law was not given so that the Israelites by keeping it could attain 
righteousness (Rom. 3:20a; Gal. 3:11). A righteous standing (justification) before 
God has always been only by faith (trust) in God (Gen. 15:6; Rom. 4:3, 22; 5:1; 
Gal. 2:16; 3:6, 21). The Law functioned to show the 1 ‘l [sic] Israelites their 
sinfulness (Rom. 3:19–20b; 7:7) in contrast with God’s standards of holiness and 




It is interesting to notice Hannah’s preoccupation with guilt and innocence. The idea of 
(not) being held guiltless appears in the locution in relation to the third commandment 
(regarding the misuse of God’s name) but only in relation to that commandment. Yet for 
Hannah, the question of righteousness, justification, and condemnation loom large even 
though they do not appear in the locution. The punishment of sins does appear in the 
second commandment (prohibition against graven images), though this is in relation to 
the character of God. 
Soares-Prabhu (1999) brings in a completely different illocutionary reading. 
Referencing the Dalits (the “untouchable” caste – see the discussion above in Framework 
3: Authority for more), Soares-Prabhu explains what the text does in this way: 
The significance of the commandments lies not so much in what they prescribe as 
in how they prescribe. Implied in their universal, categorical, and abstract 
formulation is the intuition that everyone (priest, king, commoner, or slave) stands 
equally under the same basic God-given law. . . . In contrast to the massive and 
sophisticated compendium of Hindu law, which sustains hierarchy, biblical 
legislation, inspired by a very different understanding of the human person, 
pursues the vision of an egalitarian society. (Soares-Prabhu 1999, 52) 
 
Thus, where Hannah sees a passage about condemnation, Soares-Prabhu sees a passage 
about egalitarian authority structures. It can be concluded that cultural differences along 
the authority framework do have meaningful effects within the GCR epistemic 
community. 
Framework 4: Human Nature in Romans 5:12 
Cultural differences in the human nature framework also have meaningful effect 
within GCR. Romans 5:12 has provided opportunity for substantial interpretive 
wrangling around the question of human nature for most of Christian history. A typical 
Western reading is presented by Jacobs: 
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For Augustine, this passage meant that ‘even infants are born sinners, not by their 
own act but because of their origin’—their origin being the primal fatherhood of 
Adam. And here we see what is meant by original sin, paccatum originalis in 
Augustine’s Latin: sin that’s already inside us, already dwelling in us at our 
origin, at our very conception. (Jacobs 2014, Loc 5.025) 
 
Ndama (2020), writing from an African perspective, works significantly with the various 
interpretive tools used to understand Romans 5:12 but ultimately comes to the following 
divergent conclusion regarding its meaning: 
After attaining an understanding about the text in concern; hereditary death and 
hardship, not hereditary sin through procreation, then, I get reminded of a possible 
way to speak of this expression contextually using Ubuntu theology. It is a 
Christian perception of African Ubuntu philosophy in which the humanity of a 
person is known in a relational way with the rest of the community. With this 
perception while reflecting on my own experience too as an African, an 
individual’s fault can result to turbulence for the rest of the community, as well, 
unless it is corrected, either individually and/or collectively. In other words, a 
family or community can bear the consequences of what is done by one of its 
members although they might not be guilty of it. However, intermediate 
measures, either personally or collectively, are needed for getting out of such 
consequences. In this manner, Adam’s sin and the implied consequences can be 
contextually understood; his posterity has inherited not his sin; rather, they daily 
experience the consequence – toilsome living conditions and death – which is left 
for them individually, as personal responsibility to get rid of it. (Ndama 2020, 65; 
emphasis added) 
 
Consider (Euro-)American Witmer (1983) again as a counter example. Witmer 
provides two readings of the passage: Adam is either representative of the human race 
and thus “Adam’s act of sin was considered by God to be the act of all people and his 
penalty of death was judicially made the penalty of everybody”; or Adam had a federal 
headship over the human race in that “the entire human race was seminally and physically 
in Adam, the first man. As a result God considered all people as participating in the act of 
sin which Adam committed and as receiving the penalty he received” (458). Thus, the 
illocutive reading of the passage is divergent between Ndama and Witmer. For Witmer, 
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what the text does, one way or another, is explain how all of humanity has sinned in 
Adam. For Ndama, the text explains the communal disruption caused by Adam’s sins. 
These are illocutive differences that connect to the human nature reading of the text. 
Interestingly, this type of divergence can also be seen in practice because of 
differences in the understanding of sin, either as a state of being (Western) or as an act 
that is done, especially a serious crime (Confucian). Chan (2014, 80–81) explains the 
implications: “When a Christian evangelist tells devotees of ‘Chinese religion’ that they 
need a Savior because they are ‘sinners,’ the hearers are likely to feel deeply offended. 
Their usual response is likely to be, ‘I haven’t killed or burned down anyone’s home; 
how dare you call me a sinner?’” These interpretations also demonstrate illocutive and 
perlocutionary divergence. Thus, cultural differences along the human nature framework 
do have meaningful effect within the GCR epistemic community. 
Discussion 
The difference between the readings of the texts above is noteworthy in part 
because in nearly every case there is no debate about the locution,41 and yet there is 
divergent illocution. Considering the interpretation of Authority in Exodus 20:1–17, it 
could be objected that both Hannah (2018) and Soares-Prabhu (1999) inserted something 
external into the text, perhaps an example of hermeneutical eisegesis. However, it is more 
useful for the present study to understand their divergence as an expected effect of 
preunderstanding: 
Preunderstanding is the personally acquired prior knowledge that, consciously or 
unconsciously, informs and influences one’s interpretation of Scripture. Working 
in conjunction with our settled convictions, preunderstanding is the ever 
 
41 The exception is human nature, where there are textual questions about Romans 5:12. 
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expanding conceptual or ideational grid through which we process the phenomena 
of life and through which we interpret Scripture. (Nebeker 2004, para. 4) 
 
Julian explains the relevance of the concept to the types of interpretations observed in 
Hannah and Soares-Prabhu: 
We see, then, that preunderstanding, which is a part of worldview, is not 
something that Christians, evangelical or not, can simply shed as they approach 
Scripture. They may be able to identify some preunderstandings, perhaps even 
many, but others are so embedded in their worldview that they are beyond 
awareness. (Julian 2010, 63) 
 
Thus, the illocutionary differences not only are quite different, but this is perhaps the 
expected state of affairs for Julian and Nebeker, both of whom specifically identify 
cultural preunderstandings as an important influence on interpretation. 
Conclusions 
It was the objective of this chapter to address one research question. Regarding 
Q1, the inquiry into culture in GCR confirms that, yes, cultural differences can 
meaningfully affect the ability of actors from different cultures to arrive at shared 
meanings of shared texts and events. Similarly, H1: Cultural differences meaningfully 
affect the ability of culturally different international actors to arrive at shared meanings 
from shared texts and events is confirmed. Note that H1 does not ask about or consider 
international relations actors (see Chapter One: Introduction for clarification) but rather 
asks about actors who are international. 
Two limitations may be noted: First, a strength of the research presented in this 
chapter is that all of the frameworks were found directly in the text, rather than by 
inference. The limitation is that the process of analysis may resemble a literature review 
more closely than the systematic coding process that was intended in Chapter Three: 
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Methodological Approach. While a Straussian process was followed, it was not necessary 
to continue into axial coding, as the strength of obvious, non-hidden data was sufficient. 
Second, it should be noted that this chapter is not intended to present a comprehensive 
theological or cultural hermeneutical interpretation of any of the scriptures considered. 
The goal of this chapter was to discover whether these cultural frameworks could be 
observed at use “in the real world,” and to discern whether those framework differences 
could cause meaningful effect understood as illocutionary and/or perlocutionary 
divergence within a particular epistemic community. Both of these goals have been 




CHAPTER V – CASE STUDIES WITH COUNTERFACTUALS 
In the previous chapter, Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture within Global 
Christian Reasoning, four deductive cultural frameworks were examined within Global 
Christian Reasoning (GCR) literature to assess and were found to be present and to have 
a meaningful effect on the ability for people from different cultures to arrive at shared 
meaning, despite being within the same epistemic community. These frameworks were 
shame, honor/guilt, innocence; time orientation; authority; and human nature. This 
chapter uses counterfactual case studies to examine Research Question #2 (Q2), Research 
Question #3 (Q3), Hypothesis #2 (H2), and Hypothesis #3 (H3): 
Q2: Can the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 be expected to matter 
in the conduct of international relations? 
 
Q3: Can intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which such 
differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
 
H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation meaningfully affects changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
 
As reported in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach, three case studies are 
used to test these hypotheses. Each case study will be presented as follows: 
1. A résumé of what actually happened (according to available records) 
2. Identification of plausible cultural values to each party in the dyad 
3. A counterfactual narrative in which one actor (identified upfront) employs the 
capacity for intercultural adaptation 
a. Identification of key points of decision or interpretation that may be of 
importance 
b. Counterfactual narrative 
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Three cases have been selected: US/Iraq 1991 (Miller 1990; Reed 1990),42 US/Iraq 2003 
(Harvey 2012), and finally US/Russia after September 11, 2001 (particularly the 
unsuccessful reset prompted by Russia’s offer of assistance [Devold 2008]). The first two 
cases are “most similar” in that they involved the same actors and both led to an invasion 
of Iraq by the United States. The third case is “most different” in that a different dyad 
actor is involved (Russia) and that no war between the dyad members immediately 
followed. 
Process Tracing 
This chapter employs process tracing to evaluate the counterfactual narrative. 
Bennett and Checkel (2015) recommend 10 best practices for process tracing: 
1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations. 
2. Be equally tough on critiquing all of the alternative explanations. 
3. Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources. 
4. Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative 
explanations. 
5. Make a justifiable decision on when to start. 
6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable 
decision on when to stop. 
7. Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal 
and feasible. 
8. Be open to inductive insights. 
9. Use deduction to ask “If my explanation is true, what will be the specific process 
leading to the outcome?” 
10. Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process 
tracing is conclusive. (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 21) 
Each of these ten items is taken into account in this chapter, and each is briefly described 
below. 
Cast the net widely for alternative explanations: It is fully anticipated that the 
proposed counterfactual explanation (intercultural competence in one party of the conflict 
 
42 With appreciation to Rana Nejem for bringing this to the author’s attention 
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dyad) is not the only explanation for the ultimate outcome of the conflict. Thus, 
alternative explanations are not only admitted but also expected in the present study. In 
particular, explanations offered by neoclassical realism (e.g., Ripsman, Taliaferro, and 
Lobell 2016) within international relations are understood to underlie geopolitical issues 
both between and within states. This chapter does not intend to reject or supplant those 
explanations. However, it is argued here that there is also an important cultural feature of 
international geopolitics to which insufficient attention is afforded by those explanations, 
which may have such important consequences that attention is due. 
Be equally tough on the alternative explanations: Because the program of this 
research is to identify a particular gap in the existing programs such as neoclassical 
realism, it is not necessary to address those alternative explanations directly. Instead, the 
role of this chapter is to investigate whether (and, if so, the extent to which) that gap 
exists and is important. 
Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources: This is a major issue for 
cultural research, as identified in Chapter One: Introduction. Both intentional bias (i.e., 
misleading statements from people in power) and unintentional bias (i.e., failure to 
observe cultural phenomena because of a lack of awareness of such phenomena) are 
anticipated. This is one of the primary reasons for the counterfactual research program 
undertaken herein. Rather than relying on faulty, biased, and incomplete evidentiary 
sources, the counterfactual program allows exploration of the “what if” nature of the gap 
(intercultural competence). 
Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative 
explanations: It is useful to borrow from Ting-Toomey’s (1999, 83, 269) O-D-I-S 
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method for understanding intercultural communication. Observe involves attention to 
verbal and non-verbal signals exchanged in the communication process. Describe 
involves an attempt at non-evaluative, non-interpretive accounting of events. Ultimately, 
it is not possible to engage in non-interpretive description from a critical realist 
perspective. However, the intent here is to recognize interpretive frames as they are being 
applied and to push closer to brute facts through specific description. This allows the 
move into Interpret, which involves development of multiple possible interpretations – 
some of which may be mutually exclusive. From this point, the decision about 
Suspending Evaluation, or not suspending evaluation, can be made based on whether or 
not enough information is available to accurately choose from the plausible explanations 
in the Interpret stage. 
An example may be helpful: When investigating an unpleasant interaction with 
another person, it is common to skip from observe to evaluate. The thought, “He was 
rude to me” jumps directly from the observation of the interaction to an evaluation of it. 
Insisting on description means backing up to explain the particular behaviors that were 
exchanged. Continuing with the example it is possible to generate richer, more complex 
data such as follows: “He did not respond when I spoke to him. I spoke to him several 
times and he never changed his posture to acknowledge me.” This then leads to the 
opportunity to generate multiple possible interpretations of the event just described. This 
could result in Interpretation 1: “He heard me and chose not to acknowledge me,” which 
could lead to sub-interpretation 1A: “He chose not to acknowledge me because he wanted 
to disrespect me,” and 1B: “He chose not to acknowledge me because he was afraid of 
me,” and 1C: “He chose not to acknowledge me because he was busy and did not want to 
 
167 
be distracted”; Interpretation 2: “He did not hear me and thus did not acknowledge me,” 
which could also lead to its own sub-interpretations. This then gives opportunity to make 
a decision about whether enough is known to evaluate or whether evaluation must be (at 
least temporarily) suspended. 
In the evidentiary sources that form the basis of the résumé of what actually 
happened, many have moved from observation to evaluation in a manner similar to the 
interaction described in the preceding paragraph. This means that in some cases, even the 
descriptions of the events in those evidentiary sources are shaded by 
interpretive/evaluative decisions. The objective of this chapter is to suggest that attention 
to culture introduces a new set of plausible interpretations. This set of interpretations is 
not necessarily exclusive of all existing interpretations and evaluations, but it adds 
another layer of complexity. Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian 
Reasoning demonstrated that other layer of complexity (cultural difference) does actually 
matter, even within an epistemic community. The goal of this chapter is to investigate 
whether that layer of complexity is likely to have an appreciable impact on the conduct of 
international relations. The goal is not to create an entirely new theory of international 
relations but instead to supplement existing theories with an important missing 
perspective. 
Make a justifiable decision on when to start (and stop): There is some 
difficulty in knowing when to start. One of the insights of the English School is that 
historical patterns of relationships matter (Linklater and Suganami 2006). Case 1: The 
US/Iraq conflagration between 1990 and 1991 relationship could arguably be investigated 
as far back as the US recognition of Iraq in 1930 (or perhaps the Red Line Agreement of 
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1928). However, while this information would be of tremendous interest, it would make 
the project untenable. Even the US/Iraq relationship during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war 
brings in too much information to be practicable. Case 2: While the US/Iraq interwar 
period from 1991 to 2003 is similarly rich in important and relevant data, there is simply 
too much to be included. Case 3: The US/Russia relationship has been underway since 
the beginning of the United States, although Russia did not recognize the United States 
until 1803. There is a very significant amount of history that built toward the interaction 
following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, including of course the entirety of the 
Cold War and the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union. Summary: In summary, 
each case presents a huge amount of data, but the data included will be selected from 
elements that point ahead of time to the particular critical juncture examined in the case 
and that shows the basic trajectory after the critical juncture. 
Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a 
justifiable decision on when to stop: As with the previous point, there is almost 
limitless data that could be considered. The purpose of the data included will be to create 
and establish the case that if the counterfactual plausible difference were actually to 
happen it would matter. Thus, data extraneous to this point will not be sought. Once 
enough data has been brought into the chapter to allow the creation of a counterfactual 
narrative, this will be considered sufficient. 
Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research 
goal and feasible: This is the design of this research program, with both most-similar 
and most-different designs included. Be open to inductive insights: It is certainly 
possible that inductive insights will arrive. One potential limitation in the research 
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strategy is the inclusion of only four cultural frameworks in the deductive design. 
Inductive insights regarding other cultural frameworks (as well as other insights) will be 
admitted for consideration. Use deduction to ask “If my explanation is true, what will 
be the specific process leading to the outcome?”: In each of the three cases, the 
counterfactual process is the one that will be considered. Thus, the process rather than the 
outcome is under investigation. Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, 
but not all good process tracing is conclusive: It is entirely possible that this chapter 
will not be able to result in a strong finding. If at least a “straw in the wind” process-
tracing finding is possible, this will be considered a success for the research program 
undertaken. It is unlikely that a firm acceptance of hypothesis 2 or hypotheses 3 will be 
possible. Before moving into the cases themselves, a profile of each cultural group is 
presented. 
Identification of Plausible Cultural Values 
There are three nation-state actors involved with the two case dyads: the United 
States and Iraq as well as the United States and Russia. Accordingly, the present section 
presents cultural values for each of these three actors. The case studies themselves refer 
back to this information before the presentation of the counterfactual narrative in this 
chapter and in the case analysis in Chapter Six: Analysis. As discussed in Chapter One: 
Introduction, levels of analysis are notoriously tricky in application of cultural 
interpretation to international relations. This section presents cultural frameworks that 
may be plausibly assigned to the dominant cultural group within each state43 and thus 
 
43 There is difficulty in identifying core Russian values, as there are traditional, West-oriented, and Soviet-
style subgroups (Fertelmeyster 2015). For this reason, Fertelmeyster’s goal was to “identify a number of 
core values that are most prevalent in today’s Russia” (91). Similarly, the United States is comprised of 
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may be plausibly expected to impact the perceptions and reasoning of the foreign policy 
executive (FPE).44  
The presentation of cultural values takes place according to the following pattern: 
the four frameworks defined in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach and employed 
in Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning are considered, 
including shame, honor / guilt, innocence; time orientation; authority; and human nature. 
One of the conceptualizations (Muller 2001) of the shame, honor/guilt, innocence 
motivational structure also includes a third continuum: power/fear, which will also be 
considered along with the original frameworks. After the four frameworks are 
considered, additional cultural frameworks are introduced. This pattern is repeated for the 
United States, Iraq, and Russia. These cultural frameworks are exemplary, not 
comprehensive. The goal of the present chapter is not to provide a complete ethnographic 
overview of each culture. Whole books have been written in the attempts to accomplish 
that. Instead, the goal is to create enough familiarity with major features of each culture 
to allow development of a plausibility structure in which the case studies can be 
examined, and the counterfactual narratives can be created. 
United States45 
This section presents an overview of American culture, first by reviewing each of 
the four cultural values frameworks from Chapter Three: Methodological Approach and 
 
considerable diversity. Nonetheless, Althen (2003, xxiv) found it possible to talk about “American culture” 
by specifying that “American culture as talked about in this book . . . has been strongly influenced by white 
middle-class males.” Althen further specifies the importance of understanding that his observations relate 
to generalizations and that no particular observation should be expected to match any particular (or every) 
individual. The section on Iraqi values draws primarily on sources that speak to Arab cultural values, rather 
than to Iraq-specific values (such as Nejem 2016). 
44 The foreign policy executive (FPE) does not necessarily refer to an individual, although it certainly may. 
45 Some of the material in the US and Russia profiles previously appeared in the author’s paper presented at 
the International Studies Association in Hong Kong (Jones 2017). 
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning, followed by 
several additional cultural frameworks. It is worth noting from the outset that “Americans 
generally believe that theirs is a superior country, probably the greatest country in the 
world” (Althen 2003, xxix), and the future is viewed with optimism (Saphiere 2015, 
101). Hastedt (2015, 58) observes four particularly important ideas: “America as God’s 
‘chosen nation’ ”; “America has a special mission or calling to transform the world”; “the 
United States is engaged in a struggle against evil”; and the prevalence of an “apocalyptic 
outlook on world affairs.” These themes are connected to the cultural values of U.S. 
Americans as presented here. 
Shame, Honor / Guilt, Innocence / Power, Fear 
Guilt has been a stronger motivator in American society than has shame, and 
Americans view a distinction between motivation from guilt and motivation from shame 
(Wong and Tsai 2007). Additionally, fear is a small but increasing motivating factor in 
the United States (Saphiere 2015, 100). Regarding facework vs. standards, in general 
the United States is very rule bound; people are expected to behave in certain 
ways; rules are rules regardless of the situation; lawyers and contracts are 
everywhere; and the written word is generally binding (signs, contracts), 
reflecting what Fons Trompenaars calls universalism, the tendency to apply 
regulations uniformly. On the other hand . . . in their social lives U.S. Americans 
tend to desire freedom, choice, and a lack of obligation. (Saphiere 2015, 100) 
 
It is not surprising that “Americans, then, consider the ideal person to be an 
individualistic, self-reliant, independent person. They assume, incorrectly, that people 
from elsewhere share this value and this self-concept” (Althen 2003, 9). This 
individualistic outlook is consistent with the guilt, innocence framework as described in 




In U.S. American culture, there is a high value on efficiency, as evidenced by the 
idiomatic “time is money” (Saphiere 2015, 99). This is related to the belief that “time is a 
resource that, like water or coal, can be used well or poorly” (Althen and Bennett 2011, 
19). Saphiere goes on to explain, 
Americans are action oriented, focusing on completing the task at hand more than 
on their relationships with other people. Speed tends to be more important than 
precision. To those who do not value efficiency in this way, U.S. Americans may 
seem rude, pushy, or shallow. (Saphiere 2015, 99) 
 
Regarding past, present, and future orientation, Americans tend not to be as 
interested in history as people from older and more traditional societies (Althen 2003, 
18). This is reflected in the circle map presented by where the past is the least important 
and is disconnected from the future, which itself is the most important: 
 
Figure 4. Past, Present, and Future in American Culture. 
Originally published in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012, figure 9.1, p. 156), shown here as displayed in (Grove 2015, 860). 
 
U.S. Americans tend to experience time sequentially, leading Richmond (2009, 
111) to echo Saphiere in saying that “time is money to Americans, and punctuality is a 
virtue. Meetings are expected to start on time, and work under pressure of the clock is a 
challenge routinely accepted.” Because of this sequential, rather than synchronic 
experience of time, time is a resource to be used well or poorly. Efficiency, doing things 





Regarding the theme of consent and involvement vs. authority-centered vs. 
authoritarian, Americans “fear that a government can become too strong and thereby 
endanger citizens’ freedom” and prefer decentralization and inefficiency in government. 
Americans also feel great freedom to criticize political leaders. All people, including 
leaders, are supposed to be subject to the law (Althen 2003, 78–81).  
Status, meanwhile, is to be achieved rather than ascribed in U.S. American 
society: 
What is distinctive about the American outlook on the matter of equality are the 
underlying assumptions that (1) no matter what a person’s initial station in life, he 
or she has the opportunity to achieve high standing and (2) everyone, no matter 
how unfortunate, deserves some basic level of respectful treatment. (Althen 2003, 
15) 
 
Saphiere (2015, 100) confirms this sentiment, noting, “The rags-to-riches person 
is much admired in U.S. culture, the person who moves from poverty to wealth through 
the individual’s own efforts.” Status can be changed, and to change status is perceived as 
a good thing. Concurrently, Americans have a relatively low power distance, as 
“egalitarianism is another hallmark of U.S. American values” (100). Althen (2003, 14) 
comments, “Americans have a deep faith that in some fundamental way all people (at 
least all American people) are of equal value, that no one is born superior to anyone else. 
. . . Americans are generally quite uncomfortable when someone treats them with obvious 
deference.” Additionally, in contrast with cultural contexts where age accords authority, 
Americans “perceive aging as a progressive loss of function” and thus “social rules based 




Regarding assumptions of human nature, “Americans assume that human nature 
is basically good, not basically evil” (Althen and Bennett 2011, 17). This is demonstrated 
in emphases on rehabilitation, belief in democratic government, and self-help (17). 
Ultimately, Americans tend to believe that people, like society and the environment, are 
improvable, which also leads to an American sense of personal power and responsibility: 
“the belief that they can and should make things happen” (14) Althen and Bennett note 
that this perspective typically “does not exist in many other cultures” and “contrasts 
sharply with the fatalistic . . . attitude that characterizes people from many other cultures, 
notably Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern, where there is a pronounced 
reverence for the past” (16). Regarding gender, while they may violate the ideal of gender 
equality in terms of pay, Americans believe that men and women are created equal – 
different but neither is inferior (Althen 2003, 15). The belief in democracy “reflects the 
extent to which American political thought is rooted in the eighteenth-century view of 
human nature” (Hastedt 2015, 61). 
Additional Cultural Frameworks 
There are quite a few additional cultural frameworks that could be of interest; 
however, in interest of focus, only a few of these are named here. 
Self-expression: Americans hold a belief in “the fundamental uniqueness of each 
individual,” in which confidence and persuasiveness is desired and individualistic self-
expression is preferred (Saphiere 2015, 100). 
Communication: Americans are usually direct in communication, such that 
“words tend to be taken at face value” and body language cannot be counted on to 
 
175 
mitigate or supersede words (Saphiere 2015, 101). Additionally, Americans “usually 
assume that conflicts or disagreements are best settled by means of forthright discussions 
among the people involved,” but this expression is plain and direct. They do not mask 
their emotional responses but are at the same time emotionally restrained, sometimes 
coming across as emotionless and cold (Althen 2003, 28). Americans also have private 
thoughts that might never be shared with anyone, and confidentiality is expected if they 
are shared (Althen 2003, 14). Americans tend to use low-context communication; clarity 
is valued (Saphiere 2015, 101). 
U.S. Americans tend to communicate in a low-context manner . . . People who 
speak up, honor their word, say what they mean, and mean what they say are 
generally respected. . . . Words tend to be taken at face value, and there is not 
generally an expectation that the listener will read between the lines. Subtle 
language or hints may pass by unrecognized. . . . U.S. Americans are literal, 
answering a question as it was asked rather than providing a larger answer to an 
implied question. (Saphiere 2015, 101) 
 
Rationality: For Americans, context is not particularly important, but the point 
(the piece of information at the center) is critical. Precision, directness, and clarity about 
the point are expected. Thoughts should be organized linearly, using factual evidence as 
proof (Althen 2003, 55–60). Americans look for and expect to find cause-and-effect 
relationships (65). For Americans, facts “are assumed to exist independently of the 
individuals who study or talk about them,” and the most reliable facts come in the form 
of numbers. Emotions, subjectivity, and theory, on the other hand, are generally 
distrusted (Althen 2003, 61–63). 
Mutability: Change is possible and often desirable. Americans “have the idea that 
what happens in the future is within their control, or at least subject to their influence. 
The mature, sensible person, they think, sets goals for the future and works systematically 
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toward them” (Althen 2003, 18). In the U.S., “change is seen as positive, and the future is 
generally perceived with optimism. . . . Risk tolerance is fairly high. . . . A common 
saying is ‘Nothing ventured, nothing gained’” (Saphiere 2015, 101). 
Relationship of humanity and nature: Americans assume that the physical and 
social environment is “subject to human domination or control” and thus fatalism is 
viewed negatively and Americans get impatient with people “they see as passively 
accepting conditions that are less than desirable” (Althen 2003, 18–19). “Americans 
expect things to go well, and they become annoyed when they do not” (Richmond 2009, 
35). There is a distinction between humanity and nature, and the natural world is seen as 
being wild but also understandable and capable of being studied and controlled (Althen 
and Bennett 2011, 115–25). 
Individualism – Interdependence: Althen argues that it is necessary to grapple 
with individualism to understand Americans: 
The most important thing to understand about Americans is probably their 
devotion to individualism. They are trained from very early in their lives to 
consider themselves as separate individuals who are responsible for their own 
situations in life and their own destinies. They are not trained to see themselves as 
members of a close-knit, interdependent family, religious group, tribe, nation, or 
any other collectivity. (Althen 2003, 5) 
 
Among other effects, this means that for Americans, “personal success is linked to one’s 
own efforts and actions, a sense of independence and self-reliance” (Saphiere 2015, 100). 
Activity: Americans have a strong value on efficiency and are action oriented, 
“focused on completing the task at hand more than on their relationships with other 
people” (Saphiere 2015, 99). There is a view that work itself is “virtuous and redemptive” 
(100). Americans believe they should be “doing” and have a strong achievement 
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motivation, often enjoying activity for its own sake (Althen 2003, 25). Furthermore, 
simply being together and talking seems like a waste of time to Americans (41). 
Religious identity: Americans hold to separation of church and state and view 
religious freedom (guaranteed by the government) positively. While many Americans are 
religious, there is a high level of religious pluralism including different denominations 
and religions (Althen 2003, 120–24). 
Iraq 
Makiya (1989, 120) observes that that Iraqi identity and character is incredibly 
complex: “Iraqi nationalism understood as a sense of identity with a territorial entity 
known as Iraq does not exist. . . . On the other hand, an Iraqi national character is a 
complex centuries-old ensemble of perceptions and sensibilities affecting myriads of 
phenomena in culture and society.”  
Shame, Honor/Guilt, Innocence, Power/Fear 
Arab culture emphasizes honor and shame, and this is considered by some to be 
one of the most important areas for social interaction in Arab cultures: 
A person’s dignity and reputation are of paramount importance, and no effort 
should be spared to protect them. The preservation of honor, whether of one’s 
own self, family, friends, community, or state, is an overriding social obligation. 
(Ismail and Fayez 2015, 97) 
 
Indeed, Nejem goes so far as to assert, 
The central importance of honour, dignity, and pride to the Arab mentality cannot 
be overestimated. The core drivers for behaviour in Arab culture are to safeguard 
and enhance a person’s honour and avoid shame. (Nejem 2016, 48) 
 
This also means that steps, including the use of third-party mediators are taken to 
avoid public loss of face (Ismail and Fayez 2015, 97). Criticism, “and especially public 
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criticism,” are especially problematic, and efforts should be made to “save the person’s 
dignity and status in the group and to minimize loss of face” (97). Nejem explains the 
issue of saving face further: 
The notion of ‘saving face’ is extremely important and must be understood by 
anyone wishing to build long-term successful relationships in the Middle East. It 
is an especially critical point to keep in mind during negotiations. If your 
objective is to save the relationship and reach win-win solutions, then you must 
find a way to give your Arab opponent an honourable way out that would save his 
face in front of his people. (Nejem 2016, 51) 
 
Furthermore, judgment is external – the “community and society are the judges of what is 
considered honourable and acceptable behaviour” (Nejem 2016, 48). Moreover, the 
consequences of misdeeds are writ large across ones family and tribe – not just on the 
individual offender (48). 
Time Orientation 
Although both Nejem (2016) and Ismail and Fayez (2015) acknowledge that 
attitudes toward time are changing as society changes, they nonetheless argue that 
traditional views of time are very relevant in the Arab experience. In general, Arab 
cultures treat time “more casually and with flexibility” (Ismail and Fayez 2015, 97). 
Nejem discusses the origins of this trait: 
Perhaps it is the nature of life in the desert. Or perhaps it is the strong belief in 
fate and that everything is in the hands of our creator, the attitude towards the 
concept of time in the Arab world is more flexible and fluid in comparison to the 
more schedule-oriented and punctual cultures of North America and Western 
Europe. (Nejem 2016, 133) 
 
Given this more fluid understanding of time, it is perhaps unsurprising that future 
planning is also somewhat more fluid. Indeed, future planning could be seen as “tempting 
fate. So it is common to hear an Arab use such phrases as: ‘If we were still alive next 
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summer, then we would think about doing this’ ” (Nejem 2016, 141). If the future is not 
the primary focus, it is also unsurprising that “history and tradition are an integral part of 
their identity,” which Nejem contrasts with American culture in particular (146). Nejem 
notes that this difference in perspective on time frame has political consequences: 
David, a diplomat living in Cairo, says: “often we don’t remember as Westerners 
the amount of history that comes with the relationship between the West and the 
Arab world. We have much shorter memories than Arab people do. . . . I think 
people in the Arab world feel that they have sometimes been the victims of a lot 
of outside interference – pushed around a lot, so that they are very sensitive to 
whether they are being shown understanding and respect. Especially Arab 
Muslims, who feel they have lost a place in the world as a great civilisation and 
they no longer have that preeminent status.” (Nejem 2016, 147) 
 
Contrasting with the schedule- and time-oriented cultures of the West, Nejem 
reflects that the Arab approach to time is comparatively flexible; “achievement might be 
measured by how effectively you were able to handle last-minute cancellations and 
changes, all while giving priority to people in your situation or setting” (135). The strong 
relational orientation in Arab cultures influences timing. This does not mean that timing 
is unimportant but rather that it is not driven by the clock or calendar: 
Timing is everything. Arabs in general are quite observant and will wait until the 
person is in the right mood to listen so they get the positive response they are 
after. An Arab would pick up information and certain signs and would be able to 
sense the best time to approach that person – even if it means waiting for a few 
days. Rushing it would be foolish and would risk a negative response that could 
mean even longer delays. (Nejem 2016, 139) 
 
This deemphasis on schedule is not accidental but rather fits into a complex relational 
system: 
In Arab culture, everything appears to be in a constant state of fluidity, nothing is 
solid or firm – and even the most important plans can be changed at the very last 
minute. Again the focus is on the people and completing the transaction rather 




As the next section focuses on authority, it may also be worth noting that time is 
itself a status symbol: “The amount of leeway an individual gets in any given time system 
is an indication of that person’s position in an organization or society” (Nejem 2016, 
146). When combined with attitudes on authority and honor, this may be an important 
perspective indeed. 
Authority 
The particular exercise of power and authority in Iraq is a complex story of 
political maneuvering, historical narratives, and present realities (Makiya 1989; 
pseudonymously published as Samir al-Khalil). Certainly, Hussein had significant power 
consolidation by the time the events considered in this dissertation took place. However, 
what is important to observe in this section is the underlying framework of attitude 
toward authority. 
Authority in Arab cultures is not tied primarily to accomplishments. Though what 
a person has accomplished is important, “family name, connections, relationships and 
even years of service account for a lot more weight in the ‘being-based’ or ‘ascribed’ 
culture of the Middle East” (Nejem 2016, 60–61). Nejem observes that this often causes 
confusion for non-Arabs, who find “this aspect to be the most difficult to accept in Arab 
culture. Coming from a ‘doing-based’ or ‘achieved’ culture, where everything is about 
meritocracy . . . the ascribed culture, to Westerners especially, is very confusing and 
frustrating” (60–61). What is clearly expected is deference to authority, which is 
“reflected by the importance of status, rank, title, reputation, and position” (Ismail and 




Ismail and Fayez, as well as Nejem, argue that religious context – whether 
Muslim, Christian, or other – must be taken into account to grasp Arab understandings of 
ethics. Discussing Islam, Sedgwick (2006, 68) explains, “Humans are born to live 
properly, which in practice means living according to Islam, as indicated by the Sharia. 
They are born sinless, knowing God, but the world washes this original knowledge away. 
There is no concept of ‘original sin,’ but humans inevitably do sin, not being angels.” 
Additional Cultural Framework 
One additional cultural framework bears mentioning here. It is the sense of fate 
and destiny experienced by Arab cultures. Ismail and Fayez describe it this way: 
The influence of religion leads to a core belief in fate and destiny, that nothing 
occurs without God’s will. In general, Arabs are fatalistic and have a strong belief 
that life circumstances are ultimately beyond individual control. In Sha’ Allah, or 
“If God wills,” is often the response to any future anticipated event, small or 
significant, short- or long-term. Faith in God, patience, and acceptance of one’s 
fate are primary coping mechanisms when encountering negative or difficult 
circumstances. (Ismail and Fayez 2015, 96) 
Russia46 
Russian culture can be somewhat difficult to pinpoint. Russians have the pull 
between East and West, with the culture sharing elements of both (Hosking 2001). The 
early cultural structures were more Asiatic than European, but since the sixteenth century, 
Russia has been shaped in relation to the West (Hosking 2001, 21–22). However, 
Hosking argues that there is an even more important underlying analytical structure that 
must be observed when considering its culture: the tendency (especially among the elites) 
“to seek extreme solutions to problems and to lurch from one set of cultural patterns to 
 
46 Some of the material in the US and Russia profiles previously appeared in a different format in the 
author’s paper presented at the International Studies Association in Hong Kong (Jones 2017). 
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their diametrical opposite” (22). Fertelmeyster (2015) refers to this as Russia’s history of 
contradictions. As with other states, “Russia” does not encompass merely one but in fact 
many different cultures; at the highest level of analysis, Fertelmeyster observes three: 
traditional, West-oriented, and Soviet-style. However, she argues that it is nonetheless 
possible to identify “core values that are most prevalent in today’s Russia,” while 
maintaining that it is important to remember the actual complexity of Russia’s nearly 200 
ethnicities (91). 
Another important element of Russian culture is found in its self-perception: 
“Messianism is still alive in Russia today, particularly among intellectuals, on the left as 
well as the right, who share a belief and pride in Russia as a great power with a special 
mission in the world” (Richmond 2009, 51). This is, in part, because 
starting in the 15th century, Russia saw itself as the Third Rome—a true protector 
of the traditions of Orthodox Christianity and a source of spiritual salvation for 
the world. The word for “Russian Orthodoxy” in Russian is Pravoslavie. It has 
two roots—Pravyi (“correct,” “right”) and Slavit (“to praise”). The name strongly 
implies that there is a right way to praise God and it belongs to those who follow 
Pravoslavie. (Fertelmeyster 2015, 91) 
 
Thus, in Russian culture, there is a long history of acknowledging “only one right way 
rooted in its religious tradition” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93). But what is the Russian way? 
This section presents a brief overview of Russian culture through the four cultural 
frameworks observed in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach and Chapter Four: 




Shame, Honor / Guilt, Innocence / Power, Fear 
Regarding shame, honor/guilt, innocence, one of the conceptualizations presents a 
third continuum: power / fear (Muller 2001). This third continuum is important and 
relevant to understanding Russian motivational structures: 
Fear is a major element of the Russian psyche, and strakh [fear] will be 
encountered in many places in Russia, even at the highest levels of government, 
where there is often fear of an outside enemy determined to destroy Russia. 
(Richmond 2009, 36) 
While being right is very important to Russians, it plays out differently than in the 
Americans’ traditional guilt/innocence structure. This has interesting implications when 
considering Russia’s complex moral environment: 
The sense of moral righteousness often leads to quick judgments. A Russian 
might not only behave in a rather judgmental manner but might strongly and 
passionately hold on to that judgment. A hierarchy of moral superiority serves to 
balance out other hierarchical structures and a sense of not having enough control 
in one’s life. (Fertelmeyster 2015, 94) 
 
Richmond observes that Russians may rely on fibs to avoid facing unfavorable facts 
(107). Fertelmeyster makes sense of the noted tendency in this way: “In a culture that 
more often defines truth through emotions, the sense of what is morally right is often 
perceived as more right than what is legally right” (93). This also may connect to the 
interdependent understanding of Russian morality in which “Russians think of 
themselves as members of a community rather than as individuals,” and “everybody’s 
business is also everyone else’s” (Richmond 2009, 15–16). 
Time Orientation 
In general, Russians have a preference toward a future that is deeply rooted in the 
past. Order is highly preferred “because Russians believe it helps to provide a clear view 
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of the future and thus avoids the uncertainty of the present that they so dislike” 
(Richmond 2009, 81–82). 
 
Figure 5. Past, Present, and Future in Russian Culture. 
Originally published in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012, figure 9.1, p. 156), shown here as displayed in (Grove 2015, 860). 
 
This may explain, in part, Trompenaars’ finding of a deemphasized future: while 
some Russians have shifted to an internal locus of control, “the sense that nothing much 
depends on me or it is not up to me is much more common” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93). 
Perhaps this is why “Russian pessimism contrasts with American innocence and 
optimism. . . . Russians expect things to go poorly and have learned to live with 
disappointments” (Richmond 2009, 35). This may also explain why, for Russians, time is 
approached so differently than it is for Americans: 
Time is like the seasons. . . . Time is not a vital commodity. . . . Being on time is 
consequently alien. The business part of the talk will also be lengthy, because 
important issues are approached in a roundabout rather than in a direct manner. 
Impatient foreign businesspeople will wonder when the key issues of the meeting 
will be discussed. And after the meeting has concluded and the visitor believes he 
has agreement to proceed, nothing may happen for weeks, or months, or ever. 
(Richmond 2009, 111–12) 
Authority 
Russians have a complex relationship with authority. Richmond (2009, 80) 
describes it this way: “Russians may respect authority, but they are not intimidated by it. 
Seeing themselves as coequal with others, they are not shy about speaking up in public or 
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asserting themselves.” In that tension there is an important paradox: “acceptance of and 
protest against the hierarchy” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 92). Richmond describes the tension: 
Russians have long been seen as submissive to authority, politically passive, and 
unswerving in policy. But when the breaking point is reached, the submissive 
citizen spurns authority, the docile worker strikes, the passive person becomes 
politically active, and rigid policies are reversed almost overnight. (Richmond 
2009, 53) 
Human Nature 
The soul is a deeply important concept for Russians, especially the Russian soul. 
Fear for the survival of the Russian soul bothers Russians – and Western values seem a 
particular threat (Richmond 2009, 42). The human soul itself is considered the darkest 
dark and the lightest light (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93). 
Additional Cultural Frameworks 
Mutability: Although, or perhaps because, change can be huge – from one poll to 
another – change of all kinds (but especially of character) tends to be resisted and slow 
(Richmond 2009, xx, xxii, 12, 34). 
Rationality: Richmond (2009, 40) the “rational and pragmatic approach does not 
always work” for Russians. They can be obsessed with ideas but also driven by emotion 
(and the soul in particular), which is viewed as a valid source of knowledge. “More often, 
it is personal relations, feelings, and traditional values that determine a course of action. 
Westerners are more likely to depend on the cold facts and to do what works” (Richmond 
2009, 40–41). Some level of intuitive knowledge is expected, based on the high-context 
communication and soul-level knowledge (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93). With Russians, the 
world is perceived to be irrational: “One thinks and acts as if not able always rely on 
objective methods of analysis and logic. This is opposed to American positivism” 
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(Bergelson 2003, 2). What is more, historically, “the consensus of the Orthodox 
congregation was regarded as the truth—a singularity of truth in which there was no 
room for a pluralism of opinion” (Richmond 2009, 24). 
Expression: A high level of emotional expression is normal, and appeals are made 
based on emotions and not merely facts (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93). Russians 
have a well-deserved reputation for extremes. When emotions are displayed, they 
are spontaneous and strong. Russian hospitality can be overwhelming, friendship 
all encompassing, compassion deep, loyalty long lasting, drinking heavy, 
celebrations boisterous, obsession with security paranoid, and violence vicious. 
With Russians, it is often all or nothing. Halfway measures simply do not suffice. 
(Richmond 2009, 38) 
 
Individualism – Interdependence: “Sobornost (communal sprit, togetherness) 
distinguishes Russians from Westerners” and the roots of these precede communism, 
being linked instead to a Russian survival strategy (Richmond 2009, 12). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, “individualism . . . has a pejorative meaning” in Russia (15). And 
while some Russians are individually oriented, even for them group relationships are very 
important (Fertelmeyster 2015). 
Providence: Fertelmeyster (2015, 93) observes “Russians willingly engage in 
lamenting over things big and small. Routine emphasizing of what’s wrong without 
necessarily offering how to make it right . . . Russians would argue that it comes either 
from their genuine concern or from their genuine belief (often based on previous 
experiences—contextual knowledge) that ‘nothing ever changes here.’ ”  
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Case One: US / Iraq 1990 
Résumé of What Happened 
The analysis of US/Iraq 1990 begins with a brief encyclopedia narrative of the 
event: 
(1990–91) International conflict triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990. Though justified by Iraqi leader Ṣaddām Ḥussein on grounds that Kuwait 
was historically part of Iraq, the invasion was presumed to be motivated by Iraq’s 
desire to acquire Kuwait’s rich oil fields and expand its power in the region. The 
United States, fearing Iraq’s broader strategic intentions and acting under UN 
auspices, eventually formed a broad coalition, which included a number of Arab 
countries, and began massing troops in northern Saudi Arabia. When Iraq ignored 
a UN Security Council deadline for it to withdraw from Kuwait, the coalition 
began a large-scale air offensive (Jan. 16–17, 1991). Ṣaddām responded by 
launching ballistic missiles against neighbouring coalition states as well as Israel. 
A ground offensive by the coalition (February 24–28) quickly achieved victory. 
Estimates of Iraqi military deaths range up to 100,000; coalition forces lost about 
300 troops. The war also caused extensive damage to the region’s environment. 
The Iraqi regime subsequently faced widespread popular uprisings, which it 
brutally suppressed. A UN trade embargo remained in effect after the end of the 
conflict, pending Iraq’s compliance with the terms of the armistice. The foremost 
term was that Iraq destroy its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
programs. The embargo continued into the 21st century and ceased only after the 
Iraq War started in 2003. (“Persian Gulf War” 2017) 
Prior Happenings 
One of the more complete chronologies of the Persian Gulf War can be found in 
Grossman (1995, 465–502). From this lengthy chronology, several key points have been 
observed. First, there is no natural starting place for a history of the Persian Gulf War – 
Grossman’s first four entries are in the years 636, 1534, 1752, and 1869 (all CE), and 
there is substantial development in the 1920s, 1970s, and 1980s, which all build toward 
Grossman’s history of 1990’s conflict. Second, the very complex preexisting relationship 
between the United States and Iraq must be noted, as must the relationship between Israel 
and the United States, along with that between Iraq and Iran. The September 1980 
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invasion of Iran by Iraq was apparently seen by Saddam to be parallel in some way to the 
636 CE battle of Qadissiyat in which Arabs found victory over Persians (467). The 
historical record is not insignificant: Israel’s alleged attacks and assassinations targeting 
the Iraqi nuclear program, along with Israel’s 1981 aerial bombing and destruction of the 
Iraqi nuclear power plant at Osirak, Iraq, (perhaps in response to Saddam’s statement that 
the Iraqi nuclear program was intended to be used against the “Zionist enemy”) (467–68). 
On August 20, 1988, the Iran–Iraq war ended without either country emerging as 
a clear winner. Iraq ended the war with $80 billion of war debt and reconstruction costs 
of about $320 billion. However, Iraq was somewhat hamstrung because the key Shatt al-
Arab Waterway – the state’s only access to the Persian Gulf, which forms part of the 
border between Iraq and Iran – was ruined in the conflict between those two countries. 
Consequently, Iraq demanded that Kuwait (formerly part of Iraq) lease the Bubiyan and 
Warba islands in a long-term agreement. This would have assured Iraqi access to the 
Gulf. However, Kuwait refused. Iraq renewed its demands in December 1988. In 
February 1989, “for the third and last time, Iraq demands leases to the Bubiyan and 




Figure 6. Kuwait, Especially including Warbah and Bubiyan. 
CIA (2002).  
The United States had restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984, despite 
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers (Grossman 1995, 468–69), and 
Washington sold multiple aircraft and extended significant loans to Iraq in the midst of 
the Iraq–Iran war. Yet the United States also had been secretly shipping weapons to Iran 
(Iran–Contra), which provoked “intense anger and a sense of betrayal” among the Iraqis 
regarding the U.S., as “the U.S. has armed Iran to kill Iraqis” (US Assistant Secretary of 
State Murphy, as quoted in Grossman 1995, 469). The United States had not been alone 
in seeking to influence the conduct and outcome of the Iran–Iraq conflict. Eventually that 
conflict regionalized to become the Iranian–Arab war in which Iraq “secured the financial 
and political support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other oil-rich Arab states of the gulf, 
as well as political and limited military support from Jordan and Egypt” (Stork 2014, 
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n.p.). Moscow, after a brief hiatus, resumed military supply shipments to Iraq, and French 
supplied warplanes and missile systems were used by Iraq to limit Iranian exports (Stork 
2014). Syria closed Iraq’s Mediterranean pipeline in support of Iran (2014). The 
significant debt ($80 billion), reconstruction costs ($320 billion), and ruined water access 
to the Persian Gulf at the end of the Iran–Iraq War, along with Kuwait’s refusal to lease 
water access (i.e., Bubiyan and Warba islands) to Iraq, are all important elements of the 
back-story. Indeed, Stork (2014, n.p) observes, “In many ways, the Iran–Iraq War linked 
the Iranian Revolution of 1978 and 1979 to the 1991 Gulf War” as Kuwait “provided 
both the provocations and the pretexts for Baghdad to made a new bid for regional 
hegemony.” Importantly, this led to the expansion of U.S. presence (and the capacity of 
the Saudis to facilitate US military unloading in port) in the region (Yetiv 1997, 54). 
The April 12, 1990, meeting between Saddam Hussein and four U.S. Senators 
further demonstrates that the complex relationship between Iraq and the U.S., although 
fraught, was not far from negative. As Senator Metzenbaum (D – Ohio, as quoted in 
Grossman 1995, 471) put it, “I am now aware that you are a strong and intelligent man 
and that you want peace.” Senator Simpson (R – Wyoming, as quoted in Grossman 1995, 
471) similarly said, “I believe that your problems lie with the Western media and not with 
the U.S. government.” The senators’ affirmations came despite the undisputed use of 
chemical weapons by Iraq and the specter of Iraq’s actual or potential possession and 
development of biological weapons. However, the U.S. was certainly wary, and increased 
its intelligence operations in Iraq later that same month. 
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Runup to the Event 
Nonetheless, as late as May 21, 1990, “USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] 
appraises the developing trouble spot that is the border between Iraq and Kuwait and 
estimates that ‘Iraq is not expected to use military force to attack Kuwait or Saudi Arabia 
to seize disputed territory or resolve a dispute over oil policy’ ” (Grossman 1995, 472). 
By the end of July 1990, the situation had changed dramatically. While the United States 
had begun to develop plans regarding a response to a potential Iraqi invasion of Saudi 
Arabia, no such plans had been developed regarding an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; it had 
even been suggested that perhaps Washington should accept the takeover of Kuwait in 
the interest of defending Saudi Arabia (Hess 2001, 164). 
One of the primary grievances that Saddam had publicly aired related to the fact 
that several Persian Gulf states, including Kuwait, had produced more oil than was 
allowed by quota (Grossman 1995, 472). This, in turn, led predictably to reduced world 
oil prices and more saliently hamstrung Iraq’s efforts to pay its war debts (472). On July 
17, 1990, Saddam “estimates that such ‘backstabbing’ has cost Iraq $89 billion between 
1981 and 1990, and an additional $14 billion if it was allowed to continue” (472). The 
next day, on July 18, Iraq lodged several additional charges against Kuwait with the Arab 
League, including “stealing Iraqi oil, building military installations, and refusing to 
cancel loans it had made to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war” (472). A day later, Saddam 
was declared “President-for-life by the Iraqi Parliament” (472). On July 24, Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak met separately with leaders of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq 
and scheduled a meeting for July 31 in Saudi Arabia, led by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
(473). At the July 31 meeting, Iraq “takes a hard line, calling for compensation from 
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Kuwait for seizing what it claims is Iraqi territory and stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil 
from disputed oil fields along their common border, while also demanding that Kuwait 
cancel Iraq’s estimated $10 billion war debt” (473); at this point USCENTCOM and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believed the invasion of Kuwait had become 
imminent. 
The Event Itself 
Saddam apparently considered the United States to be of only mild significance in 
the pending conflict, and 
consequently, in July 1990 he gave Kuwait little time to respond to his demands, 
and when on 1 August the first round of negotiations went nowhere—as the Iraqi 
delegation had been ordered to ensure—Saddam launched the Republican Guard. 
On the night of 2 August the RGFC overpowered Kuwait’s meager armed forces, 
and within thirty-six hours Iraq was in complete control of the emirate. (Pollack 
2013, 4) 
 
The same day as the takeover of Kuwait, Iraq installed a provisional government, 
which “it claims . . . has requested military assistance from Iraq, and that it will 
eventually hold elections in Kuwait” (Grossman 1995, 473). Kuwait’s ruling al-Sabah 
family fled and had all their assets taken by the newly installed Kuwaiti government 
(473). 
Short-Term Responses 
Although “in the weeks and months prior to the invasion, there had been signs of 
the Iraqi dictator’s intentions,” “the audacity of Saddam Hussein’s blitzkrieg, his 
determination to swallow the whole of Kuwait, stunned most observers. . . . His country 
was deep in debt and his exhausted people longed for peace” (U.S. News and World 
Report 1992, 13). 
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On August 2, the United States immediately froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets (as did 
France and Great Britain), banned trade and transactions with Iraq, and barred travel by 
air or sea to Iraq (Grossman 1995, 473). The UN Security Council voted 14–0 (Yemen 
abstained) to call for the “unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait” (473). 
The Soviet Union also immediately stopped supplying arms to Iraq, and “the Islamic 
Conference Organization condemn[ed] Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait” (473). Iraq, 
meanwhile, promised that the Iraqi armed forces would “close in an iron rank against 
those who try to challenge us and will make Iraq and Kuwait a graveyard for those who 
launch any aggression” (473). 
Also on August 2, in a conversation between Mubarak and King Hussein of 
Jordan, 
the king told the Egyptian president that he had spoken with Saddam earlier that 
day and that the Iraqi leader had assured him his soldiers would begin to leave 
Kuwait soon—but only if there was no condemnation of the invasion and talk of 
outside interference. ‘You know us.’ The king quoted Saddam as saying. ‘If the 
result is going to be a position of condemnation and accusation and a tough stance 
that might pave the way for outside intervention, then we will tear each other’s 
eyes out.’ King Hussein told Mubarak that it was critical that there be no hasty 
condemnation of the invasion at the upcoming meeting of the Islamic Conference 
in Cairo.” (U.S. News and World Report 1992, 59) 
 
On August 3, the Arab League Council voted “in favor of a Saudi-proposed 
resolution that condemn[ed] Iraq’s action in Kuwait,” although “Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, the 
Palestine delegation, Sudan, and Mauritania abstain” and “Libyan delegates walk[ed] out 
before the vote” (Grossman 1995, 474). Iraq, meanwhile “announce[d] its intent to 
withdraw troops on 5 August” (474). 
One of the very interesting documents to emerge from Iraq is the Statement of 
Withdrawal from Kuwait, introduced and presented by Grossman: 
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On 3 August 1990, just a day after it invaded and swallowed up the nation of 
Kuwait, the Iraqi government issued a statement to the world announcing that its 
forces would be withdrawing back to Iraq, leaving a puppet government in charge 
in Kuwait City. Herewith is the text of that statement, delivered by a spokesman 
for Iraq’s ruling Revolutionary Command Council and reported by the official 
Iraqi news agency, INA. 
 
The statement issued by the Revolution [sic] Command Council [on Thursday, 2 
August] was clear in defining the reasons and circumstances which made Iraq 
extend help to the free provisional government of Kuwait. Our forces have 
performed their pan-Arab and national duty in supporting our people in Kuwait 
and maintaining security and stability with a high degree of faithfulness and 
discipline, as everyone saw, even our enemies.  
In accordance with the statement yesterday on the mission of our brave 
forces, and according to the understanding with the free provisional government 
of Kuwait, a plan has been laid down to start withdrawing these forces under a 
timetable as of Sunday[,] August 5, unless factors appear that would threaten the 
security of Kuwait or Iraq. We announce and emphasize to our people and our 
glorious Arab nation that by doing this we are not responding to the hollow fuss 
launched from various places by ill-meaning people to whom we give no 
consideration whatsoever. We are committed to our principles, and in harmony 
with ourselves and the duty rendered by our brave forces in accordance with the 
statement yesterday. 
Any party whatever, great or small, of whatever sort, that might try and 
interfere with Kuwait and Iraq would be confronted with a decisive stand that 
would chop its arms off from its shoulders. There can be no return for the extinct 
regime now that the sun of dignity and honour has shone over Kuwait. Present 
and future relations between Kuwait and Iraq will be determined only by the 
people of Iraq and Kuwait. (Grossman 1995, 351–52) 
 
On August 5, Bush “declares that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait ‘will not stand’ ” 
(Grossman 1995, 474). On August 6, in Moscow, “American Secretary of State James 
Baker and Soviet Foreign Ministry Eduard Shevardnadze issue a joint statement 
denouncing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as ‘crude,’ ‘tragic,’ and ‘a violation of 
international law.’ Both men, in unison, warn Baghdad of ‘very serious consequences’ if 
it did not comply with the UN mandate and withdraw from Kuwait as soon as possible” 
(Grossman 1995, 474). On August 7, the United States initiates the implementation of 
Operation Desert Shield, ostensibly to protect Saudi Arabia (475). Iraq declares Kuwait 
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“‘a republic’ and declares the end of the emirate. Jordan announces its non-recognition of 
the new Kuwaiti republic” (475). On August 8, Iraq “announces its annexation of 
Kuwait,” and President George H. W. Bush outlines the U.S. requirements for settlement 
of the conflict (475). Badsey and Crowcroft (2015, 1) suggest that “in response” to the 
UN Security Council condemnation and Saudi Arabia’s agreement to receive U.S. forces, 
“on 8 August, Iraq announced the incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq, an act of direct 
conquest unprecedented among United Nations members.” 
Yetiv observes that the coalition built by Bush to carry out the threat of retribution 
against Iraq was unusual in its breadth and durability: 
Napoleon once said that if he had to fight a war, he hoped it would be against a 
coalition. Saddam perhaps saw the Gulf crisis in a similar manner, because he 
repeatedly sought to split the coalition. In conjunction with his political approach 
of linkage, Saddam used a military approach in the form of Scud missile attacks 
against Israel. Israel had not attacked him, had nothing to do with his fight with 
Kuwait, and was not even part of the U.S. led coalition. Nonetheless, Saddam 
tried to provoke Israeli retaliation and thus splinter the U.S. led alliance by 
angering its Arab members such as Egypt and Syria, and generating popular 
discontent in the Arab world. 
But Saddam guessed wrong on two counts. Despite consistently pursuing 
a policy of retaliation against aggressors, Israel, under pressure from the United 
States, showed restraint and stayed out of the conflict. In addition, Egypt and 
Syria, the two most influential Arab states in the U.S. led coalition, were not at all 
inclined to fall into Saddam’s trap. They understood Israel’s right to retaliate in 
self defense if attacked. Foreign Minister Farouq al Shara of Syria as well as 
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt asserted that their countries would not be 
dragged by Saddam into a war with Israel, even if Israel retaliated against Iraq. 
(Yetiv 1997, 77) 
 
This assessment was shared by Pauly and Lansford (2005, 1), who argue that the 
United States role in the 1990/1991 conflict was a “highwater mark” for United States 
influence in the Middle East, particularly because of the coalition Bush was able to 
assemble – including among erstwhile enemies. Pauly explains, 
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Bush also recognized the need to avoid unilateral American action in a region 
generally averse to Western culture and influence. In order to achieve that end, he 
set about the construction of a broad coalition of Western, Asian and Middle 
Eastern states that would act only under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) 
and thus mitigate, if not avoid completely, the perception that the United States 
was acting solely in its own interest. (Pauly 2005, 4) 
 
In total, more than 30 states participated, including the six members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (Grossman 1995, 71). In addition to these and the United States, coalition 
members included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Honduras, 
Italy, Japan, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Soviet Union, Spain, 
Syria, and Turkey (71–75). 
Longer-Term Responses 
Eventually, on November 29, 1990, the UNSC “set a deadline of 15 January 1991 
for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, authorizing the use of force (‘all necessary means’) to 
support this” (Badsey and Crowcroft 2015, 1). Iraq did not withdrawal from Kuwait, and 
Early on 17 January 1991, the coalition began with a massive air bombing attack 
against Iraq, which responded by attacking Israel (which was not a coalition 
member and had taken no military action) with long-range missiles. Critically for 
coalition solidarity, Israel refused to retaliate. The coalition launched its ground 
offensive to clear Kuwait on 24 February. This revealed that the Americans had 
greatly overestimated the Iraqi army, which virtually disintegrated, offering only 
token resistance. On 28 February, having achieved the objective of liberating 
Kuwait, Bush called a unilateral cease-fire, and a permanent cease-fire came into 
effect on 11 April. (Badsey and Crowcroft 2015, 1) 
 
Interestingly, Bush appeared to believe that this military action was “the start of a ‘New 
World Order,’” though in reality “although the Gulf War secured oil supplies for the 
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West, it failed to deliver the promised ‘New World Order’” (Badsey and Crowcroft 2015, 
1). Saddam continued in power after the war and brutally crushed uprisings within Iraq. 
Bush was able to convert some coalition relationships into post-war efforts. In fact, “even 
after Saddam accepted the truce, Bush was able to implement a containment strategy 
toward Iraq with broad international support” (Pauly and Lansford 2005, 6). However, 
neither Clinton nor W. Bush were able to repeat the success that H. W. Bush had in 
coalition building – which, for its part, is seen by some as “a shining example of coalition 
diplomacy and US leadership” (3). Perhaps in part because of Clinton’s inability to do so, 
“US–Iraqi relations through the 1990s were marked by constant strife, both rhetorical and 
physical” (1). Pauly (2005, 144) observes that the choice by Bush to not pursue regime 
change may have been necessary for the sake of the coalition but there is a line directly 
traceable from that decision to the growth of Al Qaeda under Bin Laden. Pollack (2013) 
also links the 1990–1991 conflict directly to the later (2003) conflict, which is Case Two: 
US / Iraq 2003 in this chapter and which is where the US/Iraq interwar period will be 
discussed. 
The Role of Culture 
There are numerous cultural values that could potentially have influenced the 
conduct and outcome of interstate relations in the run-up to and early decision making 
within the Persian Gulf War. 
Critical Decisions or Interpretations that May Be of Importance 
Differences in United States and Iraqi perception around the events in 1990/1991 
were significant. Pollack introduces the divergent perceptions in this extended passage, 
which details first the US perspective and then the Iraqi perspective: 
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After the Iran–Iraq war finally ended in 1988 with a modest Iraqi victory, 
Washington’s and Baghdad’s perceptions of each other quickly diverged. As 
many others did for years thereafter, the administration of George H. W. Bush 
misread Saddam, seeing him as a nasty dictator but a pragmatic one: as someone 
who could be trusted to be prudent, to see his interests as others saw them, and to 
understand the constraints created by Iraq’s relative weakness. Bush and his 
advisers believed that they could work with Saddam the way that the United 
States had worked with other nasty dictators over time, from Chile’s Augusto 
Pinochet to the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos to Iran’s shah. They inaugurated a 
policy called “constructive engagement” that was designed to wean Saddam from 
his more objectionable behavior—support for terrorists, use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and mass murder of his own people, including the Kurds, 
200,000 of whom had been slaughtered by Saddam’s Anfal campaign the year 
that President Bush took office—by providing him with further American aid. 
However, over time, Saddam refused to give up his objectionable practices and, in 
particular, greatly expanded his WMD programs. This brought him into conflict 
with various American allies, including Israel, and eventually began to alarm even 
the Bush administration. 
Saddam’s perspective was entirely different. He had never trusted the 
Americans, even at the height of Iraqi–American cooperation. The Iran–contra 
scandal during the Iran–Iraq war—when it was revealed that the United States had 
sold surface-to-air missiles and antitank missiles to Iran to secure the release of 
American hostages and create a rapprochement with Tehran—convinced him of 
American perfidy. Moreover, as he publicly explained in several important 
speeches, Saddam saw in his victory over Iran the basis for staking a claim as the 
leader of a new Arab political–military coalition and even a new superpower. He 
argued that the fall of the Soviet Union had created an unbalanced world in which 
the United States would be unchecked, to the detriment of the Arabs, if not the 
whole world. He announced that Iraq, with its victorious army and strategic 
arsenal, would take on the burden of standing up to the United States and 
protecting the Arab world—whether they liked it or not. (Pollack 2013, sec. The 
Invasion of Kuwait, 1990.) 
 
One of the great areas of missed understandings surrounds Iraq’s calculations 
leading up to the invasion of Kuwait. The great financial need of Iraq after the Iran–Iraq 
war was notable. However, less well understood (by the United States) was the Iraqi 
leader’s understanding of Kuwait: 
The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was based on an interpretation of history dating to the 
time when the area comprising the modern states of Iraq and Kuwait had been 
part of the Ottoman Empire. Kuwait had been a district in Basra Province, which 
together with two other Ottoman provinces had been reconstituted as the nation of 
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Iraq in 1932. By that time, however, Kuwait had become an ‘independent 
sheikdom under British protection.’ When Britain withdrew in 1961, Kuwait 
emerged as a fully sovereign state, recognized as such by the members of the 
Arab League and most other nations. Iraq, however, had never accepted the ‘loss’ 
of Kuwait. If not questioning the legitimacy of Kuwait, it periodically challenged 
the legality of the existing border as well as Kuwait’s control of the islands of 
Warba and Bubiyan. (Hess 2001, 162 footnote) 
 
Iraq was historically embarrassed by the loss of Kuwait, particularly now that Iraq 
was in need of access to the Gulf, which Kuwait could have granted. Kuwait alternatively 
(or conjointly) could have relieved debt or granted access to oil fields. However, “when 
the unexpected happened, and Kuwait did not cower, Saddam took it as a calculated 
insult to him personally, a public slap in the face that had to be punished” (Dawisha 2009, 
224). Not least in the motivations was maintenance of Saddam’s leader image. 
Responding to the “charge that he is considered by his friends and enemies alike as the 
Butcher of Baghdad: ‘weakness doesn’t assure achieving the objectives required by a 
leader’” (Grossman 1995, 472). Mohammed Saadun, an Iraqi college grad who had 
formerly been in the Iraqi military said on August 3, 1990, “I have been expecting a 
cross-border operation since Kuwait humiliated Iraq by refusing to write off debts. 
Saddam cannot tolerate this” (as quoted in Janz and Abrahamson 1991, 7). 
At the same time, Saddam miscalculated the United States. Pauly (2005, 143) 
observes, as a result of Iraq’s economic need after the Iran–Iraq War, “Saddam attempted 
to refill his state’s coffers by using military force to annex neighboring Kuwait and seize 
the oil fields situated therein. However, he miscalculated politically, figuring incorrectly 
that the United States would not use force to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait.” One of 
the reasons for the miscalculation by Saddam was that Bush interpreted it as the first 
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post–Cold War test of the UNSC and read the crisis through the lens of the weak interwar 
leadership of the League of Nations: 
I was keenly aware that this would be the first post–Cold War test of the Security 
Council in crisis. I knew what had happened in the 1930s when a weak and 
leaderless League of Nations had failed to stand up to Japanese, Italian, and 
German aggression. The result was to encourage the ambitions of those regimes. 
The U.N. had been set up to correct the failings of the League, but the Cold War 
caused stalemate in the Security Council. Now, however, our improving relations 
with Moscow and our satisfactory ones with China offered the possibility that we 
could get their cooperation in forging international unity to oppose Iraq. (Bush, as 
quoted in Hess 2001, 162) 
 
It was thus that, “from the beginning of the crisis, Bush assumed that the United States 
needed to provide international leadership” (Hess 2001, 162). One additional, very 
important conflicting interpretation appears to have occurred on July 25, when “Saddam 
Hussein ask[ed] to meet with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie. Conflicting sources later 
report that Glaspie assured the Iraqi president that the United States would not become 
involved militarily in an Iraqi–Kuwaiti border dispute. Glaspie later denies any such 
assurance” (Grossman 1995, 473). Importantly, major build-ups happened after this 
meeting. 
Glaspie did, however, indicate that the United States had no opinion on the border 
disagreement with Kuwait (U.S. News and World Report 1992, 25). In that same 
meeting, Saddam, when describing what would ultimately be the failed August 1 meeting 
in Jidda, told Glaspie, “When we meet and we see that there is hope, then nothing will 
happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not 




Interestingly, information available both at the time and since indicates that 
Saddam believed that, in light of the American decision to defend Kuwaiti oil 
exports against Iranian attack in 1987–1988, there was a fairly high probability 
that the United States would send military forces to try to prevent Kuwait’s fall. 
However, he convinced himself that the United States would send only light 
forces—a small marine unit, the ready brigade of the Eighty-second Airborne 
Division, an aircraft-carrier task force—and that his huge, battle-hardened 
Republican Guard, backed by the chemical-warfare munitions with which he 
ostentatiously began arming Iraqi warplanes right after the invasion, would make 
short work of such forces. Then, based on his reading of America’s hasty retreats 
from Lebanon and Vietnam, he expected that the United States would not have 
the stomach for any more losses and would reluctantly accede to his annexation of 
Kuwait. (Pollack 2013, 4) 
Counterfactual Narrative 
Several critical junctures rise to the surface as having been particularly 
susceptible to misinterpretation due to cultural difference. The first is the divergence in 
interpretations regarding Saddam’s motives. The second is the divergence in expectation 
around the meaning of public condemnation of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The third is the 
divergence in expectations regarding the withdrawal timeline. A counterfactual narrative 
is presented here for only the first of these three. The counterfactual introduces one 
plausible change, which is that the United States Foreign Policy Executive USFPE 
functioned from the adaptation perspective of intercultural competence:47 
<Begin Counterfactual 1> 
By early 1990, USFPE has accurately understood that Iraq’s Foreign Policy 
Executive (IFPE) was embarrassed by the loss of Kuwait while under British 
colonization. USFPE understands that this is a relevant, contemporary detail for 
IFPE, due in part to their perception of time. USFPE further recognizes that while 
the material questions facing IFPE at the end of the Iran–Iraq war were huge and 
daunting, that honor was another equally important form of power that had been 
damaged by the lack of a clear winner in the Iran–Iraq war. This damage to honor 
is compounded with the US’s duplicity in supporting both sides during the Iran–
Iraq war (i.e., Iran–Contra affair) and most aggravatingly with the embarrassment 
of Kuwait’s refusal to lease the Warba and Bubiya islands. This latter fact is the 
most alarming because the shame of being refused by a state that is essentially a 
 
47 See Chapter Two: Literature Review for a discussion of adaptation in intercultural competence. 
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lost child of Iraq brings incredible shame onto IFPE. This refusal, combined with 
Kuwait’s unwillingness to write off Iraqi debts, creates a powder keg of shame, 
and USFPE is cognizant of this increasingly risky situation. 
USFPE was alarmed in September 1989 when Saddam Hussein bestowed 
Iraq’s highest award, the Rafadin Medal on Kuwaiti Emir Sheik Jaber al-Ahmad 
al-Sabah (Grossman 1995, 470). USFPE recognized this clearly as a mode of 
honor-shame negotiation and as a clear escalation in the conflict between Iraq and 
Kuwait, the latter by this time having refused Iraq’s requests at least three times. 
USFPE also recognizes clearly that while Iraq believes the US will defend Kuwait 
if Iraq invades, that the US’s honor is so weakened in Iraq’s eyes due to the US’s 
retreats from Vietnam and Lebanon, as well as the US’s duplicity, that the US 
would melt away before the honorable and terrible forces IFPE possesses. This, 
USFPE realizes, is a rational interpretation of the shame, honor dynamic. USFPE 
further realizes that IFPE would not interpret Iraq’s intervention in Kuwait as 
anything more than an in-house squabble; USFPE certainly realizes the IFPE 
would not anticipate the USFPE’s reading of such events as a critical juncture in 
the post–Cold War international liberal regime. 
In light of all of these concerns, it was not Ambassador Glaspie but rather 
US Secretary of State James Baker who met with Saddam July 25, 1990. The 
position of USFPE was evidently unclear to IFPE and if there was any hope of 
making it clear, USFPE must ensure that it is clearly interpreted. USFPE has 
ensured that Baker is himself culturally competent enough to accurately interpret 
IFPE and to relay USFPE’s likely reading of any potential invasion not as an in-
house attack but as a violation of the liberal regime the US had just spent some 50 
years defending. USFPE explains this in terms of the great dishonor the US would 
face if that regime were tested and found wanting, and it becomes clear to IFPE 
that the US resolve might more similarly match its commitment in 1943 than in 
1973 or 1983. At the same time, USFPE is not sympathetic to IFPE’s demands for 
the islands. USFPE clearly views the islands to be the sovereign territory of 
Kuwait. However, USFPE also recognizes that the combination of dishonor, war 
debt, and material need that is driving IFPE to such lengths is reminiscent of 
interwar Germany and proposes pursuit of a negotiated solution that would allow 
IFPE to secure access to the Gulf. 
The meeting on July 25 is not followed by immediate buildup of forces. 
IFPE proclaims to its people that it has pushed the American aggressor into a 
corner and received concessions. USFPE is annoyed by this but understands the 
two-level honor game played by IFPE and begins to lay the groundwork for 
guaranteed Iraqi access to the Gulf. This outcome was a result of the combination 
of (1) the clear reading of the problem of dishonor faced by IFPE, (2) USFPE’s 
clearly communicated intolerance of violations of the international liberal order, 
and (3) USFPE’s willingness to engage IFPE through a cabinet official in both 
deterring aggression and promoting an alternative settlement.  
<End Counterfactual 1> 
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Case Two: US / Iraq 2003 
Résumé of What Actually Happened 
The analysis of US/Iraq 2003 begins with a brief encyclopedia narrative of the 
event: 
(2003–11) War in Iraq that consisted of two phases: a brief conflict in 2003 
between Iraq and a combined force of troops largely from the U.S. and Great 
Britain; and a subsequent U.S.-led occupation of Iraq and protracted Iraqi armed 
insurgency against it. The trade embargo and weapons-inspection process that the 
UN imposed on Iraq following the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) had partly fallen 
into abeyance by 2001. U.S. Pres. George W. Bush argued that the September 11 
attacks on the U.S. in that same year highlighted the threat to U.S. security posed 
by hostile countries such as Iraq. In November 2002 the UN issued Security 
Council Resolution 1441 demanding that Iraq readmit weapons inspectors and 
comply with all previous resolutions. Although inspectors did return to Iraq, Bush 
and Blair declared in early 2003 (despite objections by many world leaders) that 
Iraq was continuing to hinder UN inspections and that it still retained proscribed 
weapons. On March 20 the U.S. and Britain (with smaller troop contingents from 
other countries) launched a series of air attacks on Iraq, and a ground invasion 
followed. Iraqi forces were rapidly defeated, and on April 9 U.S. forces took 
control of the capital, Baghdad. British forces completed their occupation of the 
southern city of Al-Baṣrah the same day, and by May 1 the major combat 
operations of the invasion had been completed. However, the U.S. and other 
occupying forces were soon embroiled in escalating guerrilla warfare in Iraq that 
hindered Iraq’s recovery and killed thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of 
civilians. The war, long opposed by many throughout the world, also became 
increasingly unpopular in the U.S. Sectarian fighting and insurgent attacks on 
U.S. and Iraqi forces peaked in 2006 and 2007. In early 2007 the U.S. 
implemented a strategy that came to be known as the “surge”—temporarily 
increasing the number of troops in Iraq by more than 20,000 in a bid to stabilize 
the country. By the end of the year, violence had decreased substantially, although 
the role of the surge in improving security remained a source of debate. In 2008 
the U.S. began to gradually reduce the number of its troops in Iraq, completing its 
withdrawal in December 2011. (“Iraq War” 2017) 
Prior Happenings 
Much of the prior context for the U.S./Iraq conflict of 2003 grew out of the 
encounter between those two states in 1990/1991 and the following intervening years. 
According to Pauly (2005, 92), Bush’s “then ongoing rhetorical efforts to confront 
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[Saddam] over Baghdad’s WMD developmental programs and sponsorship of terrorist 
organizations” were in fact “part of a dozen-year diplomatic, economic—and, at times 
military—struggle pitting America against Iraq.” Mockaitis (2013) provides the 
following timeline: 
1991: U.S.-led coalition expels Saddam from Kuwait in Gulf War; following 
lengthy air campaign the ground war lasts fewer than 100 hours and ends in defeat 
of Iraqi forces on February 28. The United Nations (UN) later establishes a safe 
haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Iraq forced to admit UN weapons inspectors. 
1992: No-fly zone established over Southern Iraq in August. 
1995: Oil for Food Program Begins. [sic] 
1998: Saddam Hussein ends cooperation with UN weapons inspectors in October; 
U.S. bombs Iraqi weapons facilities in December [a several-day operation called 
Desert Fox] 
1998: In a letter to President Clinton, neoconservatives call upon the president to 
remove Saddam from power. Many who sign it will serve in the Bush 
administration. 
2000: In presidential debate with Vice President Al Gore, Texas governor George 
W. Bush criticizes the Clinton administration for not removing Saddam Hussein 
from power. Bush goes on to win the fall election. (Mockaitis 2013, 497) 
 
Pauly argues that Saddam had been emboldened by the Clinton administration’s 
interaction with Iraq during the 1990’s: “The half-measures Clinton did take only 
emboldened Saddam and allowed Al Qaeda to continue planning the 9/11 attacks that 
George W. Bush would have to deal with” (145). The will to depose Saddam had been 
building for years before Operation Iraqi Freedom materialized. Gardner (2010, 108–9) 
notes that in 1998 there were not one but two letters to the Clinton administration arguing 
for Saddam’s removal: the second one “zeroed in on Hussein’s supposed arsenal of 
biological and chemical weapons and his alleged past use of poison gas in the Iran–Iraq 




 Chalibi, of the Iraqi National Congress in exile, apparently influenced the two 
letters sent to the Clinton administration in 1998. Gardner reflects, in retrospect, that 
these were “a poor basis for designing a policy that went beyond profound ignorance 
about Iraqi political and cultural realities, as would become so painfully apparent in the 
months after 2003. But those had never been major considerations anyway for the 
founders of PNAC [Project for the New American Century]” who were behind those 
letters (109). 
Importantly, the view that Iraq was ripe for insurrection was not universally 
shared in the military hierarchy. In 1998, 
a warning against following this path [starting and supporting an anti-Saddam 
insurrection] came from none other than Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander of the 
US Central Command, whose writ covered the Gulf region. ‘I know of no viable 
opposition to Saddam in Iraq,’ he said. ‘Under such conditions any attempt to 
remove the Iraqi leader by force could dangerously fragment Iraq and destabilize 
the entire region.’ He added, ‘A weakened, fragmented, chaotic Iraq, which could 
happen if this isn’t done carefully, is more dangerous in the long run than a 
contained Saddam now.’ (Hiro 2002, 90) 
 
Perhaps because of concerns such as this, or perhaps because of its distraction 
with affairs at home, the William J. Clinton administration continued in its path of 
containment. However, President Clinton did sign the Iraq Liberation Act in October of 
that same year in which it was declared that 
it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a 
democratic government to replace that regime. (as quoted in Gardner 2010, 112) 
 
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration did not move this intent to action in any 
meaningful way. Gardner also notes that “from that point on things become very murky” 
regarding inspections in Iraq (112). 
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Runup to the Event 
It would be easy, but inaccurate, to assume that the runup to the Iraq War began 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda against the United States. 
Indeed, Mockaitis (2013, 497) noted that many of those who (unsuccessfully) pushed the 
Clinton administration to engage in deposing Saddam ended up serving in President 
George W. Bush’s administration. Dawisha argues that while Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMDs) ended up as the “publicly stated reason for the invasion,” instead 
it is probably more likely that from the very beginning the Bush Administration, 
or more precisely influential elements within it, made the removal of Saddam 
Husayn a central plank of the administration’s policy. According to Paul O’Neill, 
Bush’s first secretary of the treasury, it was almost immediately after the 
inauguration, that toppling Saddam became ‘topic ‘A’’ in meetings of the 
National Security Council. (Dawisha 2009, 242–43) 
 
Nonetheless, the 2001 terror attacks were certainly a turning point. Woodward (2004, 24) 
reports, “At 2:40 P.M. that day, [the day of the 9/11 terror attacks,] with dust and smoke 
filling the operations center as he was trying to figure out what had happened, Rumsfeld 
raised with his staff the possibility of going after Iraq as a response to the terrorist 
attacks.” Mockaitis (2013) traces a brief history from that day forward:48 
2001: September 11 attacks followed by invasion of Afghanistan. 
September 2002: President Bush makes the case for war at the UN based upon 
assertion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
October 2002: Congress approves war with Iraq. 
November 2002: Weapons inspectors allowed back into Iraq. 
March 7, 2003: The United States with support from the United Kingdom and 
Spain submits a resolution calling for authorization to remove Saddam Hussein by 
force. The resolution fails to gain sufficient support, and the United States 
withdraws it on March 17. 
March 18, 2003: The United States announces that it has formed a coalition of 30 
countries willing to participate in a war with Iraq, although not all provide 
 
48 Mockaitis’s brief overview omits the political wrangling within the W. Bush administration. Both 
Woodward and Gardner provide an in-depth look at those processes. 
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military forces. The United States and the United Kingdom will provide most of 
the troops. (Mockaitis 2013, 497–98) 
 
There were certainly voices of caution in the runup to the war. For example, 
RAND senior defense analyst Ochmanek warned, 
If something like the conflict outlined here does occur and the United States and 
its allies succeed in defeating the Iraqi armed forces, deposing Saddam and his 
regime, and occupying all of Iraq, success in the true endgame – providing a 
secure environment for the remaking of the political system and culture of Iraq – 
cannot simply be assumed. The emergence of tribally-based or ethnically-based 
insurgent or terrorist groups unreconciled to the post-Saddam order cannot be 
ruled out, particularly if the regime in Iran chose to sponsor and harbour such 
groups. In any case, the state of social science (if it can be called that) is such that 
we have only the most general notions of how to proceed in a project of this 
magnitude. It is very difficult to estimate the level of resources called for, other 
than to recognize that the demands will be big and that the work would go on for 
perhaps a generation or longer. Whether this administration or the international 
community are up to the challenge is unclear, though recent experience with the 
‘stability phase’ and post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan is thus far not 
encouraging. (Ochmanek 2003, 54) 
 
However, the Bush administration built what it apparently believed to be a 
compelling moral case for the war. Pauly (2005, 1) observes that “Bush drew parallels to 
past American conflicts with opponents of freedom across the globe” and emphasized the 
benefits of promoting free society. One of the important components of this case was the 
doctrine of preemption, which Bush advanced in his administration’s National Security 
Strategy (NSS) one year after the 9/11 attacks and which represented a notable shift away 
from the Cold War doctrine of containment (Pauly and Lansford 2005, 41). This included 
several notable commitments: 
We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the 
peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the 





Additionally, the NSS included the following important phrase: “The United States will . 
. . prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of 
mass destruction” (United States 2002, 7). Pauly and Lansford (2005, 47) observe that 
taken together with the rest of the NSS, this pledge was presented not as “a rash reaction 
to the 9/11 assaults, but as a comprehensive blueprint that takes into account the 
successes and failures of [Bush’s] predecessors in the white house over the past half-
century.” The NSS provided a framework the Bush Administration could use to make 
sense of the situation with Iraq and to measure appropriate interventions according to the 
new commitments. Together, this provided a basis for the “move from reactive 
diplomacy to proactive, preventative policies” (69). 
While many nations apparently misunderstood that Bush’s commitment to the war 
against terrorism extended beyond Afghanistan, “in reality Bush meant every word . . . 
and fully intended that the campaign in Afghanistan would only be the opening front in 
the war on terror” (Pauly and Lansford 2005, 70). What the Bush Administration needed 
were morally acceptable targets for the next stage of the War on Terror, and Iraq, as 
interpreted by the United States, seemed to fit the bill perfectly. In considering “truth” as 
released by the Bush Administration, Yaphe observed USFPE’s view prior to the war: 
Saddam is evil. He is responsible for the death and destruction of Iraq as well as 
wreaking havoc on neighbouring Iran and Kuwait. He used chemical weapons on 
his own people and on Iranians during their 8-year war in the 1980s. He has 
allowed war, economic sanctions imposed by the UN, and a cruel government-
controlled system of wage and price controls and monopolies to reward friends 
and family while destroying Iraq’s once-burgeoning middle class and making all 
Iraqis more dependent on him for their well-being. He sponsors international 
terrorist groups, giving them training, safe haven, weapons and operational 
assistance. . . . Saddam is a danger to Iraqis, to the neighbourhood, to Israel and, 
existentially, to us. The only solution is regime change and its replacement by a 




It seems that USFPE had constructed a world in which, “for Washington, the choices are 
few: impose sanctions on [Saddam], ignore him, accept him as the ultimate survivor, 
eliminate him, or pray someone else will” (Yaphe 2003, 28). Of course this contrasted 
sharply with IFPE’s own view: 
Saddam’s position is that Iraq does not have a WMD capacity so all sanctions 
have to end now. His strategy of a diplomatic offensive resulted in the Arab 
summit’s Beirut declaration in March 2002, which protested against an American 
attack on Iraq, called for an end to sanctions, and embraced Iraq as a reinstated 
member of the Arab fold. (Yaphe 2003, 28) 
 
There are questions of whether and how important WMDs actually were to the 
case to go to war. Gardner observes that UN WMD inspector Blix 
would later admit that while he, like many others, had actually believed at one 
time that Saddam Hussein had WMD, in the middle of the [2003] inspection 
process he became convinced that they did not exist, and that the momentum 
whipped up by the United States had produced a ‘witch hunt.’ (Gardner 2010, 
162) 
 
Indeed, the WMDs certainly were part of USFPE’s strategy to convince the world of the 
legitimacy of its operations: 
The publicly stated reason for the invasion was Saddam’s possession of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMDs) and his links with international Islamist terrorists. 
On February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United 
Nations Security Council that Saddam was manufacturing WMDs, which, given 
his terrorist associations and his hatred of the United States, constituted a grave 
danger to the American people. (Dawisha 2009, 242–43) 
 
Interestingly, despite Ochmanek’s warnings and reflections on Afghanistan in the 
same volume, Yaphe (2003, 36) expected that eventually Iraqis “probably will welcome 
the US once they are sure Saddam and sons are gone.” Still, in the runup to the war she 
did observe the path forward would not be easy: 
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What they may not welcome is an imposed solution with a government hand-
picked by Washington, and they will not welcome a foreign military presence that 
overstays its welcome. Iraqis in the military and the civil government and 
members of prominent tribes, clans and factions, all of whom have long been 
encouraged to overthrow Saddam’s regime, may choose to stay home and wait 
out the war. They will want assurance that the old regime is really dead and that 
the US will stay to help establish a new government. Most Iraqis probably will 
not welcome ‘outsiders’ – meaning the Iraqis of the diaspora – taking over power 
and authority, and most probably will not be reassured if we turn the reins of 
government over to prominent tribal, military or party leaders who abandon the 
regime in the last minute to join US efforts and then demand reward for their 
sacrifice and risk. The opportunity to create a pluralistic political system, 
representative government and democratic institutions is a powerful incentive that 
could be placed in jeopardy by turning government over too quickly to the 
‘wrong’ Iraqis. (Yaphe 2003, 36–37) 
The Event Itself 
In terms of the official War itself, the event was again relatively short in duration. 
Unlike the broad coalition developed by H. W. Bush in the runup to the 1990/1991 
United States/Iraq conflict, the W. Bush administration engaged in a form of selective 
multilateralism that gave the United States broad freedom of movement (Pauly and 
Lansford 2005, 6). The latter Bush’s coalition goals were more focused on building an 
infrastructure to combat global terrorism than on the military operations that would come 
to be known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (7). The United States repeated its Afghan 
model in which US Forces “undertook the majority of the combat operations and 
coalition forces moved in during the aftermath to provide the range of security missions 
that they had demonstrated significant capability for through missions in the Balkans and 
ongoing operations in Afghanistan” (87–88). 
For an outline of the major developments of the war, Mockaitis is again helpful 
here:  
March 19, 2003: President Bush addresses the American people to announce the 
start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
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March 21, 2003: Intense air campaign dubbed ‘shock and awe’ begins. 
April 8, 2003: U.S. forces take Baghdad. 
May 1, 2003: President Bush lands on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln 
and declares ‘mission accomplished’ and end to conventional hostilities. 
May 11, 2003: L. Paul (“Jerry”) Bremer becomes head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority. (Mockaitis 2013, 498) 
Importantly, although the military operation successfully deposed Saddam, the 
US did not find WMDs in the War. Dawisha (2009, 242–43) observes that this “failure to 
find the WMDs and to establish credible Iraqi links with the Islamist terrorist 
organization, al-Qa-ida, seriously undermined the legitimacy of American claims.” 
Short-Term Responses 
In considering the short-term responses, the IFPE becomes temporarily irrelevant, 
as it is has been dissolved. However, Iraqi society begins to emerge as a major player, in 
part as a reaction to moves made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). These 
excerpts from Mockaitis describe the progression: 
May 16, 2003: Bremer promulgates Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
General Order No. 1: De Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, which removes all 
former Baath party members above a certain level from government offices 
exacerbating already severe unemployment. . . .  
May 23, 2003: Bremer promulgates CPA General Order No. 2: Dissolution of 
Entities, disbanding the Iraqi military without pay and further aggregating 
unemployment and contributing to the bitterness that fueled the insurgency. […] 
July 22, 2003: Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, are killed in a gun 
battle with coalition forces. 
August 7, 2003: Jordanian Embassy bombing indicates growing insurgency. […] 
August 19, 2003: UN headquarters bombing kills Special Envoy Sergio Vera di 
Milo.  
August 29, 2003: Najaf bombing kills 124, including Shia cleric Ayatollah 
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. 
October 27, 2003: Baghdad bombings signal start of Ramadan Offensive. 
December 13, 2003: Saddam Hussein captured by U.S. forces in Tikrit. 
(Mockaitis 2013, 498) 
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These early bombings mark a turning point away from the focus on deposing 
Saddam. The killing of his sons and his capture in December 2003 did not stabilize Iraq. 
Instead, bombings and battles increased. March 31, 2004 marked, a major escalation as 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq mounts a wave of suicide bombings, striking against Shiite holy 
sites in Baghdad and Karbala. The attacks kill hundreds, stoking sectarian 
resentment. In Fallujah, meanwhile, four U.S. contractors are killed, burned, and 
hung from a bridge, with video of the slaughter beamed around the world. 
(Council on Foreign Relations n.d.) 
 
What became clear in the year after “the end of conventional hostilities” was that the war 
was far from over. Given that “the maintenance of security is central to any nation 
building project” (Pauly and Lansford 2005, 134), the significant uptick in insecurity 
significantly undercut the United States’ stabilization, rebuilding, and transition efforts. 
This was particularly unfortunate for Bush’s intent to engage in “wider economic and 
political transformation of the broader Arab and Islamic worlds,” the first step of which 
Bush acknowledged was the nation-building effort in Iraq (Pauly 2005, 1). Dawisha 
explains how the significantly disruptive resistance came about: 
The minority Sunnis, who, as we have seen, had ruled Iraq since the formation of 
the state in 1921, seemed unable to accept the inevitable loss of their status and 
the eclipse of their political fortunes. The area north and west of Baghdad, which 
had staffed much of Saddam’s military apparatus and secret police, quickly 
became the center of resistance to the American occupation. (Dawisha 2009, 244) 
 
Further emboldened by a flow of jihadist infiltrators from other countries, the insurgency 
quickly took on religious meaning. 
Longer-Term Responses 
From August 2003 to December 2011, there were at least 24 separate bombing 
attacks (many of which involved multiple bombs) (Mockaitis 2013). There were multiple 
battles, some of which were major. The U.S. forces swelled to a peak of 170,000 troops 
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in Iraq in October 2007 – more than four years after the end of conventional hostilities. 
Eventually, early elements of the CPA’s work were reconsidered, as in 2008 when “a 
new law reverses elements of the 2003 ‘de-Baathification’ policy and allows some to 
return to government” (Council on Foreign Relations n.d.). The war ended December 15, 
2011, which was the “official end to war as remaining U.S. forces leave Iraq after failure 
to reach a status of forces agreement that would have allowed some troops to remain” 
(Mockaitis 2013, 501). However, the fruits of the disruption caused by the war in Iraq 
were still maturing. By 2013, Al-Qaeda in Iraq had been succeeded by a new threat: the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had begun to emerge (Stern and Berger 2016), 
giving birth to a new pseudo-state and a new and expansive conflict: 
ISIS is not al Qaeda. It is not an outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist 
organization, nor does it represent the next phase in its evolution. . . . ISIS is its 
successor. ISIS represents the post-al Qaeda jihadist threat. . . . If ISIS is purely 
and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. (Cronin 
2015, 125–26) 
 
While ISIS has, after an awful reign of terror, been meaningfully disrupted for the 
present, the long-term consequences of the Iraq War are still unfolding. 
The Role of Culture 
There are many elements of this dyadic relationship that may be best explained 
through neoclassical realism or one of the other traditional IR paradigms. However, there 




Critical Decisions or Interpretations that May Be of Importance 
Honor 
One of the more confusing elements of the WMD debacle was that while Saddam 
apparently did destroy the WMDs, he continued to give the impression that he had them. 
This caused major problems from the United States’ perspective, given the understanding 
that “the greatest danger to American interests in the post-9/11 era is the acquisition of 
WMD by terrorist groups” (Pauly 2005, 145). The United States was primed to believe 
that Iraq would have WMDs. After all, 
Saddam’s past behavior led to an understandable belief on behalf of Bush and his 
advisors that Iraq had the potential to present precisely that type of threat in 2002–
03. In particular, Saddam’s repeated violations of UN resolutions designed to 
curtail his WMD development programs, his proven willingness to use such 
munitions against his domestic and international adversaries, and his support for 
terrorist organizations rendered Iraq a legitimate target for regime change. (Pauly 
2005, 146) 
 
Furthermore, “in light of Saddam’s past behavior, it would have been imprudent 
to assume that he was at all likely to refrain” from such pursuits (Pauly 2005, 147–48). 
Yet as it turns out, Saddam apparently did not have WMDs at the time the war was 
executed. Pollack explains the disjuncture between perception and reality: 
If he was going to get the sanctions lifted altogether, he had to dispense with his 
WMD altogether. Yet in typically inexplicable fashion, Saddam also remained 
determined to persuade his own people and, secondarily the Iranians, that he had 
retained a covert WMD capability to deter either from trying to move against him. 
 Saddam convinced himself that these two contradictory approaches to 
WMD could be kept from undercutting each other. Like so many of Saddam’s 
delusional assumptions, this proved entirely incorrect. Although the inspectors 
were unable to find more evidence of Iraqi covert programs, they continued to 
hear from countless Iraqis that Saddam had retained such programs—because 
Saddam was deliberately feeding those (false) rumors to deter internal and 
external threats. The conclusion that the intelligence communities of the United 
States, Europe, and the Middle East (particularly Iran and Israel) unanimously 
reached was that the inspectors were no longer finding evidence of covert Iraqi 
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WMD programs because the Iraqis had simply learned how to conceal them more 
effectively. (Pollack 2013, 10) 
 
One reasonable cultural explanation for this apparently contradictory behavior has to do 
with the honor, shame / guilt, innocence continuum. 
From a guilt, innocence perspective, there are few rational explanations for 
Saddam’s contradictory behavior. One such possibility is an intentional (realist) use of 
uncertainty in managing risk. However, this approach necessarily undercut the real gain 
that would come from having sanctions removed and from discounting the US claim of 
WMDs, which had been vocalized at least as early as 1998. In general, a guilt, innocence 
approach will emphasize actual performance of standards; Saddam did not emphasize 
this. Instead, he appears to have acted in a way more consistent with an emphasis on 
shame, honor. To publicly acquiesce to the demands of un-respected or hated enemies 
(such as the US) would involve a major loss of face not only for Saddam and by 
extension for all of Iraq. Thus, private performance with public non-performance of the 
requirements for the lifting of sanctions is entirely rational and understandable from a 
shame, honor perspective. Combined with realist incentives for nearby adversaries to be 
left uncertain, shame/honor may explain this behavior that Pollack finds no difficult to 
justify. 
Doing Right (Innocence) 
One of the critical issues facing USFPE has to do with its self-perception as a 
nation that does right, which fits with the guilt and innocence attributes of US Culture. 
For example, in defending a potential military strike against Iraq during the fervor in 
1998, Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued, 
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What we are doing is so that you all can sleep at night. I am very proud of what 
we are doing. We are the greatest nation in the world [here she was interrupted by 
applause] . . . and what we are doing is being the indispensable nation, willing to 
make the world safe for our children and grandchildren, and for nations who 
follow the rules. [emphasis added] (as quoted in Gardner 2010, 111) 
 
Indeed, according to Gardner, US Vice President Cheney apparently believed that 
“invading American forces would be welcomed as liberators” (163). That a similar 
miscalculation was made by the US regarding Canada in the War of 1812 suggests that 
this may indeed be a persistent American trait. Cheney went so far as to say that the US’s 
firm hand would calm things down in that part of the world and that “people who are 
moderate, people who want to believe in the United States, and want to support us, will 
be willing to stand up, because the United States is going to stand with them and not pull 
back and disappear when the going gets tough” (as quoted in Gardner 2010, 163). 
This communication is certainly consistent with the American cultural pattern 
observed in the US culture profile, particularly that “Americans generally believe that 
theirs is a superior country, probably the greatest country in the world” (Althen 2003, 
xxix). This communication also echoes, as well as Hastedt’s (2015, 58) observations of 
the ideas that “America as God’s ‘chosen nation’”, that “America has a special mission or 
calling to transform the world”, that “the United States is engaged in a struggle against 
evil”, and the prevalence of an “apocalyptic outlook on world affairs.” It is entirely 
reasonable that if such cultural patterns are held by Americans that this would influence 
USFPE’s calculations. 
Optimism/Future Orientation 
Another US American cultural feature which certainly influenced the preparation 
for and conduct of the war is the general US view of an optimistic future (Saphiere 2015, 
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101). Whereas Iraqi focus on the past would have spoke the need for deep caution, US 
optimistic focus on the near future saw no such limits. Consider US President Bush, who 
is quoted in Gardner as saying before the war, “We can win without destruction. We are 
already working on the post–Saddam Iraq, and I think there’s a basis for a better future. 
Iraq has a good bureaucracy and a relatively strong civil society. It could be organized as 
a federation” (Gardner 2010, 158–59). 
Spanish Prime Minister Aznar expressed precisely this concern of optimism to 
Bush: “‘The only thing that worries me about you is your optimism.’ Bush replied, ‘I am 
optimistic, because I believe that I am in the right. I am at peace with myself.’”(Gardner 
2010, 160–61). Thus, the USFPE demonstrated both the optimistic and (near) future 
orientations as well as the belief in US American rightness, and when mixed together, 
these could be very potent indeed. This also led, apparently, to the lack of planning 
regarding the themes of building a new Iraqi system: “Perhaps the illusion of such victory 
by decapitation was responsible for the absence of serious thought (in the White House) 
concerning how to go about decontaminating the Iraqi army and ministries” (Gardner 
2010, 167). This optimism and sense of rightness also may have led to the condition 
decried by Baer in which “Chalabi was scamming the U.S. because the U.S. wanted to be 
scammed” (as quoted in Gardner 2010, 206). And in fact, even relatively early 
assessments of the prosecution of the war effort, such as this by Pauly, acknowledged 
“the Bush administration itself initially underestimated the daunting nature of many of 




Comprehending the meaning of Iraqi Identity 
A fourth cultural factor that should be considered relates the considerable 
underestimation by USFPE of the risk of sectarian violence. As and almost immediately 
after the war commenced, articles came out explaining the difficulties that were starting 
to be faced regarding the insurgency (see, for examples, the following: Marr 2003; 
Nakash 2003; Hashim 2003; Nasr 2004).49 The lack of understanding of Iraqi Identity is 
complicated to place as specific cultural continua. While it connects to the frameworks 
considered in Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning, 
there is a more useful way to understand this misfire, and it has to do with the 
intercultural competence model outlined in Chapter Two: Literature Review. In the first 
three stages of the DMIS/IDC, it is not possible to accurately construe the experience of 
the cultural other. Similarly, it is very difficult to comprehend the extent to which one’s 
own experience is itself cultural. Thus, those elements of the human experience which 
have not been meaningfully encountered in one’s own culture are not likely to be 
perceived in the experience of another. In USFPE’s (dominant) culture, tribal differences 
are routinely downplayed in favor of national identity. Iraq was entirely different in this 
regard. 
Dawisha reports that Saddam had actively worked to build an Iraqi identity: 
Without intimating a necessary abandonment of the Arab identity, Saddam was 
signaling a new direction in promoting and nurturing an Iraqi identity. To this 
end, words would be backed by deeds. The regime embarked on a political and 
cultural program designed to create a continuous link between modern Iraq and 
the ancient civilizations that had resided in the same land. . . . The effort at 
 
49 This author talked with Nasr in 2008 about whether the US could have anticipated the sectarian violence 
that would follow deposing Saddam. Nasr echoed Baer’s comment that the USFPE did not want to know 
about such risks, and thus, while such knowledge would have been available, it was not sought out or 
integrated into planning. 
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identity reformulation was not just some infatuation with the country’s unrivaled 
ancient civilizations. It served a clear political purpose. . . . This early penchant 
for unilaterally formulating identity would repeat itself more assertively and 
frequently in later years. From the beginning of the Iraq–Iran war in 1980, 
through the Kuwaiti crisis and sanctions regime of the 1990s, until the end of the 
Saddamist era, the issue of identity in Iraq would simply become a ploy to serve 
the President’s political needs, particularly as he would marshal all the state’s 
totalitarian agencies of cultural production and information dissemination in an 
effort to penetrate the consciousness of Iraqis and shape their conception of who 
they are. (Dawisha 2009, 232–33) 
Core and fundamental concepts, such as notions of identity, which 
analysts usually treat as independent variables were thus transformed by Saddam 
into dependent variables, used to serve the paramount interests of the state, which 
in actuality meant his own interests, since to Saddam the two sets of interests 
were coterminous. (Dawisha 2009, 233) 
After the 1991 loss and revolts, Saddam began to emphasize solidarity 
more: “He would declare in major gatherings and under the full glare of television 
lights that tribes represented ‘all of the Iraqi people [and] all of the nation’s 
principles.’ Indeed the Iraqi state was an extension of the tribes in the way both 
cherished certain values and traditions and rejected others. The people of Iraq, 
Saddam would affirm, had become ‘a single tribe.’ Even the virulently anti-tribal 
Ba’th Party would be characterized by the ever more eager president as ‘the tribe 
encompassing all tribes.’” (Dawisha 2009, 237) 
 
This active reconstruction of national identity vis-à-vis ethnic and tribal divisions 
has not been part of the conscious lived experience of majority-culture US Americans. 
This has in part to do with US American individualism and egalitarianism, both of which 
downplays such affiliations anyway. Majority culture US Americans are accustomed to a 
“melting pot” identity in which superficial differences are celebrated and deep group-
level differences are largely forgotten or suppressed in favor of a national identity based 
on the (relatively recent) history and borders of the state. The contrast with Iraq was 
intense: 
Saddam Husain was not calling upon Iraqis to rally around their state in the name 
of some sense of territorial identity that he thought they shared regarding the 
borders of Iraq. Of all people, he was most acutely aware that Iraqi nationalism, to 
the extent that it existed in modern times, was entirely a product of the hated 
ancient regime between 1941 and 1958. (Makiya 1998, 122) 
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Thus, it was that Saddam had become, as Dawisha described above, the primary carrier 
of Iraqi national identity. This has not traditionally been an American way of 
understanding national identity and in 2003 was so foreign that it could have been 
meaningfully construed by the USFPE if it was operating in any of the first three 
(ethnocentric) stages of the DMIS / IDC. 
Counterfactual Narrative 
Any of the four issues listed in the previous sub-section could be considered in the 
counterfactual narrative. However, one of the difficulties in a counterfactual is to identify 
a particular critical juncture. A strong case could be made for analyzing the issue of Iraqi 
identity, and a critical juncture could be found in Bremer’s April 2003 CPA decisions 
that disaffected so many Iraqis. However, there is another more subtle critical juncture 
that involves the cultural self-awareness that arises in the later stages of the IDC/DMIS. 
Because intercultural competence, especially adaptive frame-shifting, is not only focused 
on other cultures but also on a reflexive understanding of one’s own culture, it seems a 
useful angle attack for building this counterfactual narrative. The counterfactual 
introduces one plausible change: the US President functioned from an adaptation 
perspective of intercultural competence when receiving Prime Minister Azner’s feedback. 
<Factual Introduction50> 
By February 22, 2003, the runup to Operation Iraqi Freedom was well underway. 
The US was about to introduce a resolution to the UNSC that would authorize 
intervention in Iraq, and President George W. Bush was aggressively courting 
support for other leaders of states. On the twenty-second, he met with Spanish 
Prime Minister José Maria Aznar. As Bush described his plans, Aznar pushed 
several times on the need for a significant support from enough countries that the 
plans in Iraq would be authorized and successful. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice planned for UN WMD inspector Blix’s anticipated report and expected that 
while it would be mixed, it would be more negative than previous such reports. 
 
50 Drawn from Gardner (2010, 157–61) 
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Bush reiterated his short timeline to get started and his unwillingness to wait for 
others to get on board. Finally, Aznar expressed a nagging concern to Bush: “The 
only thing that worries me about you is your optimism.”51 
<Begin Counterfactual 2> 
Although Bush was put off by Aznar’s expression of concern, he also recognized 
something familiar in the question of over-optimism. He responded to Aznar with 
only slightly dampened enthusiasm and expressed in no uncertain terms that he 
believed himself to be in the right. This also struck him as somehow 
uncomfortably familiar, but he could not place it right away. 
 
Over the next few days, despite the busyness of preparing for war, Aznar’s 
comments kept turning over in Bush’s mind until he realized why they were 
familiar: Whether he meant to or not, Aznar was not just describing Bush as 
overoptimistic but had hit on an element of American culture that Bush had once 
assumed was just the mark of good leaders everywhere – the belief that 
everything would work out if one has good intentions. Bush was not uncertain 
about his intentions. But he remembered that, in fact, there had had been 
respected and successful leaders from other cultures throughout history that did 
not share his own culture’s sense of optimism. And, in a bit of painful self-
reflection, his honest assessment was that not everything had worked out for the 
US in the past – even with intentions that he believed were honorable. He 
considered the fight against communism in Korea and Vietnam – fights that he 
believed in but for which US optimism had ultimately failed to carry the day. 
Bush also realized that if in fact his optimism was a cultural feature, then his aides 
might not meaningfully contradict this; it might take someone from another 
culture – perhaps one with more fatalism – to draw attention to it. 
 
None of this was enough to cause a change of course – the die was cast and for 
Bush, war was inevitable at this point. But after the unexpectedly disaffirming 
WMD report came back from Blix on March 7, and after significant players in the 
international community and the UNSC in particular failed to rally around his 
plans, Bush began to seriously wonder whether his optimism was at least partly 
misplaced. Thus, in the 12 weeks between the disappointing Blix report and the 
beginning of the war, Bush implemented an optimism-counterbalance strategy. 
He was certain that US military success was assured. But he realized that they 
really did not have a plan for “what’s next.” So, he directed the creation of not 
one but three new red teams to game out what might go wrong after the swift 
military victory he was certain of. One of these brought in culture experts who 
warned of the identity challenges that would impact governance.52 
 
51 Quotation from Gardner 2010, 160 
52 Authors include those such as Hiro (2002) and Nasr (see Nasr 2004 for a related work). Very interesting 
is Marr (2003, 21), who actually published the following in winter 2003: “First, while any change must 
replace Saddam Husayn and his entire extended family, as well as the secret police and the top of the 




None of these findings reached Bush, but they did reach Paul Bremer. By the time 
he took office in the CPA in April, he had gathered a small cadre of religious and 
cultural identity experts. These consultants, while very concerned about Ba’th 
loyalists, were equally or more concerned by the potential loss of unified identity 
that Saddam’s deposing would bring about. Among other things, they helped him 
create a graduated system of de-Baathification that avoided the appearance of 
punishing Sunnis. They implemented a plan of “wide-ranging investigations 
aimed at human rights violators and active Saddamists among Party members and 
military officers before dismissing them without imbursement”53 and so avoided 
adding insult to injury and injury to insult that would come from mass dismissals 
of the already wounded Sunni minority on its way out of power. 
 
All of this took place too far from Bush’s view to impact him directly. However, 
moving more cautiously, he avoided any bold public proclamation of victory until 
the new Iraqi constitution was ratified. 
 
<End Counterfactual 2> 
 
Case Three: US / Russia Following 9/11 
Résumé of What Actually Happened 
In the third case, the United States and Russia following 9/11 is presented as a 
“most different” case after the first two “most similar” systems presented in cases one 
and two. Particularly, this case is different in that it involves a different dyad (while 
retaining one dyadic actor: the US), which has a totally different history than the US / 
Iraq dyad. Additionally, this case did not result in open militarized conflict between the 
states. Finally, this case unfolded gradually and does not have the same type of narrow 
 
indeed, without a serious outbreak of retribution? In the military as well, much of the clan network may 
remain, particularly if new leadership emerges from the military. Second, if new political leadership 
emerges as a result of a coup or a struggle within the regime, will another clan or tribal group replace the 
Albu Nasir? How much of the clan system will persist? Above all, how can the kin/clan network be 
replaced with more modern institutions, open to all, and less dependent on personal loyalty and ties? 
Whatever leadership comes to power, the clan system, now deeply imbedded in key structures, will have to 
be dealt with.” 
53 Dawisha (2009, 244) argues that this is what should have happened instead of Bremer’s “major blunders” 
described in the résumé of what actually happened. 
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punctuated time scale as the first two cases. A brief encyclopedia narrative of the event 
frames (perhaps unevenly) the relationship under consideration: 
The 9/11 attacks shattered Western concepts of security and conflict and 
expanded NATO’s new mission of projecting security. When Putin offered his 
assistance, we effectively responded “no thanks,” thinking in particular of his 
bloody, ongoing, scorched-earth war against the Chechens. We did it for the right 
reasons. Nonetheless, it infuriated Putin. This was the last moment when any real 
rapprochement with Putin’s Russia was possible. (McKew 2017, 6)54 
 
In order to explore whether McKew’s characterization is accurate, it is useful to consider 
the relationship between the US and Russia before 9/11 as well as during the attempted 
rapprochement, along with what led to its failure. 
Prior Happenings 
After WWII, in which the United States and Russia/Soviet Union collaborated 
against Nazi Germany, U.S.–Russia relations were consumed by Cold War tensions until 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 1990s involved a couple of attempts at 
resetting relations between the United States and Russia, the first between H. W. Bush 
and Yeltsin and the second between Clinton and Yeltsin. Neither of these were very 
effective, given in part the immensity of the transition facing post–Soviet Russia (Stent 
2015). 
Runup to the Event 
When George W. Bush assumed the office of US President, the initial relationship 
between him and Putin, the new leader of Russia, did not start on a better footing: 
George W. Bush came to office as the first US president in post–World War II 
history without a Russia policy and critical of the Clinton administration for 
having one described, by Condoleezza Rice, his senior foreign policy advisor, as 
 
54 It should be acknowledged that McKew is a registered agent for the nation of Georgia, which 
undoubtedly influences this framing. 
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too ready to accommodate the Russians, too personalized, and too given to ‘happy 
talk.’ (Legvold 2016, 102) 
 
For his part, 
Putin had come into office determined to reverse the humiliating decade of the 
1990s, guarantee Russia’s territorial integrity and restore Russia’s role as a great 
power—a velikaia derzhava—that could reclaim its rightful place in the world. 
This involved, among other things, reasserting influence in the post-Soviet space 
and reaffirming the importance in international decision making of the United 
Nations, particularly the Security Council. It also entailed preserving as much as 
possible of the Cold War–era bilateral arms control structures with the United 
States, because these guaranteed Russia’s status as a major power. (Stent 2015, 
52–53) 
 
Despite these significant differences between the leaders and their states goals, the 
initial meeting between Bush and Putin raised the prospects for good relations between 
them and their states. After their first meeting 
Bush described Putin as “an honest, straightforward man who loves his country. 
He loves his family. We share a lot of values. I view him as a remarkable leader.” 
And then came the fateful phrase that was to haunt Bush for the rest of his 
presidency. In response to a question about whether he could trust Putin, Bush 
said “I looked the man in the eye. I found him very straightforward and 
trustworthy—I was able to get a sense of his soul.” (Stent 2015, 62) 
 
Bush’s praise of Putin did not sit well with everyone. National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice expressed discomfort with Bush’s statement (“this is going to be a 
problem” [as quoted in Stent 2015, 62]) as did McFaul (2018, 64), who characterized of 
Bush’s praise of Putin as “a rookie mistake.” Bush essentially stood by this idea, 
however:  
Bush gave an assessment of Putin that revealed his understanding of where the 
Russian leader stood: “I found a man who realizes his future lies with the West, 
not the East, that we share common security concerns, particularly Islamic 
fundamentalism, that he understands missiles could affect him just as much as 
us.” Then Bush, with a clear diagnosis, went to the heart of the matter. “On the 




McFaul, reflecting on the early relationship between Putin and Bush, observes, 
Years later, during Obama’s first encounter with Putin in July 2009, I listened to 
the Russian leader fondly describe his relationship with Bush. I think Putin 
genuinely grew to like the American president after several years in office; their 
closeness, however, did little to reduce the policy differences between our two 
countries. (McFaul 2018, 64) 
 
Putin had also warned Bush of the threat of Islamic terrorism on multiple occasions prior 
to the 9/11 attacks, including two days before the attacks on September 9, 2001 (Stent 
2015, 62). 
The Event Itself 
Putin was among the first world leaders to reach out to Bush after the 9/11 attacks 
(McFaul 2018). Putin told him, “Good will triumph over evil. I want you to know that in 
this struggle, we will stand together” (Stent 2015, 64). Putin also immediately started 
moving to action, demonstrating that “we will stand together” was not a mere expression 
of solidarity but an intention to act: “On television on 24 September, Putin then offered 
Russian cooperation, intelligence and airspace for humanitarian aid in the operation 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He also volunteered to coordinate with Central Asian 
states ready to give their airspace” (Buckley 2004, 223). McFaul reflects on the way in 
which the 9/11 attacks presented a watershed moment: 
Tragedy—September 11, 2001—abruptly altered the dynamics of U.S.–Russia 
relations. In the wake of this horrible terrorist attack, American and Russian 
leaders forgot about their differences seemingly overnight, and pledged to join 
together to fight a common enemy. . . . Bush divided the world into those against 
us and those with us, and Russia fell clearly in the latter camp. For a while, it 
appeared that the United States and Russia had entered a new, more cooperative 
period in bilateral relations. (McFaul 2018, 64–65) 
 




What was a national tragedy of immense proportions in the United States was 
seen in Russia as an opportunity to mend relations with the United States. Indeed, 
the Kremlin took the initiative. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Putin offered 
Russia as a strategic partner in the war on terror. At that point he believed that 
Russia’s future prosperity and status would be enhanced by greater economic 
integration with the West and cooperation with the United States. (Stent 2015, 50) 
 
Thus, the USFPE and RFPE suddenly found themselves in sudden, and even startling, 
rapprochement. 
Short-Term Responses 
This reset was far from being only symbolic. There were real commitments and 
costs that RFPE tolerated as it engaged the reset with USFPE after 9/11: 
• Putin’s swift and firm support following 9/11 
• Russia’s quiet retreat after the US left the ABM treaty in December 2001 
• Assistance against the Taliban in Afghanistan 
• Redevelopment of the NATO–Russia relationship 
• (Eventually) signing off on military bases for the US and its allies in Central Asia 
• Putin’s praise of collaboration with the US as in Russian interest (Legvold 2016, 
102) 
Both USFPE and RFPE also verbalized the importance of the new way of relating. For 
example, 
before heading to Bush’s Crawford ranch in November 2001, [Putin] 
enthusiastically reported that “today we are already prepared to seek solutions in 
all areas of our joint activities. We are willing to dismantle, once and for all, the 
legacy of the Cold War and begin fashioning a strategic partnership for the long-
term.” (Legvold 2016, 103) 
 
For his part, 
Bush was equally effusive about Putin. At a G-8 summit in Canada in June 2002, 
Bush praised Putin as ‘a stalwart in the fight against terror . . . He understands 
what I understand, that there won’t be peace if terrorists are allowed to kill and 
take innocent life. And, therefore, I view President Putin as an ally, [a] strong ally 




The significance of the word “ally” was not lost on McFaul, who observed that he was 
not aware if any US president used it in reference to Russia since WWII. 
Naturally, the reset enjoyed by USFPE and RFPE during this time did not erase 
the ongoing and underlying differences between the two countries. Bush, in particular, 
seemed to be quick to “test the strength of this new relationship” (McFaul 2018, 65). 
McFaul’s judgment is that Bush “genuinely wanted to work closely with Putin on 
fighting terrorism, but not at the expense of other national security priorities” (65). 
Legvold observes that even during the high times of collaboration and cooperation, 
neither USFPE nor RFPE 
understood the potential damaging force from the underlayment of misgivings and 
mistrust that had been building since the mid-1990s, and which neither they nor 
their predecessors had addressed, doubtless because none recognized what was 
forming at the deeper level. (Legvold 2016, 103) 
 
One example of the type of issues likely to emerge was the missile defense system 
the US wanted. At the time, “Putin’s response was muted” (McFaul 2018, 65). Later on, 
“By the end of the Bush administration, missile defense would emerge as a major issue of 
contention between the United States and Russia” (65). McFaul observes that it was not 
made an issue in 2001 because “Putin was trying hard to nurture closer ties with 
America” (65). In fact, “Putin’s foreign minister Igor Ivanov, went so far as to compare 
the new level of cooperation to the alliance between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during World War II” (65). McFaul, employing the benefits of hindsight, reflects, 
I shared the optimism of the moment and applauded the new cooperation between 
Russia and the United States. But, worried that Putin did not share our democratic 
values, I also saw the need for caution. If Putin continued to push Russia in a 
more autocratic direction, I believed that our two countries would clash again. 
Throughout American history, our deepest and most reliable allies have been 
democracies. Conversely, our adversaries have been dictatorships. The Unites 
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States has occasionally worked closely with autocracies on mutual security 
interests, but those relationships never endured, either because autocrats changed 
their minds, or because they fell from power. In Russia’s case, I was worried 
about the former. (McFaul 2018, 66) 
 
Such concerns were warranted, though the breakdown did not start with Russia’s 
autocratic drift. Another telling tension point was the 2002 NATO expansion. Although it 
frustrated RFPE, and was later cited by Putin as an issue of contention, “in 2002, 
however, just a year after September 11, Putin remained committed to working with the 
United States. U.S.–Russia relations were strained but not broken by this latest wave of 
NATO expansion” (McFaul 2018, 66–67). 
Longer-Term Responses 
By 2007, the partnership between the United States and Russia had been 
thoroughly rent; “The U.S.–Russian relationship returned to a more familiar pattern of a 
selective partnership characterized by incremental improvements on some issues and 
continued disagreements over the most difficult issues” (Stent 2015, 50). McFaul (2018, 
75) reports that “by the time the Bush administration ended, American and Russian 
officials were barely talking to each other,” thus ending not only the Bush–Putin reset but 
the reset between USFPE and RFPE dating back to Reagan and Gorbachev. At the 
February 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin expressed grievances from Russia’s 
perspective: 
He lambasted America for attempting to be the world’s “one master, one 
sovereign.” He criticized the U.S. government’s use of military force, contending, 
“Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. 
Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of 
tension . . . plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts . . . One state 
and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national 
borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural, and 
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educational polities it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is 
happy about this?” (McFaul 2018, 72) 
 
McFaul reflects on this “shocking” turn: 
Putin perceived American hegemonic, unilateral military power as a threat to 
every country in the world, including Russia. He also expressed anger about 
NATO expansion and American missile-defense plans in Europe—abandoning 
the restraint he had shown several years earlier when those proposals were first 
announced. Putin went on to recommend ways to check American power. Most 
importantly: ‘The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is 
sanctioned by the UN.’ He called upon the entire world to help him constrain the 
American threat. (McFaul 2018, 72) 
 
But how had the relationship fallen so thoroughly? Legvold (2016) identifies three 
primary causes for the breakdown: (1) the U.S. rush to war in Iraq in 2003; (2) the terror 
attack in Beslan that led to many deaths (especially children) and led to “Putin’s sharp 
tightening of political control within Russia – muzzling political opposition, shrinking the 
room for civic action, cracking down on the media, and centralizing political control” 
(104); and (3) the “color” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Legvold 
observes, 
Years later, when looking back over intervening events, Putin and his closest 
advisors convinced themselves that the United States had not simply stumbled 
into Iraq, Libya, and Syria but had been pursuing a conscious, systematic strategy 
of regime change as a means of achieving larger strategic objectives. Ukraine was 
the latest and boldest instance, with in this case Russia as the target. (Legvold 
2016, 105) 
 
This level of failed relationship took several years to develop. One of the most 
significant turning points was the 2003 decision by USFPE to invade Iraq: 
President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq delivered a more devastating blow to 
bilateral relations. Putin adamantly denounced Bush’s justification for invasion, 
asserting in chorus with many other leaders around the world, including several 
American allies, that there was no evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. 




However, it was not merely the decision to invade Iraq but the way in which it happened: 
In 2003—before Russian interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014—
the Russian president championed the inviolability of state sovereignty as a 
central principle of the international order. He especially detested the use of force 
for regime change and America’s brazen disrespect for the United Nations 
Security Council. Russa had a veto within the Security Council, a key instrument 
of Russian foreign policy at a time of lesser Russian economic and military 
power; by invading Iraq without the council’s approval, Bush was also 
diminishing an instrument of Russian power. (McFaul 2018, 67) 
 
Thus, the breakdown in relationship was not only about the USFPE policy goals but also 
the ways in which USFPE pursued those interests and how they affected RFPE: 
The Kremlin’s explanation goes like this. The West takes Russia for granted, 
swallows concessions and offers only snubs in return. Russia abandoned the 
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, on the strict understanding that NATO would 
not expand to the former Warsaw Pact countries. Yet that is exactly what 
happened. Far from winding up, or staying as a backstop security organization, 
NATO started offensive operations for the first time in its history, intervening in 
ex-Yugoslavia to bomb Serbia, a traditional Russian ally. That cold shoulder 
during the 1990s demoralized the pro-Westerners in the Yeltsin Kremlin. Now, at 
least in some Russian eyes, the West has treated Mr. Putin equally shabbily. In 
2006, a former top Kremlin aide, Aleksandr Voloshin, went on a semi-official 
mission to explain Russia’s frustration to American decision-makers, outlining 
what Mr. Putin had done since 11 September 2001. This included offering 
unprecedented intelligence and security cooperation against militant Islamism, 
closing the two main overseas bases inherited from the Soviet Union and allowing 
America to use air bases in Central Asia to support the attack on the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. All that, Mr. Voloshin argued, had exposed Mr. Putin to sharp 
criticism from hawks in the Kremlin. He had assured them that a bold gesture to 
America would pay dividends. But instead, America continued to interfere in 
Russia’s backyard, stoking popular revolutions in Ukraine and George, bringing 
the Baltic states into NATO and talking about new bases in Eastern Europe. 
(Lucas 2008, 259) 
 
Stent (2015, 50) reflects that while “Americans may question Russia’s interpretation of 
what happened after 9/11, but, in the perceptions of Putin and his colleagues, America’s 
disregard of Russian interests remains a key driver of Russian policy.” Lucas observes, 
Some Westerners may find it mildly offensive that their support for security, 
freedom and justice in ex-communist countries, and attempts to prevent genocide 
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in Bosnia and Kosovo, are dismissed as nothing more than self-interested 
geopolitics. Such arguments seem to make no impact, however: in 2006 Mr. Putin 
apparently decided that it was pointless trying to maintain a warm friendship with 
the West. Instead, Russia would have to gain respect by talking, and acting, 
toughly. (Lucas 2008, 260–61) 
The Role of Culture 
Critical Decisions or Interpretations that May Be of Importance 
There are several possible culturally-based decisions and interpretations that may 
be of importance. For example, Bush’s comment about seeing Putin’s soul may not only 
have been a “rookie mistake,” as McFaul noted, but might also point to the difference in 
understanding of soul for Americans and Russians. For the latter, the concept is 
particularly important and weighty, and Bush’s comment seems not to accord it 
appropriate seriousness. 
The difference in the importance of interdependence is another likely area of 
cultural tension. USFPE acted, on Iraq in particular, in a manner characteristic of the 
individualistic and egalitarian American culture. When the objective of invading Iraq 
could not be achieved through subordination to the authority (UNSC), the United States 
moved on and pursued the objective nonetheless. While this of course has plenty of 
connection to conceptions of sovereignty, the failure to go through the UNSC had 
repercussions for RFPE’s sense of both sovereign defense and prestige. This disconnect 
between the two states was thus not only strategic and rational but also cultural. That 
USFPE’s actions also threatened RFPE’s sense of order was also problematic (culturally) 
for RFPE; RFPE did not share the future-oriented optimism that USFPE had, instead 
being fatalistic about disruptions to order. In fact, RFPE’s concerns about destabilization 
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proved to be well founded, but this should not overshadow the fact that cultural ways of 
knowing seemed to change what each side “saw” as they looked at the situation. 
The above concerns are important, but perhaps one of the most important cultural 
factors that was likely misinterpreted by the USFPE relates to the Russian cultural 
tendency to “seek extreme solutions . . . and to lurch from one set of cultural patterns to 
their diametrical opposite” (Hosking 2001, 22). In particular, RFPE’s movement toward 
the United States and the West was an extreme solution after 9/11, and USFPE seems to 
have taken this movement for granted as collaboration against a specific form of evil. 
However, for RFPE, this appears to have been a solution to restoring Russia’s place in 
the world. When USFPE continued to fail to restore Russia’s place in the world, it was 
only a matter of time before Russia could be expected lurch to the diametrical opposite, 
which in fact took place and was most visibly signaled at the Munich Security 
Conference of 2007. Stent reflects on what RFPE had tried to accomplish: 
In the decade since the terrorist attacks, Putin has on numerous occasions 
complained to visiting Americans that the United States failed to live up to the 
commitments that were implicit in the post-9/11 bargain. There is a general 
consensus, as one Russian put it, that “Putin was interested in an equal partnership 
of unequals.” In return for supporting the United States, Putin hoped that Russia 
would be accepted as part of the international entourage that decides everything. 
John Beyrle, former ambassador to Russia, agrees: “Russia was looking for 
respect and acknowledgement that Russia’s voice mattered and that the United 
States would listen to Russia and act as if its opinions mattered.” Igor Ivanov 
emphasizes that Russia wanted a new partnership against new threats. “We 
wanted an anti-terrorist international coalition like the anti-Nazi coalition. This 
would be the basis for a new world order.” (Stent 2015, 69) 
 
McFaul reflects on the shift RFPE experienced as USFPE continued to disappoint RFPE: 
Putin resented Bush for dismissing his warnings about the risks of an invasion. 
Saddam Hussein, in Putin’s view, held Iraq together with an iron fist; his removal 
would destabilize the country and the surrounding region. Being repeatedly 
ignored on this point fueled Putin’s frustration with the United States. Had Bush 
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engaged with Putin, as he explained to President Obama when they met in 
Moscow in July 2009, the United States and Russia might have been able to 
cooperate even on Iraq. Above all else, Putin wanted to be a player, a key decision 
maker, in global affairs, but Bush denied him that role, or so Putin perceived, 
especially regarding Iraq. The American invasion also validated Putin’s earlier 
assumptions about the United States. Bush had deceived him with friendly talk 
about the United States and Russia being allies in the fight against terrorism. 
Instead, Putin now returned to his original theory about the United States as an 
imperial hegemon, which uses force to achieve its objectives. As leader of one of 
the world’s few powers not controlled by the United States, Putin believed that 
Russia had to resist and counterbalance American hegemony and defend state 
sovereignty. The flirtation with partnership after September 11 had been a 
mistake. (McFaul 2018, 67) 
Counterfactual Narrative 
The counterfactual narrative will focus on this final cultural factor. It is 
understood here that USFPE in fact failed to understand that RFPE’s rapprochement after 
9/11 was not due to a gradual warming to the West but instead an extreme solution. The 
counterfactual thus introduces one plausible change: the US President functioned from an 
adaptation perspective of intercultural competence when perceiving RFPE’s movement 
toward the US after 9/11. 
<Begin Counterfactual 3> 
After 9/11, Putin moved aggressively in support of the US. Bush was, naturally, 
pleased by Putin’s sudden warmth and even more pleased that RFPE was making 
concrete movements toward the USFPE’s positions in support of the War on 
Terror. Bush was particularly surprised by the muted reaction when USFPE began 
pursuing defense. While he was pleased that RFPE seemed not to push back 
meaningfully on this, Bush began to wonder what was really going on. 
He stopped and considered RFPE’s perception of and interactions toward 
the US over the past couple of decades. While Bush was tempted to congratulate 
himself on RFPE’s sudden nearness to the US, he realized that this was likely 
RFPE’s way of testing an extreme solution to a problem that RFPE had accurately 
identified well before USFPE had learned to take it seriously: Islamic terrorism. 
As Bush thought about this, he began to consider the what deeper 
implications of partnership with the West would be for RFPE. It would mean, in 
some ways, further degradation of world standing – a further admission of being 
wrong in the Cold War. Unless it was accompanied by specific prestige rewards 
that would help stabilize Russia’s standing in the world (both internal self-
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perception and external perception), and unless those prestige rewards could also 
be translated to the domestic audience in RFPE’s two-level game, Bush realized 
that the rapprochement would be short-lived and that, given Russian cultural 
tendencies toward contradiction, Russia would swing hard away from the US and 
the West. 
Bush observed that rather than being an encouraging sign of steady 
Russian growth and optimism regarding the West, he was instead facing a 
potential crisis with Russia. Failure to deliver on whatever rewards RFPE thought 
it would get out of this relationship would be devastating to US–Russian relations. 
Bush then had to decide whether or not this mattered. After all, Russia was 
not really a peer in his mind. What would it cost the US to use Russian goodwill 
for now and then to oppose Russia later if it did indeed swing away? Still, greater 
integration with the West could eventually lead to greater liberalization and 
democratization, which served Bush’s foreign policy agenda of making the world 
safe for democracy. 
Taking all these things in mind, Bush determined in 2002 to at least make 
a show of actively consulting Russia. He directed his team to begin strategically 
including Russia on “small” international decisions to test RFPE’s inclinations 
while also providing some small prestige rewards to RFPE. In order to give 
himself cover from the charge of being soft on Russia, Bush primarily conducted 
this test policy through existing international organizations both nations sat on. 
His team was directed to actively seek the Russian perspective and to represent it 
inasmuch as it corresponded to US interests. 
This exercise of perspective-taking among his foreign policy team had two 
benefits. First, Putin and RFPE, receiving the desired prestige rewards, sought 
more opportunities for US/Russo cooperation. Second, when discussions about 
Iraq became serious, Bush’s foreign policy team had developed a reasonably well-
informed perspective on Russia’s concerns about this potential action. 
Thus, as the push for the Iraq War began to reach the stage of international 
partnership development, Bush called for a summit with Putin to discuss the way 
forward. Putin, having received prestige rewards not only along the way but also 
from this summit, was amenable to finding some kind of solution for USFPE 
regarding Iraq. However, given the warming relationship with US and Russia, 
Bush also realized that Putin’s concerns about Iraq were not only self-interested 
but reflected real concerns about the future of the region and how Islamic 
terrorism might actually be furthered by the regime change Bush wanted to 
pursue. 
At the end of the day, Bush had entered office determined to pursue 
regime change in Iraq, so the commitment would not waiver. However, he knew 
that failure to honor the liberal international institutions such as the UNSC would 
ultimately lead to Russia’s retrenchment into an anti-West posture, so he 
committed himself to finding another way forward. 




The United States has engaged in open conflict against Iraq multiple times in the 
last thirty years, most notably in 1990/1991, 1998, and 2003. The former and latter of 
these were considered in this chapter. Additionally, the United States has been in an 
ongoing process of working to reset its relationship with Russia since the faltering and 
fall of the Soviet Union over approximately the same time frame. There are many 
complex reasons for the ways in which those dyadic relationships have played out. This 
chapter has neither attempted to offer a theory-of-everything nor to offer a parsimonious 
explanation for the conduct of those states. Instead, the program of this chapter has been 
to argue that while other research programs (such as neoclassical realism) can explain 
much, that culture (including the accurate perception of and relation to cultural difference 
and similarity) is an important element related to accurate perception and decision 
making. 
As such, the chapter utilized three case studies to test hypotheses related to the 
influence of culture. Before engaging the case studies, this chapter presented three 
exemplary (not exhaustive) sets of plausible cultural values: one each for the United 
States, Iraq, and Russia. Three cases were considered: US/Iraq 1990, US/Iraq 2003, and 
US/Russia following 9/11. The first two were most similar systems design. The last one 
was a modified most different systems design when held in contrast with the first two. 
After a presentation of the historical events, critical decisions or interpretations were 




Finally, each of the three cases presented a counterfactual narrative based on one 
plausible difference: intercultural competence on the part of the USFPE. This was 
understood to be a plausible difference because intercultural competence can be trained, 
as demonstrated by the Intercultural Development Inventory (see Chapter Two: Literature 
Review). The counterfactual narratives were intentionally limited in scope: no attempt 
was made to explain away or undercut the geopolitical realities that shaped the events as 
they actually happened. Instead, one particular interpretation was targeted for the 
intervention of counterfactual interpretation, and only by one actor (the United States, in 
each case). Each case showed a markedly different trajectory in at least one key area of 
the conflict, even though it is ultimately unclear whether other factors would ultimately 
have overshadowed the counterfactual move. 
However, this limitation is balanced by the reality that if the FPE of either dyadic 
member actually possessed and practiced intercultural competence (adaptive frame-
shifting), such would not be limited to only one interpretation but would rather lead to an 
ongoing perceptual difference. Whether or not such perceptual difference would in fact 
lead to policy difference depends on the relation between these perceptual interpretations 
and other geopolitical and domestic factors and this is necessarily beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Yet it is clear that even in the modest counterfactual adjustments 
demonstrated here, such a change could have far-reaching consequences. The following 
chapter evaluates the hypotheses against each of these case studies, and provides an 
overall analysis of the research in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER VI – ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter presented three case studies, each of which concluded with a 
counterfactual narrative that posited a different outcome for each case if one factor had 
been plausibly different. In each case, the factor selected for change was that the United 
States Foreign Policy Executive (USFPE) was functioning from an Adaptation level of 
intercultural competence. This chapter presents an analysis of each of those case studies 
individually and of the three case studies examined together. Before engaging in the 
analysis, the goals for that process are discussed. 
Goals for Analysis 
This eclectic dissertation incorporates multiple theoretical frames and processes. 
Although this leads to a certain amount of complexity, it is consistent with Bennett and 
Checkel’s first (of three) standards for process tracing: namely that, meta-theoretically, 
process tracing should be “grounded in a philosophical base that is ontologically 
consistent with mechanism-based understandings of social reality and methodologically 
plural” (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 21; emphasis added). This dissertation is precisely 
that. They also argue that process tracing must pay attention to both the context and the 
structures which give rise to processes (more complexity) as well as pay careful attention 
to alternative explanations and “take equifinality seriously” (21). Regarding this last 
point, Pouliot observes that in the practice tracing form of process tracing, 
the causal chains traced in a study are never the sole possible ones and attention 
should be paid to other scenarios. A practice analysis is always provisional and 
must remain open to contestation and revision because configurations of practices 
are so complex and shifting that one can never claim to have found the one causal 




The expected analytical outcome of this dissertation is necessarily provisional. 
This is not a problem given the interpretivist framing of the question. However, it does 
lead to some methodological complexity, given “the relationship between interpretivists 
and process tracers is one of mutual neglect, if not outright suspicion and even contempt. 
This is arguably puzzling given that on the face of it, these two groups of scholars would 
seem to have quite a few things in common” (Pouliot 2015, 237). Pouliot suggests two 
tenets of a blended approach he calls practice tracing: 
Social causality is to be established locally, but with an eye to producing 
analytically general insight. The first tenet, drawn primarily from interpretivism, 
posits the singularity of causal accounts: it is meaningful contexts that give 
practices their social effectiveness and generative power in and on the world. The 
second tenet, in tune with process analytics, holds that no social relationships and 
practices are so unique as to foreclose the possibility of theorization and 
categorization. Practice tracing seeks to occupy a methodological middle ground 
where patterns of meaningful action may be abstracted away from local contexts 
in the form of social mechanisms that can travel across cases. The added value of 
practice tracing, in terms of allowing for dialogue between process tracing and 
interpretivism, lies in simultaneously upholding singular causality and analytical 
generality. (Pouliot 2015, 237–38) 
 
So, unlike a positivist approach, the analytical fruit of this effort departs 
epistemologically from the “scientific realist assertion that social mechanisms are out 
there, as ontological entities in the world” and instead focuses on social practices, which 
“describe ways of doing things that are known to practitioners” (Pouliot 2015, 238). 
Pouliot explains further: 
The analytical generality that practice tracing aspires to cannot be validated 
through empirical testing, as if holding a mirror between models and data. . . . Just 
like typologies, practice theories are neither true nor false, but useful (or not) in 
making sense of messy arrays of practices . . . in the social world, practices elicit 




If complex, messy practices are in view, then what do results look like and to what can 
they be applied? Pouliot considers this question at length: 
For its part, analytical generality is achieved through a different kind of reasoning 
– essentially, but abstracting practices away from specific contexts. Herein occurs 
a fundamental shift at the level of validity. The validity of a generalization rests 
with its holding true across empirical occurrences, whereas the validity of 
analytical generality lies in its being useful to explain various cases. By 
implication, analytical generality cannot be true or false; only useful or not . . . . 
Ultimately, this usefulness (in helping understand connections between practices) 
is intimately tied to contextualization, because a causal account is always local. 
The logic of generality serves the purpose of highlighting the contextual 
peculiarities that grant given practices certain generative powers. In this scheme, 
it would not make sense to test (allegedly) deductive hypotheses against 
mechanisms, hoping for empirical confirmation or falsification. For one thing, 
local causality is inferred through the interpretation of contextual data, not from 
some sort of predetermined or a-contextual logic. Practice tracing is thus an 
abductive methodology, based on the joining together of empirics and analytics. 
By implication, claims about empirical regularities do not precede process tracing, 
but follow from interpretive analysis. For another thing, social mechanisms are 
abstracted away from context: their whole point is to depart from reality, not to 
match it. As such, the mechanisms coined by researchers do not have empirical 
referents that would make them true or false. Instead of testing theoretical 
constructs, then, one should show their heuristic usefulness in explaining social 
phenomena across cases or even classes of cases. (Pouliot 2015, 252) 
 
However, because such results are potentially very squishy, it is helpful to utilize 
a standard matrix by which specific statements can be utilized. For this purpose, 
Bennett’s (2010) four tests for causation will be utilized for each of the following five 
questions, repeated on a case-by-case basis: 
1. Did differences in the shame, honor/guilt, innocence dimension affect the actors’ 
understanding of the situation? How so? 
2. Did differences in the time orientation dimension affect the actors’ understanding 
of the situation? How so? 
3. Did differences in the authority dimension affect the actors’ understanding of the 
situation? How so? 
4. Did differences in the human nature dimension affect the actors’ understanding of 
the situation? How so? 
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5. Under ceteris paribus conditions, would adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one 
member of the dyad have changed the outcome of this event?55 
Table 10  
Process Tracing: Four Tests for Causation 
 
Bennett (2010, 210). The typology creates a new, two-dimensional framing of the alternative tests originally formulated by Van Evera 
(1997: 31–32). (b) In this figure, ‘‘establishing causation,’’ as well as ‘‘confirming’’ or ‘‘eliminating’’ a hypothesis, obviously does 
not involve a definitive test. Rather, as with any causal inference, qualitative or quantitative, it is a plausible test in the framework of 
(a) this particular method of inference and (b) a specific data set. 
In summary, each case will present the five questions listed above and run 
through Bennett’s tests for causation. Then, the analytical results will be narratively 
summarized for each case in a form that reflects the following attributes: 
• contextually sensitive, locally derived 
• analytically generalizable 
• provisional equifinality 
• process and practice oriented 
• heuristically useful56 
Finally, in the combined analysis across all three cases a response to Q2, Q3, H2, and H3 
will be considered: 
Q2: Can the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 be expected to matter 
in the conduct of international relations? 
 
 
55 Adaptive frame-shifting capacity is described in Chapter Two: Literature Review. 
56 This list built on a combination of Pouliot (2015) and Bennett and Checkel (2015). 
 Sufficient to Establish Causation 





Straw in the Wind  
Passing affirms relevance of hypothesis but 
does not confirm it. Failing suggests 
hypothesis may not be relevant, but does not 
eliminate it. 
Smoking Gun 
Passing confirms hypothesis. 
Failing does not eliminate it. 
Yes 
Hoop 
Passing affirms relevance of hypothesis but 
does not confirm it. Failing eliminates it. 
Doubly Decisive 
Passing confirms hypothesis and 
eliminates others. 
Failing eliminates it. 
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Q3: Can intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which such 
differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
 
H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation meaningfully affects changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
Case Study Analyses 
Case Study Analysis 1: US / Iraq 1990 
Chapter Three: Methodological Approach presented an operationalization of the 
following cultural frameworks: shame, honor/guilt; time orientation; authority; and 
human nature. Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning 
presented evidence that such cultural differences both exist and have meaningful effect 
even within the same epistemic community. Chapter Five: Case Studies with 
Counterfactuals presented a case study of the event under consideration. This section now 
assesses whether the case demonstrated the important frameworks in practice. 
Additionally, Chapter Two: Literature Review presented a definition of intercultural 
competence, with special attention given to adaptive frame-shifting in intercultural 
competence. This analysis now considers the effect of each of these factors in turn, as 
relates to Case One: US / Iraq 1990. 
1. Did differences in the shame, honor / guilt, innocence dimension affect the actors’ 
understanding of the situation? How so? 
Differences on the shame, honor/guilt, innocence dimension played a role in the 
1990 crisis between Iraq and the United States. The Iraq Foreign Policy Executive (IFPE) 
interpreted the United States to have little honor, in part based on previous betrayals of 
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Iraq by the US and based on the US’s retreats from Lebanon and Vietnam. Meanwhile, 
USFPE seemed oblivious to IFPE’s sensitivity the shame incurred by Kuwait’s refusal to 
grant concessions to Iraq. USFPE also apparently was unaware of Saddam’s intolerance 
of public condemnation and responded with typical guilt and innocence proclamations 
and actions, none of which provided a non-shame-incurring way forward for IFPE and 
Saddam in particular (see Short-Term Responses in Chapter Five: Case Studies with 
Counterfactuals for more details). It is possible that Iraq had intended to withdrawal from 
Kuwait per its August 3 statement, but public shame closed this door. The relevance of 
the shame, honor/guilt, innocence continuum passes the hoop test: enough necessary data 
exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish 
causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it” 
(Bennett 2010, 210). 
2. Did differences in the time orientation dimension affect the actors’ understanding 
of the situation? How so? 
It is likely that differences in time orientation affected differences in the IFPE and 
USFPE understandings of the situation. One of the clearest differences is in relation to 
the question of “What is Iraq?,” particularly as relates to Kuwait. For USFPE, Kuwait’s 
status as a former part of Iraq was irrelevant based on attention to the present boundaries 
of states. For IFPE, it was deeply relevant because the past was a relevant part of present 
decision-making, and furthermore, the past when Kuwait was part of Iraq would appear 
more distant to USFPE than to IFPE. That difference alone would be sufficient to affirm 
the importance of the time dimension, but there was an additional divergence in 
interpretations regarding the withdrawal timeline. 
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IFPE and USFPE likely did not share the same perspective on the withdrawal 
timeline, given divergences in how time is perceived by the two groups. For USFPE, 
failure for IFPE to meet the January 15, 1991, deadline for withdrawal validated action 
on January 17. This is consistent with an approach to time, which emphasizes its 
sequential nature and the understanding of time as a resource to be managed. The US 
belief that failure to act “on time” demonstrates moral weakness likely undergirded and 
prompted American action so quickly after the fifteenth. IFPE did not share this view of 
time and likely did not interpret the timeline in the same way nor did IFPE likely perceive 
USFPE’s own sense of moral obligation to act with immediacy after the deadline expired. 
A similar situation likely occurred with Iraq’s initial commitment to withdrawal on 
August 3, 1990. USFPE expectation of immediacy of withdrawal led the US to push for 
condemnation, rather than wait for the Iraqi timeline. The relevance of the time 
orientation framework passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the 
relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing 
thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
3. Did differences in the authority dimension affect the actors’ understanding of the 
situation? How so? 
There were clear differences in the authority dimension. One of the biggest 
differences relates to cultural beliefs around the purpose of authority in government. 
USFPE’s cultural understanding of authority is that good and moral authority is a servant 
of the people and that leaders are not existentially or ontologically different from those 
they lead. IFPE’s cultural understanding was almost the opposite of this – strong 
leadership from an individual above the rest was understood to be a moral good (even if 
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the actions of that individual were sometimes immoral). USFPE perceived Saddam to be 
immoral in part because of a leadership image that was, at least somewhat, considered 
appropriate in his own cultural context. IFPE perceived US leadership to be weak for the 
same reasons in reverse. The relevance of the authority framework passes the hoop test: 
enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to 
sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but 
does not confirm it.” 
4. Did differences in the human nature dimension affect the actors’ understanding of 
the situation? How so? 
Differences in the human nature dimension relate to US understandings of 
personal responsibility, which come from the belief in improvability of the individual, 
society, the environment, and so on. This belief in improvability leads US actors to feel 
the weight of moral responsibility to act decisively to bring good about. USFPE clearly 
felt this moral responsibility, along with the weight of past US failures to act in a timely 
and decisive manner, especially regarding Hitler. The opportunity to create a new world 
order was not just something USFPE wanted to d but felt morally obligated to engage 
because of US understandings of human nature. This contrasts sharply with motivations 
in fatalistic contexts such as IFPE’s, and IFPE appears to have grossly misjudged 
USFPE’s moral will to act, stemming from a misjudgment of USFPE’s sense of moral 
responsibility rooted in this cultural framework. The relevance of the human nature 
dimension passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of 
this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms 
the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
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Intercultural Competence: Adaptive Frame Shifting 
5. Under ceteris paribus conditions, would adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one 
member of the dyad have changed the outcome of this event? 
The counterfactual demonstrates that even small changes based in intercultural 
competence would likely have altered the outcome of this event. Intercultural competence 
as operationalized in this dissertation involves accurately perceiving and relating to both 
cultural difference and cultural similarity. Hence, USFPE’s ability to accurately perceive 
IFPE’s dilemma, and to accurately relate to IFPE, would likely have changed the course 
of the event. This change is not dependent on intercultural competence on the part of both 
actors. The relevance of the adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one member passes the 
hoop test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not 
enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the 
hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
Analytical Summary for this Case 
In summary, Case One: US / Iraq 1990 demonstrates contextually sensitive, 
locally derived observations of the influence of cultural differences on an actual case of a 
dyadic interstate relationship. At the same time, these results may prove analytically 
generalizable if confirmed in additional cases. No attempt was made to demonstrate that 
any of the above five questions for Case One: US / Iraq 1990 passed the doubly decisive 
test because of the commitment to equifinality. These cultural factors and intercultural 
competence are understood to be only two elements of a complex of myriad factors, and 
they come alongside rather than replace those other factors. Nonetheless, the 
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counterfactual case narrative suggests real practices that impact real processes and which 
build understanding of actual events. 
Case Study Analysis 2: US / Iraq 2003 
Chapter Three: Methodological Approach presented an operationalization of the 
following cultural frameworks: shame, honor / guilt innocence; time orientation; 
authority; and human nature. Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian 
Reasoning presented evidence that such cultural differences both exist and have 
meaningful effects even within the same epistemic community. Chapter Five: Case 
Studies with Counterfactuals presented a case study of the event under consideration. 
This section now assesses whether the case demonstrated the important frameworks in 
practice. Additionally, Chapter Two: Literature Review presented a definition of 
intercultural competence, with special attention given to adaptive frame-shifting in 
intercultural competence. This analysis now considers the effect of each of these factors 
in turn, as relates to Case Two: US / Iraq 2003. 
1. Did differences in the shame, honor / guilt, innocence dimension affect the actors’ 
understanding of the situation? How so? 
Difference in shame, honor/guilt, innocence appears to have played a major role 
in actors’ divergent interpretations of the situations. Although realist posturing was likely 
also part of IFPEs motivation for feeding false rumors about its possession of WMDs, 
Iraq engaged in a critical miscalculation regarding how USFPE interprets adherence to 
standards through the guilt and innocence framework (see the previous chapter for more 
discussion of this feature). The relevance of the shame, honor/guilt, innocence continuum 
passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this 
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framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the 
relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
2. Did differences in the time orientation dimension affect the actors’ understanding 
of the situation? How so? 
USFPE engaged in a typically American cultural focus on the near future. 
Combined with optimism (see human nature dimension), this led USFPE to radically 
misinterpret or disregard readily available data regarding Iraqi society, the historical 
construction of identity, and the sense to which the United States would be interpreted as 
a liberator (rather than as an oppressor). Each of these miscalculations was due in part to 
US focus on the near future rather than on the past and represents a cultural disconnect 
vis-à-vis Iraq, which tends to be more focused on the relevance of the past. The relevance 
of the time orientation framework passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists to 
affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. 
Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
3. Did differences in the authority dimension affect the actors’ understanding of the 
situation? How so? 
Differences in the authority dimension may have affected the actors’ 
understanding of the situation – particularly around the importance of the leader in 
constructing Iraqi identity. USFPE apparently did not realize that removal of the leader, 
Saddam, would also result in destruction of the shared identity; whether that shared 
identity was perceived negatively or positively by those who held it is beside the point. 
The USFPE decapitation strategy was militarily effective in the short run but societally 
disastrous (as predicted by Russia) leading to long-term instability. However, USFPE 
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lacked the cultural resources to adequately understand this because leader images in the 
United States have traditionally been much more egalitarian and short term. The 
relevance of the authority framework passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists 
to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish 
causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
4. Did differences in the human nature dimension affect the actors’ understanding of 
the situation? How so? 
The USFPE assessment of Saddam as evil played a role in how USFPE 
approached the conflict with Iraq. Because USFPE reduced the world to an essentialized 
choice between good and evil, a choice that is consistent with American cultural values, 
those who are on the “evil” side were construed as posing a particular threat that must be 
dealt with. IFPE did not share this construal of the events and likely misjudged the 
intensity with which USFPE might aggress against an adversary deemed evil. 
Additionally, cultural factors related to human capacity and responsibility to enact 
positive change (optimism) led to culturally divergent interpretations of the situation 
between USFPE and IFPE. The relevance of the human nature dimension passes the hoop 
test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not 
enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the 
hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
Intercultural Competence; Adaptive Frame Shifting 
5. Under ceteris paribus conditions, would adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one 
member of the dyad have changed the outcome of this event? 
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The counterfactual demonstrates that even small changes based in intercultural 
competence would likely have resulted in changes in the conduct of the conflict. No 
attempt was made to argue that the United States would not have invaded Iraq, although 
that is certainly possible. Instead, a much more modest argument was posited: the self-
awareness concomitant with Adaptive Frame Shifting would have led USFPE to conduct 
the campaign differently. Interestingly, even more difference would have been possible 
had IFPE also been able to access adaptive frame-shifting capacity: for example, IFPE 
likely would have explained its relation to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in a 
way more intelligible to Washington to avoid or publicly delegitimize the decapitation 
attack (for a US audience). This would have been rational for an IFPE that actually 
understood USFPEs cultural interpretation of the events. Thus, frame-shifting capacity by 
either member of the dyad (and even more so that capacity exercised by both) would 
likely have changed the outcome of this event. The relevance of the adaptive frame-
shifting capacity by one member passes the hoop test: enough necessary data exists to 
affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. 
Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
Analytical Summary for this Case 
In summary, Case Two: US / Iraq 2003 demonstrates contextually sensitive, 
locally derived observations of the influence of cultural differences on an actual case of a 
dyadic interstate relationship. At the same time, these results may prove analytically 
generalizable if confirmed in additional cases. No attempt was made to demonstrate that 
any of the above five questions for Case Two: US / Iraq 2003 passed the doubly decisive 
test because of the commitment to equifinality. These cultural factors, and intercultural 
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competence, are understood to be only one element of a complex of myriad factors, and 
they come alongside, rather than replace, those other factors. Nonetheless, the 
counterfactual case narrative suggests real practices that impact real processes and which 
build understanding of actual events. 
Case Study Analysis 3: US / Russia 2001 
Chapter Three: Methodological Approach presented an operationalization of the 
following cultural frameworks: shame, honor/guilt, innocence; time orientation; 
authority; and human nature. Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian 
Reasoning presented evidence that such cultural differences both exist and have 
meaningful effect even within the same epistemic community. Chapter Five: Case 
Studies with Counterfactuals presented a case study of the event under consideration. 
This section now assesses whether the case demonstrated the important frameworks in 
practice. Additionally, Chapter Two: Literature Review presented a definition of 
intercultural competence, with special attention given to adaptive frame-shifting in 
intercultural competence. This analysis now considers the effect of each of these factors 
in turn, as relates to Case Three: US / Russia 2001. 
1. Did differences in the shame, honor / guilt, innocence dimension affect the actors’ 
understanding of the situation? How so? 
Little evidence exists to suggest that a disconnect regarding shame and honor was 
important in this event. However, difference in interpretations of guilt and innocence still 
seem to have been important. The US belief that it could justify its own actions (as in 
Iraq, in 2003) as innocent while the same US president’s administration later condemned 
Russia’s actions (as in Georgia, in the summer of 2008) as guilty were not only 
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problematic for RFPE but also likely triggered power and fear interpretations (see Russia 
cultural profile in previous chapter for a discussion) of Washington’s exercise of power. 
USFPE, meanwhile, would not have been aware of this trigger, given its capacity to 
construe the event in merely guilt and innocence terms. Thus, the same actions and words 
meant different things to the two actors because of their different cultural frameworks to 
interpret them. The relevance of the shame, honor / guilt, innocence continuum passes the 
straw in the wind test: enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this 
framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the 
relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
2. Did differences in the time orientation dimension affect the actors’ understanding 
of the situation? How so? 
The United States and Russia do not share the same view of time, with a 
particular contrast noted between Russian pessimism toward the future and American 
optimism toward the future. The US understanding of time as a commodity to be 
managed certainly influenced US movement regarding Iraq in 2003, which was a 
particular area of tension between the two states. USFPE and RFPE did not interpret the 
moment in which they found themselves in the same way in part due to their view of 
time. The relevance of the time orientation framework passes the hoop test: enough 
necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to 
sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but 
does not confirm it.” 
3. Did differences in the authority dimension affect the actors’ understanding of the 
situation? How so? 
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It is unclear whether differences in the authority dimension were important in 
these events. The relevance of the authority framework fails the straw in the wind test, 
which does not eliminate it. The authority dimension should be revisited in future 
research regarding the USFPE / RFPE dyad. 
4. Did differences in the human nature dimension affect the actors’ understanding of 
the situation? How so? 
The human nature dimension apparently played a role, as USFPE misunderstood 
the importance and meaning of the Russian “soul.” USFPE also misunderstood the extent 
to which Western values are seen as a threat to the Russian “soul” and thus did not 
recognize the extent to which Russia’s attempted rapprochement with the West (and the 
US in particular) was actually an extreme solution rather than a gradual warming. The 
relevance of the human nature orientation framework passes the hoop test: enough 
necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to 
sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but 
does not confirm it.” 
Intercultural Competence; Adaptive Frame Shifting 
5. Under ceteris paribus conditions, would adaptive frame-shifting capacity by one 
member of the dyad have changed the outcome of this event? 
Although the counterfactual stops short of explaining exactly how things would 
have been different in the end, its trajectory suggests that the United States would have 
tried to interact with Russia differently if USFPE had been able to frame-shift and 
understand Russia’s behavior with greater accuracy. It is reasonable to suggest the series 
of small adjustments by USFPE suggested in the counterfactual would have had a 
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material impact on the conduct of international affairs. The relevance of the adaptive 
frame-shifting capacity by one member passes the hoop test: enough necessary data 
exists to affirm the relevance of this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish 
causation. Passing thus “affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
Analytical Summary for this Case 
In summary, Case Three: US / Russia 2001 demonstrates contextually sensitive, 
locally derived observations of the influence of cultural differences on an actual case of a 
dyadic interstate relationship. At the same time, these results may prove analytically 
generalizable if confirmed in additional cases. This case had more limited results than the 
first two for the guilt and innocence framework, and it had a failed straw in the wind test 
for the authority dimension. Additionally, no attempt was made to demonstrate that any 
of the above five questions for Case Three: US / Russia 2001 passed the doubly decisive 
test because of the commitment to equifinality. However, despite the limitations in two of 
the frameworks, the other two cultural factors and the intercultural competence 
dimension are found to be relevant. These elements are understood to be only one 
element of a complex of myriad factors, and they come alongside, rather than replace, 
those other factors. Nonetheless, the counterfactual case narrative suggests real practices 
that impact real processes and which build understanding of actual events. 
Combined Analysis 
Two of the four cultural frameworks were found to be relevant enough to pass the 
hoop test in every case: time orientation and human nature dimension. One of the 
frameworks – shame, honor / guilt, innocence passed the hoop test in two of three cases, 
and it passed the less rigorous straw in the wind test in the third. The final framework – 
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authority dimension – was found to be relevant enough to pass the hoop test in two of the 
three cases but failed to pass the less rigorous straw in the wind test in the third (which 
does not eliminate it). 
However, it is intercultural competence that is demonstrated to be the most 
potentially powerful influence on the conduct of international relations. Given that this 
culture-general approach can be utilized with respect to any type of cultural difference, 
not just the four frameworks considered herein, intercultural competence was able to 
function effectively both within and outside of preestablished categories of cultural 
difference. The Research Questions and Hypotheses are evaluated as follows: 
Q1: Can cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of actors from 
different cultures to arrive at shared meanings of shared texts and events? 
 
Q1 was answered affirmatively in Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within 
Global Christian Reasoning. 
Q2: Can the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 be expected to 
matter in the conduct of international relations? 
 
Q2 is answered affirmatively. 
Q3: Can intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which 
such differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
 
Q3 is answered affirmatively. 
H1: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
 




H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts 
and events. 
 
H2 passes the hoop test. Enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of 
this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms 
the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation meaningfully affects changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
 
H3 passes the hoop test. Enough necessary data exists to affirm the relevance of 
this framework but not enough to sufficiently establish causation. Passing thus “affirms 
the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it.” 
Analytical Summary for the Chapter 
As was discussed in Chapter One: Introduction of this dissertation, one of the 
great difficulties in assessing the effects of cultural difference on international relations is 
that it is a squishy subject. This chapter will no doubt leave some readers with the 
conclusion that the only real finding of this dissertation is an affirmation of the fact of the 
squishiness of culture. However, given the commitment to equifinality, this project did 
not attempt to suggest that the mechanisms attributed to culture could not have been 
exercised by some other factor. Moreover, it is expected that the multitudinous variables 
anticipated by neoclassical realists like Ripsman, Lobell, and Taliaferro (2016) are in fact 
very important, as are Putnam’s (1988) two-level games and Jervis’s (1976) traditional 
understandings of perception and misperception. Cultural analysis does not supplant any 
of these, and even the most expert exercise of intercultural competence may not redirect 
the force of those influences. However, this chapter does strongly suggest that such 
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realist and neoclassical realist interpretations are insufficiently equipped to deal with the 
actual complexity of the world as it actually is if they do not also account for the real 
influence of cultural difference in affecting interpretations of the perceptions and actions 
of states. 
At the beginning of this chapter, a commitment was made to presenting results 
that met each of the following criteria: 
• contextually sensitive, locally derived 
• analytically generalizable 
• provisional equifinality 
• process and practice oriented 
• heuristically useful 
Each of these conditions has been met for each of the three cases. Additionally, taken 
together, this has happened for the project overall. Contextual sensitivity and local 
derivation is met through the generation of insights from three different cases. There are 
generalizable findings, with appropriate limitations – for example, the authority 
framework was found to possibly, but not always, be relevant to understanding cultural 
differences. Provisional equifinality was maintained throughout, as discussed above. 
Regarding the process and practice orientation, it is useful to consider that Chapter Five: 
Case Studies with Counterfactuals involved demonstrating the usefulness of the particular 
processes/practices associated with adaptive intercultural frameshifting. This was done in 
keeping with the following explanation of this process: 
In order to decipher the meaning of a practice, its practicality must be both alien 
and native to the interpreter’s own system of meanings. If, on the one hand, the 
meaning of a practice is too deeply embodied by the interpreter, chances are that 
it will remain invisible as a second nature. If, on the other hand, the logic of 
practicality is completely alien to the interpreter, then it may not be properly 
understood within its context. . . . Epistemically speaking, the researcher is sitting 
on the fence between the community of practitioners and that of researchers, a 
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position that generates a form of knowledge that is at once native and foreign. 
(Pouliot 2015, 244) 
 
The author of this dissertation was sitting on the fence between the practitioners and 
researchers, suggesting the potential application of the practices and processes of 
adaptive intercultural frameshifting in a field where its application has not heretofore 
been sufficiently demonstrated. This is also epistemologically consistent with the critical 
realist emphasis on creativity in knowing. Finally, this chapter has demonstrated the 
heuristic usefulness of intercultural analysis. There are features of international relations 
that cannot effectively be understood with any other tool. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has, in a manner consistent with practice tracing, yielded results that 
demonstrate the usefulness of the culture concept under investigation, without engaging 
an attempt to establish positivist truth regarding this. The assessment matrix established 
at the beginning of the present chapter anticipates this outcome as both appropriate and 
sufficient. The hoop test and the straw in the wind test were particularly useful in this 
regard, given that neither presents itself as sufficient to establish causation. The 
commitments to equifinality and to complex human processes, which do not yield a 
positivist rejection of the null, nonetheless provides a heuristically useful tool for 
assessing actual practices related to culture in International Relations (see Pouliot 2015, 
252 regarding the goal of heuristic usefulness). 
Specifically, this chapter has found affirmation for Q2 and Q3 and provisional 
(hoop test) affirmation of H2 and H3. No attempt was made to find full causal effect for 
H2 or H3, and none was found. Cultural factors as explored through the four frameworks 
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introduced in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach and examined in Chapter Four: 
Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning and Chapter Five: Case Studies 
with Counterfactuals are thus seen to be analytically relevant and causally ambiguous in 
international relations. These are only four of many frameworks, and the results related to 
the frameworks suggest that the many other frameworks also warrant further explanation. 
Beyond the cultural frameworks, intercultural competence, as introduced in 
Chapter Two: Literature Review, was found to be an important, potentially mitigating 
factor in international relations. However, because of the many other factors in 
international relations, intercultural competence was not expected to be, nor was 
demonstrated to be, a sufficient causal explanation for the conduct of international 
relations on its own. Nonetheless, adaptive intercultural frameshifting was shown in three 
cases – two most similar systems and one most different system – to be a potentially 
powerful lever for changing the course of international affairs at critical junctures. Not 
assessed in the counterfactual design was whether an ongoing practice of intercultural 
competence (as opposed to a one-off application of it) would yield greater changes. Also 
not assessed is whether the application of intercultural competence by both members of a 
dyad would also yield greater changes. While both of these seem likely to be the case, 
such an assertion would be beyond the scope of the present research. 
At the outset of this chapter, a commitment was made to occupying “a 
methodological middle ground where patterns of meaningful action may be abstracted 
away from local contexts in the form of social mechanisms that can travel across cases” 
(Pouliot 2015, 237). Despite the acknowledged and intentional limitations present in this 
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dissertation, the pattern of intercultural competence in particular is seen to be particularly 
important both within cases and, when abstracted, across cases. 
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CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSIONS 
Restatement of the Problem 
In Chapter One: Introduction, the following promised was made “this dissertation 
endeavors to demonstrate that cultural differences are real, pervasive, persistent, very 
deep, and that they have an important impact on the conduct of IR [International 
Relations].” In particular, the initial goal was to “demonstrate that cultures can vary to a 
greater extent than has been commonly imagined by authors of [works on] strategic 
culture within the field of IR” without relying on the reification and essentialism that 
have sometimes plagued cultural studies. It was expected that the findings could be very 
important for IR: 
Consider the case of an illocutionary or perlocutionary misfire between actors of 
states as proposed above. If the reason for the misfire is due to cultural factors 
outside of the actors’ awareness(es), and if attention could be brought to such 
factors, it would be important to do so. Alternative explanations may have 
damaging consequences. For example, if the explanation given is that “the other 
actor is a bad faith actor,” this can have significant ramifications in the conduct of 
international relations. On the other hand, being perceived as a bad faith actor 
when one believes oneself to be a good faith actor can itself have significant 
ramifications. (Chapter One: Introduction) 
Assessment of Extent of Validity of Hypotheses 
The most important goal of this concluding chapter is to assess the extent of the 
validity of the hypotheses on the basis of the evidence presented and analyzed in the 
evidentiary chapters of the dissertation. Three related questions shaped the direction of 
this research. First, at the most basic level, 
Q1: Can cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of actors from 
different cultures to arrive at shared meanings of shared texts and events? 
 
Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning addressed this 
question in depth through the consideration of the Global Christian Reasoning (GCR) 
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literature. By starting outside of IR literature, it was possible to assess whether such 
cultural differences exist and can be expected to be of importance within an epistemic 
community. This led to the affirmation of the first Hypothesis: 
H1: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and events. 
 
In particular, Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning 
found that cultural differences affected illocutionary and perlocutionary interpretations of 
shared texts and events. These differences were found to matter even within an epistemic 
community with shared commitments (GCR). Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture Within 
Global Christian Reasoning focused on, but was not limited to, four frameworks for 
cultural difference. Each of these found significant support within the GCR record. Those 
four frameworks were not intended to capture the whole range of cultural difference, and 
indeed, they did not. There were other significant themes of cultural difference that 
emerged, with significant depth of difference as observed in the area of 
preunderstandings. These deep differences further pointed to the need for culture-general 
intercultural competence if cultural differences are to be navigated effectively. 
The second research question was as follows: 
Q2: Can the difference in shared meanings described in Q1 be expected to matter 
in the conduct of international relations? 
 
In order to investigate this question, Chapter Five: Case Studies with Counterfactuals 
presented brief cultural profiles of three states: the United States, Iraq, and Russia. The 
caveat that states are poor proxies for cultural groups was acknowledged, while it was 
also expected that the FPE of each state nonetheless follow some sort of culturally 
predominant patterns. Chapter Five: Case Studies with Counterfactuals then presented 
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three dyadic case studies. Two were most similar systems design: US / Iraq 1990, US / 
Iraq 2003; and one introduced a most different systems design: US / Russia 2001. Each of 
these case studies were examined for the potential effects of culture. These resulted in the 
affirmation of H2: 
H2: Cultural differences meaningfully affect the ability of culturally different 
international relations actors to arrive at shared meanings from shared texts and 
events. 
 
As a clarification, the affirmation of “texts” necessarily moves outside of written texts to 
speech acts and other forms of “readable” communication. 
The third research question was as follows: 
Q3: Can intercultural adaptation meaningfully attenuate the ways in which such 
differences affect outcomes in the conduct of international relations? 
 
The final step of Chapter Five: Case Studies with Counterfactuals was to introduce the 
counterfactual narratives for each of the three case studies. In each of these, the changed 
variable was that one actor (the US Foreign Policy Executive [USFPE]) functioned from 
intercultural competence. Even though the counterfactual narratives were careful not to 
change too much, in order to maintain the plausibility of the suggested changes, they 
nonetheless resulted in profoundly different interpretations and outcomes in terms of the 
conduct of international relations. This further affirmed H2 and led to the affirmation of 
H3 as well: 
H3: If adopted, intercultural adaptation could meaningfully affect changes in the 
outcomes in the conduct of international relations. 
 
However, it is important to notice that while H1, H2, and H3 were all affirmed, H2 and 
H3 were affirmed through the hoop test of process tracing, which means that their 
relevance was affirmed. However, they were not tested through the Doubly Decisive test, 
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as the commitment to equifinality did not affirm a test that would eliminate other 
explanations. 
Limitations 
This final point is perhaps one of the greatest limitations of this research. The 
findings clearly indicate that both cultural difference and intercultural competence 
(understood here as adaptive frame-shifting) are relevant in the conduct of international 
relations. However, they are not understood to be sole causal elements, and consequently, 
they initially complicate rather than clarify the conduct of International Relations. 
Moreover, the squishy nature of the cultural general frameworks and the fact that cultures 
are not static and must not be essentialized may give the reader the initial impression that 
this is just muddying the waters. Such would be true if there was no heuristic value to the 
assessment of intercultural competence. However, intercultural competence is actively 
being assessed in the real world through the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI), 
and there are attendant trainings that take seriously both non-essentialized culture general 
frameworks and the possibility and actual practice of development of intercultural 
competence in individuals and organizations. 
A further limitation of the project is that it did not engage Popperian falsifiability. 
Epistemologically, this is acceptable within the interpretivist construct in which the 
dissertation was conducted. Nonetheless, it does present a potential weakness that should 
be taken seriously. The most important control for the risk of confirmation bias is the 
inclusion of multiple case studies. Additionally, the author did not know the likelihood of 
finding the anticipated results in advance, and he was open to the possibility that they 
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would not be found. This may be cold comfort to a committed positivist, but it is 
significant within interpretivism. 
Implications for the Literature 
The implications of this project are diverse. The primary strain of literature 
affected by the findings of this dissertation is the cultural project within international 
relations, which Lantis (2002, 2014) argues was stalled in the post Huntington era. The 
civilizational studies area may also benefit from the non-essentialized approach to culture 
presented here. Indeed, some of these findings seem likely to further the projects such as 
those of Katzenstein (2010) by providing an approach to cultural frameworks that could 
prove useful for future research. The international communication literature may also 
benefit from the utility of speech act theory as applied in Chapter Four: Analysis of 
Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning. 
While this project continues the messiness that plagues (especially interpretivist) 
interculturalist literature, it nonetheless presents a way in which that literature can engage 
with methods that are more recognizable within international relations, and political 
science more generally, through the use of most similar and most different case studies 
and counterfactual analysis. The constructivist strain of intercultural development theory 
is particularly advanced through this project through employing adaptive frame-shifting, 
rooted in cybernetic and radical constructivism. It is this constructivist undertaking that 
allowed development of the insights of the counterfactual narratives. 
Finally, Global Christian Reasoning may benefit from the application of cultural 
general frameworks. One thing that was noticed in GCR was that while many culturally 
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located sources did effectively describe the influence of culturally located factors, many 
did not. This would be a particularly interesting area of future growth for GCR. 
Implications for Practice 
This dissertation does not pretend to displace other explanations for the conduct 
of international relations. However, it does find that there are real-world effects of 
cultural difference that are not effectively addressed by the literature or practice of the 
conduct of international relations. Intercultural competence is not presented as a solution 
to end all conflict in the world. Indeed, Bennett (2004, 69–70) observes that an 
interculturally competent person could come to either the conclusion that the war in Iraq 
was or was not justified. Intercultural competence is thus not a panacea for world peace. 
However, the process of reasoning is significantly different from the position of 
intercultural competence than it is from ethnocentrism. This difference in process will 
necessarily produce a different type of conflict and will lead to more accurately perceived 
disagreements. Intercultural competence will also open the door for more accurate 
reconciliation of difference when the material aims are reconcilable. Material aims are 
not always reconcilable, so intercultural competence is not expected to prevent conflict in 
such cases. However, the addition of cultural misinterpretation to already fraught areas of 
perception and misperception in international relations clearly escalates the risk of 
miscalculation, as happened when Saddam (apparently) misrepresented IFPE’s 
possession of WMDs intentionally as discussed in Chapter Five: Case Studies with 
Counterfactuals. A whole literature and practice of intercultural competence development 
already exists, which means that the findings of this dissertation are actionable. 
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Reflections on the Methods and Directions for Future Research 
The eclectic approach in this dissertation is complicated, in response to the 
complex phenomena under investigation. Because it was uncertain whether evidences of 
intercultural frameworks in practice would be identifiable within the cases studies, the net 
was cast widely, which may lead to epistemological confusion. Given that cultural 
differences are shown here to have real (but not exclusive) relevance, future research 
could go much deeper into particular cases, utilizing a combination of deductive and 
inductive cultural frameworks to investigate how dyadic cases are impacted by the 
differences between those states. Additionally, the question of narratological differences 
was proposed in Chapter Three: Methodological Approach; however, Chapter Four: 
Analysis of Culture Within Global Christian Reasoning did not develop this theme. It is 
expected that there may be much more to be found in that area of inquiry and that 
intercultural competence (adaptive frame-shifting) would again prove relevant there. 
Regarding alternative methods, it seems unlikely that any large-scale regression 
analysis would be able to support the work of this project. Even though the IDI presents 
numerical results (on the Developmental Orientation scale) that could be analyzed 
through regression, the dynamics of FPE dyadic relationships are simply too complex for 
an effective study. There are simply too many moving pieces with too many potentially 
involved individuals. This complexity suggests that an attempt at quantitative analysis of 
the phenomena studied here would necessarily fall short of analytical clarity. 
Epistemologically, critical realism was shown to be useful in this research. 
Occupying a space between positivism and phenomenalism, this middle-way 
epistemology allows for the development of generalizable findings while also taking 
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seriously locally grounded experiences. The tool of creativity embraced by critical 
realism is also particularly useful for the process of practice tracing advocated by Pouliot 
(2015), in which the researcher (and in this case the author) stands on the fence between 
the practitioner and the research community, as an insider and outsider to both.57 
Closing Academic and Policy Recommendations 
This dissertation has accomplished its primary goals through a messy, eclectic 
process. The research questions were each pursued, resulting in affirmations of the 
relevance of each hypothesis. Given the methodological limitations of the study, it is not 
expected that the results will be readily accepted in non-interpretivist strains of the 
literature. However, a good-faith attempt has been made to reflect the complexities of 
International Relations as understood by scholars in that field. The weaknesses of the 
study have been openly admitted and future research directions have been suggested. The 
results do point to a significant and important role played by culture in the conduct of 
International Relations. That there is a ready response from the world of practitioners 
(IDI) suggests an immediate and practical way forward. Three areas of recommendation 
emerge out of this dissertation: policy recommendations, academic recommendations: 
research, and academic recommendations (pedagogy). Each is addressed in turn. 
Policy Recommendations 
This dissertation demonstrates that essentialized area-study and civilizational 
approaches are not the only way to gain insights into the cultural aspects of IR 
relationships. While such approaches may generate useful background information, they 
do not guarantee that the possessor of such information has any capacity to accurately 
 
57 The author has been an IDI qualified administrator since 2007 and thus has functioned as both 
practitioner and researcher at various points in the past. 
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understand and relate to his/her own culture or the target culture. Instead of utilizing 
essentialized knowledge, a process-oriented approach, such as that demonstrated here, is 
both replicable and flexible. New cultural data can be incorporated alongside old cultural 
data. The ongoing reflexive posture of intercultural competence (recalling its cybernetic 
constructivist roots among others) also allows for ongoing adjustment. But how can these 
competencies influence policy? 
Two very practical steps could easily be implemented within the USFPE context 
(and in other FPE contexts globally). The first is assessment and ongoing training in the 
Intercultural Development Inventory among strategically placed officials and their aids in 
the USFPE. This is affordable and effective and has a proven track record in other 
contexts. The second is the creation of offices of intercultural competence within US 
Foreign Policy organs such as the National Security Council, the Department of State, the 
Pentagon (and within each branch), the Department of Homeland Security, and the many 
intelligence services. Considering the billions of dollars and many lives that could be 
saved through the incorporation of such perspectives, the cost and effort would be 
relatively small compared with the potential payoff. There is a risk that this may sound 
like a normative moral commitment, a critique sometimes leveled against constructivism 
within IR (Farrell 2002). However, similar to Wendt’s (1999, 21) “practice-ethical 
motivation,” what is in view here is a behavioral pattern that actually can be changed by 
states – something over which they actually have control. Thus, even if a state’s only 
interest is in the self-interest of avoiding the loss of blood and treasure (and not, say, 
world peace), the intervention proposed here could still be useful. 
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A third policy solution would be to implement similar offices of intercultural 
competence in international organizations, particularly including the United Nations. 
Building accurate understanding of the self and the other is critical in effectively 
achieving the stated goals of many such institutions, and intercultural competence is an 
obvious path to this kind of understanding. International institutions frequently face the 
problem of perceived agreement built on top of the underlying failure to actually achieve 
agreement of the facts and meanings. This should not be surprising, given the robust 
differences in view within GCR as demonstrated by Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture 
Within Global Christian Reasoning. A future research project could investigate whether 
there is indeed evidence for, and whether there are effects of, ethnocentrism in such 
settings. 
Academic Recommendations: Research 
Regarding research, several recommendations may be made. First, this 
dissertation demonstrates that while eclectic approaches are messy and thus not always 
desirable, they can result in interesting and potentially important data that is not readily 
attained in more traditional research programs. Practice/process tracing, counterfactual 
analysis, and case study were all key to developing the major research findings (Chapter 
Five: Case Studies with Counterfactuals). Second, the decision to look outside the field 
under investigation (IR) into another field (GCR) to uncover features that were not 
readily understandable within IR also proved useful (Chapter Four: Analysis of Culture 
Within Global Christian Reasoning). Thus, the use of both interdisciplinary and eclectic 
approaches is encouraged in future research. 
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Academic Recommendations: Pedagogy 
There is, finally, a pedagogical question that may be important for scholars of IR. 
To the extent that students are taught within IR’s existing disciplinary norms and 
epistemological assumptions, those students may miss things that actually exist and 
influence the real-life conduct of IR. Some effort may be required to broaden the 
pedagogy of IR students in order to incorporate unexpected sources of knowledge. At a 
minimum, epistemological self-awareness should be introduced so limitations in 
students’ ways of knowing are acknowledged and gaps caused by such limitations can be 
mitigated. If this dissertation has accurately assessed its subject, then real-life decisions 
with real-life consequences are potentially hanging in the balance. 
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